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ABSTRACT
The American courts have become increasingly central to many important political
debates. The marriage equality debate, the boundaries between religious freedom
and society, the death penalty, eminent domain and many other contemporary issues
that have direct effects on the lives of all Americans continue to play out in the court
systems. While Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 82 sees the federal and state courts
as complementary, this research sees these courts as often-rival political venues that
political interests make strategic choices about taking legal actions in.
Prior research finds that political interests turn to the state courts for two reasons:
The structure of law creates a legal incentive and the political interests have access
to state level resources, e.g. attorneys skilled in the laws of a state. Yet, there appear
to be important gaps in existing theory. A distinction between state and national po-
litical interests is seemingly important. State political interests are embedded within
their state political communities; consequently these interests should have strong at-
tachments with their respective state courts. Also, state political interests can be
expected to select courts on the basis of political ideology and state judicial selection
methods. Prior research has shown the connection between these factors and judicial
decision-making, but not interest group participation.
To examine these areas of uncertainty, this research collected more than 3500
observations of the participation of political interests in the American courts. Two
legal areas were selected: eminent domain and marriage equality. Ultimately, this
study finds that state political interests develop strong attachments to their respective
state courts and are more likely to enter into the state courts than their nationally-
oriented counterparts. This research also finds that judicial ideology and state judicial
selection both influence the decision to enter into the state courts. This shows a
relationship between these factors and the decision to enter into the state courts. It
i
also suggests that these factors not only affect the choices that judges make, but other
actors as well, including political interests.
ii
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 State and Federal Courts as Rival Venues
The American courts, arguably, have emerged as ideal public policy venue. Alexis
de Tocqueville may have seen this the best, writing: “There is hardly a political
question in the United States which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial
one”(De Tocqueville 2003, p. 315). And, indeed, the American courts address many
if not most of the contemporary political controversies.
It is not only the American courts taken as a whole that have become an important
public policy venue, but also the state and federal courts, each constituting a separate
public policy venue. Political interests and interest groups often have a choice of
whether to pursue public policy in one court system or the other on a single issue.
Interestingly, Alexander Hamilton, unlike Alexis de Tocqueville, may have not seen
the growing importance of the American courts; otherwise, he may have argued for
separation of powers between the federal and state courts to prevent the concentration
of political power. Rather, Hamilton in Federalist 82 argues for a partnership between
the federal and state courts. Hamilton writes: “When in addition to this we consider
the State governments and the national governments, as they truly are, in the light of
kindred systems, and as parts of ONE WHOLE, the inference seems to be conclusive,
that the State courts would have a concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising under
the laws of the Union, where it is not expressly prohibited” (Madison, Hamilton and
Jay 1987, p. 460).
Yet, arguably, the federal and state courts have emerged as distinct policy venues,
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less the kindred siblings shown in Federalist 82, and more like the rival between the
state and federal governments shown in Federalist 51. Political interests in recent
times have sought out both the state and federal courts on a number of important
issues. These have included marijuana and drug policy, religious liberty, gay marriage,
abortion, gun control and immigration. Seemingly, political interests have made use
of the courts, whether state or federal, which were most advantageous. When policy
is not advantageous at the federal level, or with the national courts, political interests
can always turn to the states and state courts, and political interests have done exactly
this.
How, then, do political interests and political interest groups act in the context
of judicial federalism? Given the amount of activity in both the federal and state
courts in recent times, this is seemingly an important question. Nonetheless, political
scientists have done little research on interest groups and judicial federalism. Farole
(1998) gives the most complete account, arguing that the state courts are generally
not a desirable venue for political interests, which will turn to the state courts under
extraordinary conditions.
Existing research argues that there are two factors that drive political interests
to turn to the state courts (Farole 1998). The first is the jurisprudential structure of
American law. Political interests, then, will turn to the American courts when the law
creates incentives for these groups to do so. The second condition is organizational
threshold, which consists of two parts: goals and resources, of which resources is the
most important part. State legal resources include staff size, longevity and patron
support. (Farole 1998, p. 17-18) suggests these are important, yet his analysis looks
primarily at whether an interest group has cooperating state-level attorneys as its
measure of resources. To litigate at the state level, political interests require attorneys
who are skilled and knowledgeable in state law, which can, according to prior research,
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be difficult to find, particularly for interests far removed from the state court, perhaps
in Washington D.C. Goals captures the orientation of the group, which can be either
material or purposive, with purposive organizations most likely to enter into the state
courts.
1.2 Questions with Prior Research
Yet, this research, while important, leaves many questions to be examined. First,
there is not a distinction between state and national interests. The research makes
an assumption that political interests at both the national and state levels will act
similarly. This might not necessarily be true. State political interests are embedded
in state political communities. This may create an in-state political orientation,
which causes state political interests to turn to the state courts more often than their
national counterparts.
By not distinguishing between state and national political interests, prior research
may not show correctly why political interests enter into the state courts. For exam-
ple, prior research (Farole 1998) examines the participation of the state chapters of
the American Civil Liberties Union. Yet, this research categorizes these state chap-
ters as being part of the national organization. This conceptualization supports the
author’s assertion that political interests enter into the state courts when these groups
have access to state legal resources, but overlooks the possibility these chapters were
embedded in state politics and this state orientation motivated their participation in
the state courts. 1
Additionally, much of the prior research is qualitative, raising questions about
its representativeness (see King, Keohane and Verba 1994). Researchers studying
1Should the state chapters of national political interests be viewed as independent? Arguably,
yes, given that these chapters enter into the courts independently of their parent organizations.
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political interests and the courts have taken qualitative approaches, often doing case
studies. This is understandable, given the complexity of the legal environment and
the difficulty in finding data. There exist hundreds of legal areas in American law that
includes thousands of individual cases. Presently, it is very difficult for a researcher
to include all of the cases. Researchers then must select samples that they believe are
representative of the larger legal environment.
In previous research on political interests and judicial federalism, Farole (1998)
took a qualitative approach. In his research, he found political interest participation in
the courts using Westlaw, an online legal database used mostly by attorneys. He then
gained further information on these political interests through qualitative interviews
and other sources of information such as the Encyclopedia of Associations. In taking
this approach, this research limited its sample size considerably. First it selected
political interest participation from two legal areas: obscenity and eminent domain.
Second, it sampled participation from the courts in five states: Colorado, Indiana,
Minnesota, New Jersey and South Carolina. Third this research only sampled from
the U.S. Supreme Court, state supreme courts and state courts of appeal. Fourth, this
research only looked at the most active organizations in the courts. In limiting the
sample, this research may not accurately represent the choices that political interests
make. As Sorauf writes, “The strategic decisions of litigators yield only the sketchiest
scholarly materials. There are rarely records of them, and one infers them from the
histories of cases at the gravest risk” (Sorauf 1976, p. 144).
The decision to only examine the most politically active organizations especially
raises questions. Many political interests do not enter into the courts as often as a
public interest law firm, but these interests also help to influence the decisions that
courts make. The activity of the groups that participate only occasionally is also
more numerous. This is also true with issues like marriage equality, where court cases
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saw the participation of many political interests, most of them not public interest law
firms and other high-profile participants. It is important that research on political
interests and the courts captures the participation not only of the more but also
the less active political interests. Farole (1998) argues that less active participants
do not make strategic choices in the courts. These groups most often participate in
amicus curiae briefs, which are less costly than other types of participation. These
briefs, nonetheless, can be expensive (Caldeira and Wright 1988). There are also
reputational costs.
The existing literature also does not take into consideration relationships between
judicial ideology, state judicial selection and the decisions to enter into the state
or federal courts. These two factors might affect the choice between the state and
federal courts. Judicial scholars have found that the ideology of judges matters. This
is particularly true of the U.S. Supreme Court (Segal and Cover 1989; Segal and
Spaeth 2002), but also federal (Epstein, Landes and Posner 2013) and state supreme
courts (e.g., Hall and Brace 1992). Those who study the courts have also shown the
effect of judicial selection methods (Hall and Brace 1992; Brace and Hall 1995, 1990;
Langer 2002).
Prior research has not discovered the relationships between judicial ideology, state
judicial selection methods and the decisions that political interests make in selecting
state or federal courts (Farole 1998). Previous research, however, suggests that these
connections do exist. Comparato (2003) found that political interests communicated
different messages via amicus curiae depending on state judicial selection methods.
Additionally, some political scientists assert that attorneys take their cases to the
state courts when they believe that the Supreme Court will not give a favorable
ruling (Sorauf 1976; Wasby 1984).
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1.3 Purposes of this Study
New research on state political interests and American judicial federalism can
address these challenges in two ways. First, it can consider other factors that cause
political interests to turn to the state or federal courts. Second it can reevaluate
some of the older research quantitatively. In doing so, this research can contribute
towards the study of political interests and judicial federalism, but also public policy
and judicial politics.
The title of this dissertation is State Political Interests and American Judicial
Federalism. While this dissertation gives its attention to both state and national
political interests, there is a unique emphasis on state groups. The reason for this is
that this research asserts that state groups are politically bound to their home states
and this state orientation fosters a special relationship with the home state courts.
Existing research supports the notion that state political interests are bound to their
home states. Nonetheless, this is novel, and much attention is given to developing
this idea.
While this suggestion may be new, it’s not entirely new. Farole (1998) argues that
access to attorneys knowledgeable in state law is an important factor with the decision
to turn to the state courts. One might assume that these attorneys knowledgeable in
state law would most likely reside in their respective states, so there exists political
embeddedness, yet this relationship is never elaborated on. This research suggests
that state political orientation goes well beyond having access to attorneys with ex-
pertise in state law. State political orientation encapsulates the political proximity
of those who work in state political communities. This research expects that judges
and those who work for state political interests develop close relationships. They also
cooperate and compete with political issues, and have intimate knowledge of state
6
political culture.
In addition to developing the notion of state political orientation, this study also
examines the connection between judicial ideology, state judicial selection and the
decision to turn to the state courts. Previous research in judicial politics has found
connections between these two factors and the decisions that state judges make. Re-
searchers have not however convincingly shown the relationships between judicial
ideology and selection and the choices that the other actors including political in-
terests make. This study attempts to do this and finds some important connections
between these factors and the decision to enter into the state or federal courts.
This research considers how these factors in addition to legal advantage of state
over federal law affects entrance into the state or federal courts. This dissertation,
however, explores other areas of interest. One area is localism in the courts. If state
political interests are oriented towards state policy then we also might expect that
these groups enter into their home state courts more often than national groups and
organizations from other states. Some state organizations, however, do enter into
courts with no legal jurisdiction over their home states. This research explores their
motivations, examining factors such as a purposive orientation, federated structure,
and the interest group environment in their states. In examining these motivations
this dissertation offers insights into political interests. One example is the impact that
a federated structure has on group decision-making. Are state organizations perhaps
more willing to make a politically risky decision and enter into an out-of-state court
when the group holds a partnership with a national partner?
This dissertation then speaks to research not only on political interests and ju-
dicial federalism, but public policy and judicial politics. This study also contributes
to the growing, fairly recent public policy literature exploring the connections and
relationships between state and national interest groups. The literatures on national
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and state interest groups have evolved separately (Gray and Lowery 2002). Yet, more
recent research points to more connectedness between state and national politics, as
well as state and national interest groups. As an example, Baumgartner, Gray and
Lowery (2009) found a positive relationship between state lobbying registrations and
Congressional legislation. If state and national interest groups cooperate in both
the state and federal courts then this, too, argues for a more connectedness between
national and state policymaking.
1.4 Theoretical Framework
This study conceptualizes political interests as rational actors. Political interest
groups look for opportunities to win power in society. Political interest groups seek
ways to become more involved in the political process, develop friends and connections
in key areas, and, in doing this, ultimately, extend their political influence. Baum-
gartner and Jones (2010) propose that political interest groups do this two ways: via
image and venue.
With image, political interests craft messages that appeal to the public, as well as
the elites. These messages attempt to frame the debate or controversy in a particular
context. This research, however, is interested in the second consideration: venue
selection. Baumgartner and Jones (2010) show the rise and fall of nuclear energy in
the United States as one example of this. They argued that the U.S. courts were more
receptive to the opponents of nuclear energy than those in the pro-nuclear political
subsystems; consequently, the courts represented the ideal venue. Vose (1959, 1972),
similarly, showed how the courts were an ideal venue for the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People.
The punctuated equilibrium Baumgartner and Jones (2010) theory of interest
group behavior borrows from rational choice theory, which holds that individuals
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will make choices that are both rational and strategic. Individuals wish to maximize
their gains or advantages, and they will work towards these goals, but also take
into consideration the choices or expected decisions of those around them. Rational
choice traces its origins to early works in economics and political science. Levi (2009)
argues there are four main origins: The first is the spatial models of voting (Downs
1957; Black 1958), the second research on choice and social pluralism (Arrow 1963),
which finds that these outcomes are not always optimal. Olson (1965) introduced the
third influence, his collective action theory, which holds that individuals do not have
an incentive to cooperate because the collective benefits can often be had without
their participation. North (1981, 1990) gives the fourth, with his theory of economic
institutionalism, which argues that institutions are advantageous because they reduce
transaction costs.
The research on interest groups and the courts draws from this rational choice per-
spective. In this literature, political interest groups wish to maximize their influence,
and—to accomplish this goal—these groups make strategic choices. This perspective
is descriptive of much of the literature on interest groups and the courts. In the early
research of Vose (1959, 1972), for example, the NAACP turned to the courts because
the other branches of government were not receptive to the organization’s message.
Later research also builds on the rational choice, strategic decision-making model.
Political scientists argued that conservative interest groups began to see the courts as
a viable policy venue following the early victories of the NAACP and other liberal in-
terest groups (e.g. Epstein 1985). This research, too, builds on rational choice because
the courts are viewed as an underused policy venue by conservative interest groups.
The holds true for the most recent research, too. De Figueiredo and de Figueiredo Jr
(2002) introduce a resource-based model where political interests maximize resources,
either through a regulator or the courts.
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1.5 Hypotheses
This dissertation ultimately asserts that there are four primary reasons why po-
litical interests, both state and national, turn to the state courts. This dissertation
reaches the following conclusions from both original and prior research:
Hypothesis 1: Political interests will turn to the state courts when the jurispru-
dential structure of American law favors litigation at the state level. One excellent
example of state law assuming precedence happened after Miller v. California, where
the U.S. Supreme Court turned over the authority to decide what constituted obscen-
ity to the states.
Hypothesis 2: State political interests will enter into the state courts more
relative to their national counterparts. State political interests have better access
to attorneys knowledgeable in state law. Additionally, these interest groups have
greater familiarity with state lawmaking practice and the leaders and histories of
their respective states. Many state interest groups emerged in response to state
policy-making environments; consequently, these groups are more likely to advocate
in areas of law, such as education, where the state courts hold more power than the
federal courts. This does not necessarily mean that state interest groups will turn
to state courts most often, only that relative to their national counterparts, state
interest groups will use the state courts more.
Hypothesis 3: Political interests will seek out state courts when there is an
ideological incentive to do so. The state and federal courts can often mimic each
other ideologically. For example the Texas state courts and the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals are both conservative. Yet, there are other state courts, some of them
ideologically liberal, such as those in Vermont, Massachusetts or Hawaii, where groups
that advocated for marriage equality went first.
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Hypothesis 4: Political interests will seek out state courts when judges might
come under political pressure to decide a case in a particular way because of how
judges are picked. Hall (2001) showed that state judicial selection in combination
with ideology affected the decisions of judges. Seemingly, the institutional selection
of judges might also affect other actors, including the political interests.
1.6 Chapter Guide
This dissertation seeks to develop a new model for the choices that political inter-
ests make, paying especially close attention to state political interests. To accomplish
this, this research draws primarily from an original quantitative data set but also
some qualitative research. These chapters follow the introduction:
Chapter Two: Data Collection and Overview: This dissertation primarily
draws data from an original data set of more than 3000 observations of participation
with political interest groups. This chapter discusses the collection of these data in
two legal areas: eminent domain and marriage equality, also why this research selected
these legal areas. This chapter also gives a historical overview of both eminent domain
and marriage equality to assist the reader in evaluating the research in political and
historical context. This chapter provides details on sampling and on the meaning of
“political interest.”
Chapter Three: The In-State Political Orientation of State Political
Interests: This chapter develops the idea of state political orientation, the notion
that state political interests are politically bound to their home states. To accomplish
this, this chapter examines instances where state political interests enter into Amer-
ican courts with no legal jurisdiction over the home state and considers the groups’
motivations. In doing so, this chapter builds a model for political localism in the
courts, which is absent from the public policy literature.
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Chapter Four: In-State Political Orientation: A Qualitative Analysis:
This chapter continues the exploration of state political orientation found in Chapter
Three. This chapter examines the reasons why state political interests enter into out-
of-state courts, but does so with a qualitative analysis, with interviews of attorneys
and leaders of state political interests. This chapter finds overlap between the quali-
tative and quantitative research, but also some original insights and observations.
Chapter Five: In-State Political Orientation and Judicial Federalism:
This chapter examines the impact of state political orientation on the decision to
enter into the state courts. This chapter finds that state political interests enter into
the state courts at a much higher rate than their national counterparts. Additionally,
this chapter finds that state political orientation is an important factor in the decision
to turn to the state courts.
Chapter Six: Judicial Ideology, State Judicial Selection and Court
Choices: This chapter develops a new model for why political interests turn to
the state courts. The research proposes four factors: legal advantage, state political
orientation, judicial ideology and state judicial selection methods. This chapter tests
the impact of these four factors on state court selection. This chapter also explores
the connections between judicial ideology and state judicial selection.
Conclusions and Future Research: This chapter examines the contributions
of this research to the study of political interests and judicial federalism, but also to
public policy and judicial politics. This chapter also attempts to give direction to
future research, pointing out ways to look at political interests and the courts more
accurately as well as the meaning of some unexpected observations.
The following chapters will present a new perspective on why political interests
enter into either the state or federal courts, with emphasis on state political interests,
and how their unique relationships with their home states affect their choices. The
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following chapters will also explore related areas such as localism in the American
courts as well as the similarities and differences between national and state political
interests and their interconectiveness.
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Chapter 2
DATA COLLECTION AND OVERVIEW
2.1 Research Design
This research has proposed that existing research shows an incomplete picture
of how political interests interact with the state and federal courts. Prior research
has not explored fully the relationships between important factors such as in-state
political embeddedness, judicial selection and ideology have on the legal strategies
that political interests adopt. This chapter gives readers a roadmap of the empirical
strategies used, as well as a description of the data collected. It also provides a
detailed historical account of the two legal issues adopted by this research so that
readers can consider this research in legal and historical contexts.
The introduction describes the previous research and how it can be improved upon.
Specifically, this research will focus its attention on two factors: the in-state political
orientation of state political interests as well as judicial ideology and state selection
methods. As previously noted, this research largely adopts a quantitative approach.It
draws from a new data set of more than 3500 observations of political interests in the
state and federal courts in eminent domain and marriage equality. This data creates
the opportunity to consider the actions of different types of political interests over
relatively long periods of time in two active legal controversies.
2.2 Political Interests and Political Interest Groups
First, this research will explain the meaning of the term “political interests.”
Those who study groups and public policy, as well as groups and the courts, have
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made choices about what organizations to include or not include in their studies.
This is often problematic, as these studies are not directly comparable to each other
(Baumgartner and Leech 1998). This study too had to make choices about what
organizations to include and not include in its analyses. In public policy, there exists
debate on the meaning of the term “political interest group” (Baumgartner and Leech
1998). This debate is understandable. While some political scientists only study
membership based groups (e.g., Walker 1991), others include business, as well as non-
membership groups (e.g., Epstein 1994; Olson 1990; Collins Jr 2008). This distinction
is worth exploring.
Some political scientists study only organizations that have been labeled ”political
interest groups.” These organizations hold open membership, and these members vote
on leadership and the actions that the group takes. Walker (1991) gives one useful
typology. Walker begins with E.E. Schattschneider’s assertion that interest was either
public or private (Schattschneider 1975, p. 118). Private interests included Walker’s
”profit sector.” These are organizations that represented the interests of professionals
in private enterprise. Walker would include an organization that advocated for the
interests of bankers in Boston under this category. Walker labeled organizations that
represented the interests of those in government as the “nonprofit sector.” Walker
would include an organization that represents postal workers in this category. There
are two other categories: mixed associations and citizen groups. Mixed associations
included members from the public and private sectors. An organization that repre-
sents nuclear scientists would most likely include those who work for private industry.
Sometimes membership is open to anyone who wishes to join the organization. The
Sierra Club is one example of such an organization. One can sign up for the club, and
assuming he or she pays his or her membership dues, is entitled to full participation.
These types of political interest groups are often “citizen groups.”
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This typology offers a starting point to consider how interest groups work to in-
fluence the American courts. However, many other organizations do not have open or
voluntary membership, yet work to influence public policy much like their membership
based counterparts. Such groups include public interest law firms, bar associations,
non-membership groups, university law clinics and think tanks. Public interest law
firms came into American politics during the 1960s and 70s. They are often pur-
posive, like the Sierra Club or National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, yet unlike those organizations they have no members (Schlozman and Tierney
1986). These groups are very active in the courts (Farole 1998). University law clinics
give students the opportunity to practice law, often for poor and underrepresented
individuals. These organizations, too, will take political positions and attempt to
influence the courts, often through amicus briefs. Bar associations are associations of
lawyers that organize either for professional or purposive purposes. Membership in
these organizations is voluntary, with the exception of a state bar, where membership
is involuntary for an attorney who wishes to practice in a state. A state bar cannot
take a political position in a court case, but a bar association with voluntary mem-
bership can (Burnham 1995). Non-membership organizations exceed the number of
membership organizations (Salisbury 1984). These groups take on the persona of
membership organizations and engage in politics in similar ways, yet lack members
(Schlozman and Tierney 1986).
This study has selected to include both membership and non-membership groups
and uses the term “political interests” to refer to both, unless membership groups
are compared to non-membership groups directly, in which case “political interests”
will refer to non-membership organizations and ”interest groups” will refer to orga-
nizations with members. Many political scientists only study membership groups, so
this research separates these groups in some of the statistical analyses. In this study
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not all political interests were included, however. The exceptions were: businesses,
religions and private individuals. This is because these political interests did not
organize for a distinctly political or social purpose.
This dissertation considers both membership and non-membership groups for a
number of reasons. For one, doing so creates a larger sample size, which is important
in a quantitative study. A greater number of observations improves the validity
of regression and other statistical analyses (e.g., King, Keohane and Verba 1994).
Also, this approach creates a large enough data set to consider unique situations
quantitatively. For example, Chapter Three examines state political interests that
enter into courts with no jurisdiction over the home state–which this research can
consider qualitatively because there are enough observations to do so. Finally, this
approach creates the opportunity to consider the actions of membership and non-
membership groups and see if differences exist.
2.3 Political Interests and the Courts
The American courts represent one venue in which political interests can take
action. However, there are a number of actions that political interests can take to
influence the decisions of a court. Legal and political interest scholars have identified
four ways for interests to exert influence. These include: amicus curiae, direct spon-
sorship of test cases, legal aid and support and direct legal action through intervener
status in a particular case (Collins Jr 2008). Political interests use amicus curiae,
“friends of the court,” briefs the most. Yet, political interests use all of these tactics
under different circumstances for different reasons (see Collins Jr 2008).
Some political interests attempt to influence policy by setting up test cases. This
is accomplished either by challenging policy directly, or by approaching an individual
or organization and giving them direct legal support and guidance in challenging
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policy (Collins Jr 2008). Test cases often address constitutional questions (Wasby
1995). Test cases are expensive and time-consuming. Political interests pursuing this
avenue generally must be able to generate publicity, have a narrow issue focus and
have their own full-time staff and attorneys (Wasby 1995). Consequently, this is the
least often taken route of action, yet the interest that do take this route are often
“repeat players,” attempting to win as often as possible over a series of cases. This
strategy is risky, as legal defeats often put the interest at a loss (Galanter 1974, 100).
A second approach is to sponsor a group or individual who brings a case to the
court. This is similar to a test case, but different in that sponsorship does not
begin until the case reaches the appellate level. So while with a test case sponsorship
begins prior to legal action, with sponsorship, the interest involvement does not begin
until much later. This tactic, like test case sponsorship, is costly, given that similar
resources are often required, i.e. a full-time legal staff, narrow issue focus and the
ability to publicize the case. Sponsorship can put a political interest at a greater
disadvantage than if the group had sponsored the case as a test case, given that
the case has already been structured in a way that may not maximize the policy
advantage of the political interest (Collins Jr 2008).
Direct legal action represents a third approach. This is difficult, given that a po-
litical interest must have standing to participate as a party in case, and the courts
have made it difficult to win this standing. To participate directly, an interest must
show either that their interest would be directly affected by the outcome or that they
hold the statutory right to participate. In legal practice, requests for direct partic-
ipation are most often denied. The participation of third parties often complicates
cases, given that the legal system is adversarial; consequently, judges are not apt to
grant standing (Lowman 1991).
The fourth approach involves filing an amicus curiae or “friends of the court”
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briefs. Political interests that fail to win standing often participate as amici curiae
(Goepp 2002). This option is less cost-intensive than other forms of intervention.
Caldeira and Wright (1988) estimated the cost of a brief filed by a reputable law
firm between $15,000 and $20,000. Some scholars have suggested the costs might be
far less. Smith and Terrell (1995) have estimated the costs to be as little as $1,500.
Inexperienced attorneys often write the briefs to gain experience (Ward 2007), while
law professors often write the briefs pro bono (Moorman and Masteralexis 2001).
Participating as amicus curiae does have its disadvantages (Collins Jr 2008). Unlike
with a test case, a political interest cannot control the course of litigation (Epstein
1985, 148).The political interest has not been given the opportunity to influence
either the facts of the case or the lower court record. Political interests can, however,
introduce positions not introduced by the litigants, and give broader perspectives
(Caldeira and Wright 1988; Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1997).
2.4 Areas of Law
Previous research (Farole 1998) asserts that political interests see legal advantage
between the state and federal courts as the most important consideration when se-
lecting the federal or state courts. Consequently, this research attempts to capture
instances when the federal and state courts held a legal advantage. Farole sampled
from two areas of law: eminent domain and obscenity. Regarding eminent domain, he
found that judges looked to the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment, which requires
that property be taken for public use and its owners fairly compensated, in deciding
cases. Many state constitutions include similar stipulations for takings, which the
courts have interpreted as granting greater protections. Political interests can turn
to the state courts in these cases. Nonetheless, Farole found that this was not often
the case, and, as a result, he included eminent domain as an area of law where the
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federal courts held the advantage. He selected obscenity as a second issue. This area
of law was advantageous for his research because Miller v. California (1973) shifted
the balance of power from the federal to the state courts at a point in time. As a
result, the interaction between political interests and legal advantage could be clearly
examined.
The dissertation considers the participation of political interests in the courts from
two legal areas: eminent domain and marriage equality. In eminent domain cases,
the federal courts hold the legal advantage. American courts have decided recent
eminent domain cases on the basis of state law. State constitutions sometimes give
greater protections for property than the U.S. Constitution. Yet, the takings clause
of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution remains powerful. 1 2 In
marriage equality, the federal and state courts held the legal advantage for periods
of time. Prior to Perry v. Schwarzenegger (2010), political interests advocating for
marriage equality turned largely to the state courts, which afforded protections that
the federal courts did not recognize in the U.S. Constitution up until that time. This
reliance on the federal courts, however, changed when advocates for marriage equality
challenged California’s constitutional amendment on marriage, Proposition 8, on U.S.
constitutional grounds in 2010. Prior to this point in time, advocates for marriage
equality had certainly used federal arguments; yet, after this point in time their use
often in federal courts was next to ubiquitous.
1An argument can be made that state courts enjoyed the legal advantage following Kelo v. City
of New London. Appendix C examines this possibility and reevaluates the results of this study by
labeling eminent domain cases following Kelo as having state legal advantage.
2As with the previous regressions, the state legal advantage variable was omitted for eminent
domain. This is because legal advantage was coded as federal in all of the eminent domain cases.
This produced singularities that interfered with the inversion of the Hessian Matrix.
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2.4.1 Eminent Domain
Certainly, today, eminent domain remains a contentious issue. Americans do not
support government taking private property, even when fair compensation is given.
Yes, surprisingly, this was not always true. In colonial America, there existed an ex-
pectation that government would appropriate property (The Public Use Limitation of
Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem 1949; Treanor 1985; Horwitz 1992; Stoebuck
1972).
There existed two reasons for this: The first is that the King of England had the
right to appropriate property, often without compensation (Treanor 1985; Stoebuck
1972). The Magna Carta and subsequent English law explicitly lays out the powers
of the King of England, which were: “dominion of the sea, control over navigation,
foreign affairs, defense of the realm, enforcing acts of Parliament, dispensing justice,
coining money, providing for his own household, granting offices and tiles of nobility,
and collecting taxes” (p. 553 Stoebuck 1972). The Magna Carta however, did not
explicitly list the king’s powers. The king also had implicit “necessary and proper”
powers to carryout the foregoing powers. In a time of war, the king could, for example,
appropriate property to aid in the war effort.
Not only did the crown exercise direct, but also indirect authority over property.
Feudal traditions conceptualized property as belonging to the sovereign, yet granted to
individuals under certain conditions. If these conditions were violated, the sovereign
could take back what was rightfully his (Treanor 1985). In Vermont, for example,
farmers from neighboring New Hampshire settled the land. King George III, however,
had given possession of Vermont to New York. Following the Revolutionary War, the
New York legislature sought to evict the farmers because they had not been given the
authority to settle by the original land grant (Treanor 1985).
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Republicanism also influenced the American colonists’ view of property rights
(The Public Use Limitation of Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem 1949; Tre-
anor 1985). The American colonists prized the collective good over individual gain.
The colonists support for the common good did not preclude citizens from own-
ing property, as property ownership enabled one to contribute to the common good
through politics, much as a propertied citizen of ancient Athens. Yet, the American
colonists also saw the private ownership of property as destructive of the common
good, as people were naturally selfish, and those with wealth would not spend it to
benefit society. Consequently, government rightfully had the power to take property
in the interest of the common good. In Pennsylvania, for example, it was expected
that the state could use private property for the construction of public roads, which
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed in M’Clenachan v. Curwin (1802).
Public attitudes towards government takings, however, changed after state rep-
resentatives ratified the U.S Constitution into law (The Public Use Limitation of
Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem 1949; Treanor 1985; Horwitz 1992). When
the U.S. Constitution was drafted, only Vermont, Massachusetts and the Northwest
Territories had banned uncompensated takings. This change is best reflected in the
Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which declares that “private property
[shall not] be taken for public use without just compensation.” There are two parts
to this clause: the first being that private property is taken for public use, and the
second that fair compensation is required. Yet, other parts of the U.S. Constitution
aid in protecting private property. Article I prohibits the U.S. Congress from regu-
lating commerce wholly inside of the respective states. States also cannot lay duties
on goods imported or exported except to generate the revenue necessary to maintain
their inspection stations. Finally, the Third Amendment prohibits the quartering of
soldiers in private homes, except in times of war. While many states had takings
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clause requiring compensation, the Fifth Amendment did not also apply to the states
until the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was affirmed before the U.S.
Supreme Court in Chicago, B. & QR Co. v. Chicago (1897).
Many citizens wanted greater protections against government takings, yet this
right was far from absolute. The leaders of the industrialization and construction of
transportation networks in the United States put pressure on the courts and lawmak-
ers to limit compensation for takings (Horwitz 1992). The construction of railroads,
canals, and public and private roads required the taking of private property. These
projects, however, also damaged property that was not taken. American courts wres-
tled with the two parts of eminent domain law: direct and inverse condemnation.
2.4.2 Direct Condemnation
Direct Condemnation describes government actions that take private property,
which Americans most often associate with eminent domain. The courts have given
greater scrutiny to the “public use” requirement found in the Fifth Amendment.
Berman v. Parker (1954) established the contemporary benchmark. In the case,
the District of Columbia took blighted properties through its eminent domain power.
The residents filed suit against the city, and the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately
ruled in favor of the District of Columbia, but in doing so created a standard under
which property could be taken. The court found that governmental takings could be
in pursuit of a goal that was constitutionally permissible; this fulfilled the “public
use” requirement. Associate Justice William O. Douglas captures this sentiment,
wiring, “The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well balanced as well
as carefully patrolled” (Berman v. Parker 1954).
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Two subsequent cases tested the limitations of Berman v. Parker (1954). In
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (1984) the U.S Supreme Court ruled in favor of
the power of government to take private property and give it to private individuals.
In the early 1980s, 22 private owners controlled more than two thirds of the land on
the island of Oahu as the result of remaining vestiges of feudalism established under
king Kamehameha I. As a result, the cost of housing was exceedingly expensive,
given that a small number of individuals controlled the buildable land. The State of
Hawaii intervened; taking control of building titles and giving them to the lessees in
exchange for fair compensation. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that this action was
permissible under governmental eminent domain powers. Under this ruling, land did
not have to be blighted or transformed; it could be transfered and this would fulfill
the constitutional public use requirement.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New London (2004) further clarified the
public use requirement. In the case the New London Development Corporation took
property that was not blighted for economic development purposes. In response two
tenants who were evicted filed suit against the city. As in Hawaii Housing Authority
v. Midkiff (1984) the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of the government taking. In
this case, however, the Court found that the City of New London had the power to
transfer ownership of private property to another private interest because the property
did not generate enough tax revenue (see Peterson 1981).
Prior to the Kelo decision, American governments acquired a broad ability to take
property through their eminent domain powers. Tax revenue alone gave ample justi-
fication for municipalities to seize property. Supporters of property rights, however,
did win cases in state supreme courts, given that states can give greater protection
for rights than the federal government. In Norwood v. Horney (2006), the city of
Norwood Ohio had seized property for economic redevelopment much like New Lon-
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don had done in Kelo. The case ultimately went before the Ohio Supreme Court,
which ruled that the Ohio constitution prohibited Kelo-style takings exclusively for
economic benefit.
2.4.3 Inverse Condemnation
Direct Condemnation cases have arguably not favored property rights advocates.
With inverse condemnation cases, they have succeeded more often, particularly with
the U.S. Constitution’s requirement that government provide just compensation for
property that was taken. Inverse Condemnation does not involve a physical taking
of property, but rather the taking of the productive value of property. A government
activity or regulation can result in an inverse condemnation. The Bureau of Land
Management, for example, might close a gate, which, subsequently, limits a cattle
rancher’s access to his or her land. The rancher could then be expected to file suit
against the government, claiming that this action took away from the value of the
property.
Justice Harlan in Mugler v. Kansas (1887) established an early test on whether
a takings claim was permissible under inverse condemnation, defining a police action
as one that establishes rules on “public health, public morals, or the pubic safety”
(Mugler v. Kansas 1887, p. 661). While claims against a police action were not
permissible, claims against an action that involved a “physical invasion” were. Ac-
cording to Harlan, these actions had the same effect as physically taking the property.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon (1922), nonetheless,
ruled that suits could be filed against government regulatory actions or what Justice
Harlan labeled “police actions.” In the case, the Court struck down a Pennsylvania
law that prohibited coal mining in areas that might damage physical structures like
roads or houses. In doing so, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes established a new test:
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Government had the power to act, but if the economic consequences were too severe,
the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment would come into effect. Holmes’ con-
ceptualization of inverse condemnation was entirely different from Harlan’s. While
Harlan saw the inverse condemnation power as dichotomous, Holmes constructed it
as continuous.
The U.S. Supreme Court observed the Holmes test until the 1970s. Yet it was
vague. Those in the legal community did not fully know the meaning of Justice
Holmes’ phrase “If the regulation goes too far” finding in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon (1922). Passenger rail service in the United States fared poorly in the 1960s
and 70s. American travelers embraced the new interstate highway system and air
travel and took the train much less often. The Pennsylvania Central Railroad, as
a result, sought to demolish Penn Central Station and build atop the underground
tracks in New York City. The New York City Landmarks Preservation Committee,
however, did not approve the plans. In response, the railroad sued the city in court
citing eminent domain, and ultimately lost in the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled
that New York City’s actions fell under its eminent domain power. In its ruling,
the court, however, further refined Justice Holmes’ balancing test. In his opinion,
Justice Brennan identified three important considerations to determine whether the
government had imposed too heavy a burden: first, the character of the government
regulation, second the economic impact to the plaintiff and third the economy injury
to economic expectations prior to the regulation taking effect (Penn Central Transp.
Co. v. New York City 1978).
Following Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City (1978), the American
courts further refined the interpretation of inverse condemnation eminent domain law
in three areas (Farole 1998). The first area is compensation, where the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego (1981) that government
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must always provide compensation for takings. The supporters of government takings
had argued that it was sufficient for the government to correct the offending statute;
The U.S Supreme Court, however, disagreed, with Justice Brennan writing: ”... once
a court finds that a police power regulation has effected a ‘taking,’ the government
entity must pay just compensation on the date the regulation ... (San Diego Gas
& Elec. Co. v. San Diego 1981, p. 658-659). The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
precedent established in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego (1981) in First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles (1990), where the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Los Angeles County’s temporary prohibition against
building in a recently flooded area constituted a taking and the plaintiff was eligible
for compensation.
The American courts have also considered inverse condemnation in substantive
due process. Municipalities and regional governments often impose stipulations for
their approval of building permits. Governments can demand that building permit
applicants contribute land, physical structures or money to compensate the govern-
ments for public infrastructure improvement that is necessary for the building project.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n (1987) a California family wished to demol-
ish an existing beachfront property and construct a larger three-story house. The
California Coastal Commission required for their approval of a building permit a lat-
eral easement. This would allow the public to see the beach despite the blockage
created by a three-story house. In response, the Nollan family filled suit, claiming
a violation of their Fifth Amendment eminent domain rights. Ultimately, the U.S
Supreme Court agreed, asserting that governments must have a “legitimate state in-
terest,” also an “essential nexus” between the project and state interest to impose
permit requirements, which the Court ruled that the California Coastal Commission
lacked. In Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994), the U.S. Supreme Court similarly held
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that an Oregon municipality had violated eminent domain rights as a condition for a
building permit. In this case, the U.S Supreme Court added a third condition to the
Nollan test: There must be a proportionate relationship between the requirement for
the building permit and the impact of the projects. This third condition strengthened
property rights
Finally, the American courts have elaborated on “per se” inverse condemnation
takings. In (Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City 1978) the U.S. Supreme
Court had introduced a balancing test between property rights and government inter-
ests. In “per se” cases the government action is exceedingly injurious; consequently
eminent domain is applicable regardless of the urgency or importance of the govern-
ment interest. The courts have discovered two instances when per se rulings have
effect. The first is when a government regulation takes away the economic value
of property. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992) illustrates this, where
David Lucas, an owner of beachfront property filed suit against the commission in re-
sponse to its prohibition on construction. Lucas claimed that the regulation deprived
him of the value of his property. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed. The second type of
per se cases happens when a government regulation physically intrudes into property.
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. (1982), the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled in favor of property rights advocates in such a case. Loretto, an owner of New
York apartments, filed suit against the city after the city New York required that he
install cable in his apartment. Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed, ruling
that the cable installation requirement was equivalent to the government occupying
his property.
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2.4.4 Marriage Equality
The drive for marriage equality did not win significant momentum until the early
2000s (Becker 2015). At this point in time, the movement gained considerable mo-
mentum winning political victories in the legislative, executive and judicial branches
of both state and national U.S. governments. This movement culminated in U.S
Supreme Court ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), which declared same sex mar-
riage a right protected by the U.S. Constitution.
In the beginnings of the marriage equality movement, marriage equality supporters
questioned whether marriage equality was a viable goal (Becker 2014). Up until this
point in time, around 2008, marriage equality supporters had given their attention
to overturning workplace discrimination and anti sodomy laws (Becker 2015). This
approach made sense; homosexuals endured lawful discrimination in their daily lives.
To give an example: In 1960 anti sodomy laws at the state and municipal levels
policed private consensual acts in all 50 states.
Those who supported marriage equality, however, did challenge existing law in the
courts. In 1971, a minister married a same sex couple in Minnesota. The clerk denied
their request because it was unlawful in the state. In response, the couple filled suit
in Minnesota, before appealing to the Minnesota and U.S. supreme courts. Their
legal counsel argued that the Minnesota Constitution failed to state that marriage
was only between a man and a woman. Also, the Minnesota Constitution violated the
First, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution (Baker
v. Nelson 1971). The state, Minnesota and U.S. Supreme courts largely dismissed
these arguments. Nonetheless, the equal protection and due process clauses of the
Fourteenth amendment would become essential to the efforts of those advocating for
marriage equality.
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The 1970s and 80 saw a limited number of unsuccessful cases (Klarman 2012).
This changed in 1990, when Hawaii denied three same sex couples marriage licenses.
Dan Foley, a lawyer with the American Civil Liberties Union brought the case before
the Hawaii courts despite a lack of support from the ACLU. The plaintiffs appealed to
the Hawaii Supreme Court after the trail court dismissed the challenge. The Hawaii
Supreme Court also did not decide in favor of the plaintiffs. The court instead re-
manded the case to the trial court for a hearing stipulating that because the marriage
law discriminated on the basis of sex, the law was subject to strict scrutiny under
Hawaii’s constitution; consequently, the state had to give a compelling reason(s) why
discrimination on the basis of sex in marriage was necessary for it to retain effect
(Baehr v. Lewin 1993). In 1996, judge Kevin Chang failed to find the state reasons
for denying marriage equality sufficiently compelling under the strict scrutiny re-
quirement of Hawaii’s constitution, creating de facto marriage equality until Hawaii’s
legislature intervened (Baehr v. Miike 1996).
Seizing on the success in Hawaii, marriage equality advocates initiated legal test
cases in Vermont, claiming that the state’s prohibition on same sex marriage violated
the Vermont’s constitution common benefits clause. In Baker v. Vermont (1999), the
state Supreme Court agreed; yet did not extend full marriage equality because the
state viewed the transition as too dramatic. The court”s ruling then went to the leg-
islature, which passed legislation that created civil unions, to ensure that the benefits
and protections of Vermont’s marriage laws were extended to same sex couples.
The Vermont and Hawaii cases caused a political backlash. Opponents of same
sex marriage attempted to stop the gains made by the proponents in state and federal
governments (Klarman 2012). In response to the Hawaii case, the Utah legislature
ordered its courts to not recognize same sex marriage, while the South Dakota House
of Representatives voted for a bill prohibiting same sex marriage. Alaska passed a
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Constitutional amendment prohibiting same sex marriage. Policymakers at the fed-
eral level had also responded towards the trend legalizing same sex marriage. In 1996,
the U.S. Congress weighed in on the issue, passing DOMA, the Defense of Marriage
Act, which did two things: First, it gave the states the power not to recognize same
sex marriage in other states. Second, the Defense of Marriage Act withheld federal
recognition to same sex marriages; consequently same sex couples were not eligible
for federal marriage benefits (Klarman 2012).
Nonetheless the advocates of marriage equality continued to win important vic-
tories. By this point in time states could no longer enforce their sodomy laws. In
Lawrence v. Texas (2003), the U.S Supreme Court ruled that a Texas sodomy law
was unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which the court interpreted as affording individuals a right
to privacy, particularly in their homes. While this ruling was not directly tied to
marriage equality, those who opposed same-sex marriage perceived it as a significant
defeat. This momentum continued and in 2003, the allies of same sex marriage ac-
complished what they were not able to in Vermont: state recognition of same sex
marriage. In the case GLAD, the Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders filed
suit on behalf of same sex couples denied marriage licenses. As in Baker v. Nelson
(1971), the judges ruled Goodridge v. Department of Public Health (2003) on state
constitutional law. In this case the judges turned to the “free and equal” clause,
which they interpreted to grant marriage equality. A subsequent effort to oust the
political leaders who gave their support failed.
As with the Hawaii and Vermont marriage equality cases, Goodridge v. Depart-
ment of Public Health (2003) created a political backlash. Prior to the decision, three
states, Alaska, Nebraska and Nevada had banned same sex marriage in their consti-
tutions. Following this decision, the voters in many other states approved initiatives
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that prohibited same sex marriage at the constitutional level, which included Propo-
sition 8, a California initiative that generated media attention and much controversy.
Yet, pro marriage equality groups had continued to win victories. Following
Goodridge, three states: California, Connecticut and Iowa allowed same sex mar-
riage based on rulings in each of the states’ supreme courts. In In re Marriage
cases (2008); Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health (2008); Varnum v. Brien
(2009), the state supreme courts decided that same sex marriage was protected un-
der state law. These victories continued in the federal courts. In Strauss v. Horton
(2009), proponents of same sex marriage failed to overturn Proposition 8 in Califor-
nia’s supreme court. They argued that state constitutional law ensuring fundamental
rights could not be changed by citizen initiative. The petitioners in this case failed.
Yet, the petitioners in Perry v. Schwarzenegger (2010) (later Hollingsworth v. Perry
(2013)) succeeded. They petitioned the court under U.S. constitutional law and
Judge Walker of the northern district of California ruled in their favor, finding that
California’s Proposition 8 violated the substantive due process and equal protection
clauses of the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment. Federal law, similarly, was
used against DOMA; with the U.S. Supreme Court finding that section three, which
asserted federal non-recognition of same sex marriages, of the law violated the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment in 2013.
When the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated section three of DOMA, the majority of
states, 37, had legalized same sex marriage. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, had
yet to rule on same sex marriages themselves. This changed in 2015 when six marriage
equality cases in the sixth district of the U.S Court of Appeals were consolidated. The
Sixth District Court of Appeals ruled against those in favor of marriage equality, and
they appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, where they won in on the grounds that
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment protected
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same sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015).
2.5 The Design of the Study
As described, this dissertation has adopted a quantitative approach, collecting
more than 3000 observations This approach is advantageous for different reasons.
First a high number of observations creates the opportunity to consider the data
both qualitatively and quantitatively. Farole (1998), for example, listed the number
of cases where active political interests participated in the federal and state courts.
With more observations, much of this qualitative research can be replicated, but also
regression and other statistical techniques can be employed in order to examine the
relationships between political interests and the courts. Second, study with a high
number of observations creates the opportunity to study the less active political in-
terests. While public interest law firms and the most active political interests make
strategic decisions about whether to enter into the state or federal courts, the less ac-
tive political interests, seemingly, do as well, given the often-high cost of participation
in the courts, even for relatively inexpensive litigation strategies like amicus curiae.
Next a quantitative analysis creates the opportunity to consider the effects both of
judicial advantage and resources. Existing theory asserts that political interests will
seek out the state court only when there is a legal advantage to doing so and the
political interest has state level attorneys and other resources. He finds in obscenity
cases following Miller v. California (1973) which gave legal advantage to the state
judiciaries that state chapters litigated when they had access to state level attorneys
and resources; nonetheless, this effect was only observed in a few cases. A qualitative
approach gives the opportunity to examine this hypothesis.
This research generated data based on the information inWestlaw, which the text
above describes. Entrance into a court by a political interest represents the unit of
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analysis. The different litigation strategies, described above, include amicus curiae,
test cases, sponsorship, direct participation and participation as a third party. For
eminent domain and marriage equality, this study took approximately 20-year samples
between January 1995 and June 2015. This research sampled from case families;
consequently the data includes some cases prior to January 1995. For each act of
participation in the courts, this research recorded the name of the organization, along
with other important information such as the name of the court, litigation strategy,
type of political interests, date, the political interest’s side in the case and whether the
political interest was a state or national group. This study organized related cases
into case groups. In all this research collected 2072 observations in the marriage
equality legal area, 1568 in eminent domain. Taken together , there are 3640 total
observations.
In determining whether the federal or state courts held the advantage, this study
employs two techniques. The first is an examination of the history of both marriage
equality and eminent domain. With the legal areas that Farole selected, obscenity
and eminent domain, and marriage equality there was a natural tendency for political
interests to select the federal or state courts more often. As noted, with obscenity,
the break between federal and state courts holding the advantage came with Miller
v. California (1973). With marriage equality, this divide happened around the time
that political interests challenged California’s Proposition 8 on federal grounds.
The second technique comes from a coding of court cases. While federal courts
are largely limited to the interpretation of federal law, state courts interpret both
state and federal statutes. This creates ambiguity as to whether there was a federal
or state legal advantage in the state courts, given that a state court can decide a case
based on federal law. The U.S. Supreme Court considered this problem in Michigan
v. Long (1983), and declared that cases were decided on federal law, unless the court
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explicitly noted that the decision rested on state law. Scholars have applied these
criteria to code whether cases were decided on the basis of federal law (Esler 1994;
Latzer 1991; Fino 1987).
Farole establishes two criteria: First, did state law offer greater protection than
federal law? Second, did state legal precedent give greater protection than federal law?
This study, similarly, codes cases in the state courts as holding a state advantage if
they rested on state law, e.g. a clause in a state constitution giving greater protection
than the U.S. Constitution, or legal precedent. Ultimately, these data show that
courts decided eminent domain cases with federal law and marriage equality cases on
state constitutional law, up until legal efforts to invalidate California’s Proposition 8.
This study distinguishes between state and national political interests, which
proved to be challenging, as research cannot always place the organizations active
in American politics into either category. For example, some political interests oper-
ated in more than one state. The Chesapeake Bay Foundation, for example, attempts
to influence environmental policy in all of the states with shoreline on the Chesapeake
Bay. To complicate matters further, some regional groups had grown and taken on a
national political orientation. The Mountain States Legal Foundation gives one ex-
ample. The group had once represented property owners in the American mountain
west. The organization, however, was successful and is today a national actor. Inter-
national political interests and non-governmental organizations, too, have a hand in
American politics.
This research categorized political interests as state political interests if the name
of the organization also included the name of a state. If the name of a state was
not part of the group’s title, this study categorized the political interest as a state
group if it was clear that the organization was a political actor at the state level,
or if it was clear that the organization did not have the resources to pursue policy
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at the national level. An alliance of community centers in Los Angeles advocated
for marriage equality, for example, most likely would not have the human or capital
resources (see Gerber 1999) to pursue policy in Washington, D.C.
This dissertation classified the state chapters of federated interests as state po-
litical interests. This breaks with the current classification scheme (see Wolak et al.
2002), which categorizes state chapters as being part of national interests. This
was done for two reasons: First, these groups are often semi autonomous, with the
resources to enter into independent litigation. Second, these state chapters are em-
bedded within state politics. Their members most likely live in these states and work
through state political communities. True, the issues they confront might be national
issues, like both marriage equality and eminent domain; nonetheless, because these
groups are oriented to state politics they will most likely seek policy changes on these
national issues in their state political communities.
These data were supplemented with more information. The name of the court
and the judge(s) or justices who decided the case was noted, in addition to the party
of the governor or U.S. president who appointed the magistrate, or the party label of
the judge, if she ran in a partisan election. Other key pieces of information include
the judicial selection method if the case was decided in a state court. These data
were primarily taken from Ballotpedia, an online digital collection of information on
elected officials and elections that can be accessed on the internet.
One key advantage of these data is that they were sampled from throughout the
50 states and at all levels of the U.S. courts, both federal and state. As noted prior
research sampled from 5 states and the U.S Supreme Court, in addition to state
appellate courts. These selection choices were most likely representative of the larger
United States, yet one cannot be certain. This sample, while it does not account for
all of the activity in the courts, does not experience this problem.
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2.6 Conclusion
To examine the participation of political interests in the courts, this study has
sampled from two areas of law: marriage equality and eminent domain. These is-
sue areas will give the opportunity to retest the existing incentive structure yet also
whether there is a state political orientation for state political interests, also whether
this affects the relationship that political interests have with judicial federalism. These
data are more complete than previous samples, taken from each of the different lev-
els of both the federal and state courts and from court cases in all of the states.
Consequently, these data give the opportunity to test the relationships that political
interests have with judicial federalism more thoroughly, with both quantitative and
qualitative analysis.
This study has chosen to sample from classically defined political interest groups,
yet also political interests. This is consistent with the existing literature, given that
Farole included public interest law firms in his sample, which do not meet most
definitions for political interest groups. It is also necessary because much of the
decision making with political interests and the courts originates from the public
interest law firms, but also non-membership groups, which are becoming increasingly
prevalent.
The next chapter turns to the concept of a state political orientation of state
political interests. Existing research does not distinguish between state and national
political interests, yet this study will argue that it is important. It will also lay the
foundation to the following chapter, which will examine in-state political orientation.
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Chapter 3
THE IN-STATE POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF STATE POLITICAL
INTERESTS
3.1 In-State Political Orientation?
This research has argued that state political interests have a unique orientation
to state policy making, and this unique orientation changes the incentives to take
action in both the federal and state courts. Yet this concept of state policymaking
orientation is not entirely clear. Does an in-state political orientation exist for state
political interests? Do state political interests find themselves bound to the politics of
their respective states? How does this orientation to state politics shape the way that
state political interests interact with their national counterparts on political issues?
Also, if state political interests do hold a state orientation to politics, does this matter,
and does this matter when considering the actions that state political interests take
in the American courts?
Some previous research on political interests has concluded that national and state
political interests are very similar, and argue that there are no important differences
between these types of groups (Hunter, Wilson and Brunk 1991; Nownes and Free-
man 1998; Morehouse and Jewell 1981). Other researchers have found differences.
Rosenthal (2001) for example finds that state lobbyists place much greater emphasis
on cultivating personal relationships than their national counterparts. Yet even if
state political interests are similar to their national counterparts, this does not mean
that their political orientations are as well, given their embeddedness in state politics.
Groups then may be structurally the same. These groups, however, find themselves
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in different environments. Consequently, one might expect that their actions would
be different because of their political embeddedness.
Yet does this embeddedness create a state political orientation? The existing lit-
erature is not conclusive. It give reasons why state political interests may or may
not be oriented towards state politics. Nonetheless, understanding the orientation of
state political interests to state politics will become increasingly important as more
recent studies have begun to examine more closely the relationship between policy
creation at the state and national levels (e.g., Baumgartner, Gray and Lowery 2009).
Consequently, understanding state political orientation becomes increasingly impor-
tant, as it can explain differences between the actions taken by state and national
groups. This study is not an exception.
In considering state political orientation, there is little research. One place to
begin is with studies on nationalization, which asserts that political groups, both
state and national, are becoming more alike. Generally, nationalization suggests the
opposite of a state political orientation. With nationalization the political interests
show greater similarities. With a state political orientation political interests show
important differences as a result of their location. One might expect that these forces
are antagonistic. Greater localism creates less nationalization and vice versa.
The nationalization of state politics has taken on three meanings (Wolak et al.
2002). In the first definition, nationalization refers to the increasing tendency for
political interests to become more alike. At one point in time the forces that drove
the creation of state political interests were more dissimilar because the states were
separated by different cultures (e.g., Elazar 1972), economics (e.g., Hrebenar 1987)
and geographic distances. Nonetheless, these political interests are becoming more
similar because the forces acting on the states are becoming more similar. For ex-
ample, the economies of states are becoming increasingly homogeneous. This drives
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the creation of state political interests (Lowery and Gray 1994), which are more alike
than dissimilar.
The second meaning of nationalization concerns the professionalization of politi-
cal interests. Initially, state political interests were not highly professionalized unlike
their national counterparts. Rather, these groups were close knit, and lacked the capa-
bilities of political interests in the national capital (Gray and Lowery 1996; Hrebenar
1987; Thomas and Hrebenar 1991, 1999). Yet, state political interests became more
professionalized, especially following policy devolution beginning with U.S. President
Richard Nixon (Rosenthal 2001). During this time, national political interests helped
to create multi-state lobbying firms, which in many ways resembled their national
counterparts, with access to sophisticated surveying techniques and data analysis
capabilities (Jacobson 1997).
The final meaning of nationalization examines the political actors within a par-
ticular state. If the political interests originate from the state, then there is less
nationalization than if the actors came from other states or the national level. This
is distinct from the first meaning in that it does not ask if the actors are becoming
more similar, but rather are the actors tied to the states themselves.
3.1.1 Why State Interests Might have an In-State Political Orientation
Wolak et al. (2002) consider localism within this third context. Ultimately, they
find that most political interests had only registered in a single state. Also, at the
state level, in 21 out of the 50 states, the majority of organizations had only reg-
istered in that particular state, with the modal number of registrations for political
interests that did register in more than one state as two. This evidence supports their
conclusion that American politics is in fact local, which supports a lack of national-
ization and an in-state political orientation. Otherwise, there would have been more
40
out-of-state lobbying registrations.
This is nonetheless not the only evidence. Most of the existing literature argues
strongly for what this study has labeled an in-state political orientation. One early
theory holds that the strength of state political interests were inversely proportional to
the strength of political parties (Zeller 1954; Morehouse and Jewell 1981; Zeigler 1983;
Hrebenar 1987; Hrebenar and Thomas 1992, 1993, 2010). The political orientation
of these state political interests, then, would very much be local, given that their rise
or decline would depend on state parties. Early research also discovered a business
connection, arguing that the strength of political interests was directly proportionate
to the strength of business (Zeigler 1983; Zeigler and Van Dalen 1976; Thomas and
Hrebenar 1990). Here too internal state factors helped to shape the internal makeup
of political interests in a state, which argues for an in-state political orientation.
Zeigler (1983) also observes that the wealth of states was inversely related to the
strength of political interests. Again, the internal characteristics of the states, here
wealth, created the groups within the state political communities.
Studies by Hrebenar (1987); Hrebenar and Thomas (1992, 1993, 2010), beginning
with Interest Group Politics in the American West also argue that the makeup of
state interest group communities are very much the result of state characteristics. In
their studies, Hrebenar and Thomas employed scholars and experts to write about
the interest group communities in the states and the unique economic and often
historical circumstances that may have created the communities of political interests.
The authors considered interest group power in the context of the theories described
above. Interestingly, however, the researchers of the individual states often found
the existing theories to not be true. For example, Syer (1987) found that California’s
interest groups were strong in spite of party strength in the California legislature. The
states themselves then created a unique set of conditions which produced a unique
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set of political interests.
Population ecology too suggests that state political interests are embedded in their
home states. In the population ecology model, each of the three factors that drive the
creation of state political interests–energy, stability and area—are tied to the states
themselves, albeit imperfectly (Gray and Lowery 2000). This is especially true with
area. A state with a high number of farmers, for example, would be expected to also
have many groups representing them. Conditions within the states then drive the
creation of the interests with the states.
3.1.2 Why State Interests Might Not have an In-State Political Orientation
While the existing literature argues for a strong in-state political orientation, it
does not suggest that this nesting in state politics is perfect. State political interests’
policy orientation can reach well beyond the state level. One example comes from
Gray and Lowery’s (2000) ESA model, where political interest and enthusiasm causes
the formation of political groups. This energy does not necessarily have to come
from state politics, as Baumgartner, Gray and Lowery (2009) found when they dis-
covered a positive relationship between U.S. Congressional hearings and the lobbying
registrations of star political interests.
Other research also gives reasons why in-state political orientation might be less
than perfect. Political scientists have shown the co-evolution between political in-
terests at the state and national levels. Baumgartner (2004) illustrated how social
movements both at the state and national levels led to greater Congressional attention
to the environment, civil rights and other issues. Mettler (2005) described the rise of
state and national interest groups following WWII and the G.I. Bill, while Campbell
(2005) showed the evolution of senior citizen interest groups throughout society fol-
lowing the passage of Social Security. A number of other studies show these linkages
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both at the national and state levels. These include: Baumgartner and Jones (2010),
Skocpol (1992) and Soss (2002).
3.1.3 In-State Political Orientation and the American Courts
Wolak et al. (2002) concluded that much of state politics was still local, given that
most of the political interests in their sample were only registered in a single state.
Yet does this observation also hold true in the American courts? Seemingly, if state
political interests have an orientation to local politics they will enter into out of state
courts infrequently. While this question was considered in the context of lobbying
registrations (Wolak et al. 2002), it has yet to be considered in the context of the
courts. If state political interests enter into out of state courts frequently, then, they
hold a political orientation that is like their national counterparts—one that is more
national than local.
The institutional structure of the American courts, however, complicates this anal-
ysis. What exactly does entering into an out-of-state court mean? A state political
interest might act in a court that has the power to affect policy in more than the
home interest’s state. If a political interest in Washington State appeals a case to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the ruling of that court would affect all the states
that belong to the Ninth Circuit. Yet, this progression is to be expected, given that
the federal district courts in western and eastern Washington belong to the Ninth
Circuit. The legal actions of state political interests in the U.S. Supreme Court also
fit this definition. This might be called an example of unintentional influence.
There are cases, however, when state political interests act in courts in which
the decision has no effect on policy in the political interest’s home state. This is an
example of extraterritorial influence. If a political interest from Iowa, for example,
took a legal action in Michigan, the decision of that court would have no effect in
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Iowa. Also there are no direct institutional channels from the Iowa to the Michigan
courts. A court case that originates in Iowa does not naturally progress to Michigan.
The same holds true for the federal courts. State political interests can enter into
legal action in a federal circuit that does not include the political interest’s home
state, yet there is not a natural progression to this court.
3.2 Investigation of In-state political orientation
This research will examine in-state political orientation three ways: First does an
in-state political orientation matter? If state political interests are active in political
issues with their national counterparts then this orientation arguably could. Second
does an in-state political orientation exist? If state political interests take most of
their legal actions in their home state courts and federal courts with jurisdiction over
the home state then arguably these interests do hold a state orientation. Third what
are the reasons why a state political interest might pursue policy outside of its state
or federal district court that holds jurisdiction over the interest’s home state? This
may help to identify exceptions to the in-state judicial orientation of state political
interests. To answer these questions this research will draw on the data collected and
described in the previous chapter.
3.3 Does an In-State Political Orientation Matter?
Ultimately, this research attempts to answer the question whether an in-state po-
litical orientation matters in the context of political interests and judicial federalism.
But, for now, perhaps the question to ask isn’t does an in-state political orientation
matter, but rather does an in-state political orientation have the potential to matter.
This question can be informally assessed by examining the rates of participation of
national and state political interests in marriage equality and eminent domain.
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Figure 3.1: Court Participation by State and National Political Interests
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This figure shows the number of times both state and national political interests took legal actions
in eminent domain and marriage equality cases.
Figure 3.1 shows that state political interests are very active relative to their
national counterparts. In eminent domain cases, state political interests took 249 out
of 849 legal actions, slightly less than a third of the total count. In marriage equality
cases, actions taken by state political interests comprised 274 out of 770 instances of
legal participation. This represents slightly more than a third of the policymaking
activity in the courts in this legal area.
Clearly, both issues—eminent domain and marriage equality—are national issues
and have policy effects beyond the borders of any one state. If state political inter-
ests are active in high numbers relative to their national counterparts, then, a state
orientation clearly has the potential to matter.
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3.4 Do State Political Interests Have an In-State Political Orientation?
The second question asks whether state political interests are state political actors,
or whether these interests become national policy makers, either intentionally or un-
intentionally? Earlier the difference between intentional and unintentional influence
was described. In unintentional scenarios, state political interests enter into federal
courts of appeals where the outcome of the case has the potential to affect policy
beyond the borders of the political interest’s home state. Nonetheless, this influence
is unintentional because this court holds jurisdiction over the interest’s home state.
Intentional influence is when a political interest seeks legal outcomes in a court that
has no jurisdiction over the political interest’s home state. This can be because the
political interest has entered into another state court or a federal court of appeals
that lacks jurisdiction over the political interest’s home state.
This question, too, can be examined with the data collected. There were 523
instances of participation by state political interests in the courts. In slightly more
than half of these legal actions, the decision of the court may have influenced policy
outside of the borders of the political interest’s home state. This is shown as a
percentage in Figure 3.2 under “Any.” These data suggest that state political interests
are often national policy actors, given that more than half of the actions took place
in courts where the decision had the potential to create national policy.
Nonetheless, this is somewhat misleading because 40% of the total instances of
interest participation falls under the “unintentional” category, where the institutional
structure of the American courts forced the political interest into the position of na-
tional policymakers, given that the federal court holds jurisdiction over the interest’s
home state. This is shown under the “unintentional” bar. The “intentional” bar
shows that about 10% of the court activity took place in courts where there were no
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Figure 3.2: Out of State Court Participation by State Political Interests
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This figure shows when state political interests are in the position to influence policy in the courts.
The “Intended” bar shows the percentage of legal actions taken in out of state and U.S. Courts
of appeals without jurisdiction over the “home” state court. The “Unintended” bar shows the
percentage of legal actions taken in federal courts with jurisdiction over the “home” state. The
“None” bar shows the percentage of legal actions taken in the political interest’s “home” state.
The “Any” bar combines the first and second bars, and shows the percentage of cases where state
political interests were in the position to affect policy beyond the borders of their home state.
policy consequences in the home state.
These results very much suggest that state political interests hold a state orien-
tation to policymaking via the courts. In approximately 90% of the observations the
state political interest acted in a court which was tied with the interest’s home state,
either because the action took place in a court belonging to the interest’s home state
or a federal court with direct jurisdiction of the state political interest. There appears
to be a relatively low incentive to act in outside courts. The rate of extraterritorial
influence, about 10%, is very similar to the percentage of lobbyists that registered in
more than one state (Wolak et al. 2002). Nonetheless, this statistic is not substan-
47
tial. Also it doesn’t include participation in the U.S. Supreme Court, which holds
jurisdiction over all of the states. When the observations in the U.S. Supreme Court
and Federal Court of Appeals are not included in the observation pool, the rate of
extraterritorial influence increases to 16%, which is almost exactly the same as “un-
intended” influence, or the cases where the political interest entered into a federal
court of appeals with jurisdiction over the interest’s home state.
3.5 Why State Political Interests Leave their Home State
Most often state political interests turn to either state courts or federal courts with
jurisdiction over the home state. Nonetheless, there seems to be instances when state
political interests willingly become out of state actors. This research proposes that
understanding these instances when state political interests leave their home states
will help in better understanding localism and the American courts. The existing
literature has not addressed why a state political interest might enter into out of
state courts. The literature does however offer suggestions as to why state political
interests might do this.
Group or Political Interest: American politics is populated not only by clas-
sical interest groups but by non-membership organizations (Salisbury 1984). These
organizations have access to resources that rival and often exceed their membership
counterparts (Schlozman et al. 2015). Representation within the organization, too, is
different. Those who make strategic decisions for political interests often must take
into to account the wishes of their members (Holyoke 2003). Yet, the participants
in non-membership organizations are not like the members of membership organiza-
tions; they most likely do not vote or elect their leaders. As a result, they have less
ability to object to the decisions made by those on top. It is reasonable to assume
then that these organizations would be more inclined to pursue policy in out of state
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courts because their leaders have more power to do so without interference.
Purposive vs. Material Organizations: Purposive organizations work to-
wards a purposive goal. Material organizations, on the other hand, protect the mate-
rial interests of their individual members or businesses. This research proposes that
purposive organizations would be more likely to enter into out of state courts because
these organizations might see achieving a purposive goal in a different state as being
equally valuable as it is the home state. Past research supports this assertion. Zei-
gler (1983) and Thomas and Hrebenar (1999) observed that state political interests
increasingly shared resources, often through interstate political action committees,
which, in turn, could be used to fund elections or influence policy in multiple states.
Participation: Political scientists have found that political interests respond to
conflict, as a moth is drawn to light (see Holyoke 2003; Olson 1990; Scheppele and
Walker Jr 1991). This happens two ways: First a political interest is more likely to
enter into a venue with a partner group in a coalition. Second, political interests will
more often enter into a political venue with their opponents (Holyoke 2003).
Federated: National political interests have taken a much greater interest in
state policy, especially following U.S. President Richard Nixon’s efforts to give greater
policymaking power to the states Rosenthal (2001). For example, national political
interests have formed close relationships with their state-level counterparts and estab-
lished local chapters. This federated structure was advantageous for the state political
interests because their national counterparts could help these organizations, resulting
in greater professionalization. Yet, it was also advantageous for the national political
interests because these groups gained the local expertise of their state counterparts.
In the courts, this partnership gave national political interests greater access to state
attorneys, knowledgeable in state law (Farole 1998).
Density and Diversity: In states there exists unique makeups of political inter-
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ests (e.g., Gray and Lowery 2000). Gray and Lowery consider the makeup of political
interests largely in two ways: density and diversity. Researchers have examined how
density and diversity influence the makeup of state political communities (e.g., Low-
ery and Gray 1993; Gray and Lowery 1993) Political scientists have also connected
these measures with the actions taken by groups. Wolak et al. (2002) found that
political interests from states with high density were more likely to register to lobby
in more than one state. Their density measure represents the number of political
interests in a state, while diversity represents the different types.
The density and diversity of states might cause state political interests to enter into
out of state courts. First, there is crowding in states with high densities of political
interests (Gray and Lowery 1998). The literature suggests that political interests
overcome the “crowded room” problem through partnerships with similar groups. A
state political interest might also enter into a different state to win attention in a
different niche. With diversity a state political interest might be more likely to go
out of state when the group can uniquely speak to a particular case or controversy in
that state. In states with greater interest group diversity, there would seemingly be
more opportunities for this to happen.
State political interests might also enter into an out of state court because a policy
event has motivated the group to do so. The population ecology model (Gray and
Lowery 2000) argues that groups emerge and respond to policy events. Baumgartner,
Gray and Lowery (2009) found that Congressional hearings affected state lobbying
in three ways: contemporaneously, substitution and simulation. The substitution
effect conceptualizes American federalism as political venues. If political interests
cannot pursue policy at the federal level, these groups can always turn to states.
This would also hold true for state interest groups. These groups can turn to other
states or the federal government if these groups believe that they cannot effectively
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change policy in their respective states. This pattern has been well documented
in the national context. Walker (1991), for example, observed that citizen interest
groups did not emerge until after the U.S. government implemented redistributive
government programs prior to and following World War II. These organizations were
created because there was demand to safeguard these recently won benefits like Social
Security.
Judicial Ideology and State Judicial Selection: Political scientists often
study judicial ideology and state judicial selection methods with the courts. State
political interests may enter into out of state courts where the leaders of the orga-
nization believe that it is advantaged, either by the judicial ideology of the court or
the state’s judicial selection method. Ideology is a powerful determinant of judicial
behavior, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court (e.g., Segal and Cover 1989; Segal and
Spaeth 2002), but also among federal judges (e.g., Epstein, Landes and Posner 2013)
and state Supreme Court judges (e.g., Hall and Brace 1992). States also select their
judges or justices differently. These selection methods include: partisan elections,
non-partisan elections, the Missouri Plan, and legislative selection. Under partisan
elections, judges or justices have the least independence from the electorate, while
under legislative selection, judges have the most, given that they are not popularly
elected and do not have to stand for reelection. State-level judicial selection methods
have been shown to have an effect on judicial behavior (Hall and Brace 1992; Langer
2002). If political interests know this, there is an incentive to use judicial selection to
their advantages (Comparato 2003)
3.6 Operationalization
This study generated these data from information in Westlaw Next. From a larger
sample of 3639 observations, this research took a smaller sample of 523 observations
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where a state political interest was on the side of the party that brought a suit before
a court, either as an appellant, petitioner or plaintiff. This research included inter-
est groups, in addition to other organizations active in the courts such as nonprofit
organizations without members, public interest law firms , university groups, unions,
think tanks and bar associations, both state and private. This dissertation examined
political interests rather than interest groups alone to capture a large enough sample
size for quantitative analysis. The data show that membership organizations, i.e.,
interest groups, participate less often in the courts than did non-membership groups.
The unit of analysis is an act of participation in the American courts. This research
coded the important variables as follows:
Out of State Court Action: This measure represents the dependent variable.
This research marked legal actions in the courts as 0 if the action took place in a state
court, federal district court or court of appeals associated with the political interest’s
home state, in addition to those cases in the Supreme Court or a federal specialty
court, like the U.S Court of Federal Claims. If the action took place in an out-of-state
court or a court of appeals that does not have jurisdiction over the interest’s home
state, then the observation was coded as 1, showing an extraterritorial action.
Group or Political Interest: This research based its measure on Walker’s (1991)
typology, categorizing “interest groups” as those that Walker included in his typology.
Otherwise, this research labeled the organizations as “political interests.”
Purposive versus Material Organizations: This research categorized state
political interests as purposive if the organization advocated for purposive rather
than material goals.
Conflict: This measure captures the amount of conflict between political inter-
ests. The measure represents the total number of acts of participation in a legal
case
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Federated: This research categorized state interests as federated if the group
met one of two criteria: First, the political interest was a chapter of a national
interest. The San Francisco Bay Chapter of the Sierra Club is clearly a local affiliate
of the Sierra Club, yet, this organization can and does enter into its own litigation.
These examples were usually obvious, as the name of the state organization often
included the name of the parent organization and the state to which it belonged.
Second, this study categorized state interests as federated if it was clear that the state
interest maintained close ties with a national counterpart, yet the organizations were
independent. The Alabama Policy Institute, for example, is a state level partner with
Focus on the Family, a national political interest. This was determined by entering
the name of the suspected national counterpart and the phrase “state affiliates” into
Google, an Internet search engine.
Density and Diversity: Gray and Lowery (2000) describe density two ways:
density in the electorate and density before government. This study adopts the second
measure, density before government, in considering localism and the courts, which is
created by taking the number of lobbying registrations for a state in a single year.
Prior research on state localism also adopted this measure (Wolak et al. 2002). This
study also considers the impact of diversity. Gray and Lowery created their measure
using a Herfindahl index, which showed the probability that lobbying registrations
in the economic sector will belong to a particular guild, like mining or banking, for
example. A lower Herfindahl score signals greater diversity. This research calculates
the density and diversity measures this way, but with newer data, from 1997 and 2007
, with the 1997 scores being used with court cases before 2003 and the 2007 scores
after.
Ideology: Political scientists have created increasingly sophisticated measures of
ideology, both for political interests (Bonica 2013; McKay 2008), for judges or justices
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at the state level (Bonica 2013), and federal, for the U.S Supreme Court Segal and
Cover (1989), and federal courts of appeal and district court(Giles, Hettinger and
Peppers 2001a,b; Epstein et al. 2007). Unfortunately, despite recent efforts, there
still does not exist common measures for the ideology of political interests, the U.S.
Supreme, federal and state courts.
This research considers ideology in the context of out-of-state legal actions. This
research operationalized ideology as the ideological advantages or disadvantages be-
tween either states or U.S. courts of appeal. To give an illustrative example: A liberal
political interest in Washington State might take a legal action in California if there
is an ideological incentive to do so. Yet, this incentive might not exist because Wash-
ington State is also liberal. An ideological incentive, then, requires that the state
court visited be a stronger ideological match than the home state. A political interest
might remain in the home state for ideological reasons as well. Yet this is much more
difficult to construct, given that there is not a single alternative for comparison other
than all of the remaining states. It is also unlikely that a political interest would stay
in-state primarily for ideological reasons because the chances of there being a more
liberal or conservative state available to litigate in is high.
The ideological advantage measure requires three other measures: political inter-
est, state and federal court ideologies. To begin with the political ideology of interests,
this research coded organizations on a -1 to 1 scale, with 1 showing a conservative
organization, -1 a liberal orientation and 0 a group where the ideology was unclear,
or where the group was oriented less towards politics. For most political interests,
particularly those involved in the marriage equality debate, it was clear whether these
groups were liberal or conservative. Professional organizations were generally assigned
a 0 score.
For the ideology scores for the federal courts, this chapter adopted scores from
54
the Common Space Judicial Project Epstein et al. (2007). These researchers based
their scores on measures originally created by Giles, Hettinger and Peppers (2001a,b),
and are compatible with NOMINATE Common Space scores. Giles, Hettinger and
Peppers (2001a,b) based their scores on senatorial courtesy.
For state courts, this research adopted Bonica’s (2013) Cf-scores, which Bonica
based on campaign contributions and are scaled the same as NOMINATE ideological
scores. Bonica generated his Cf-scores in three ways: political contributions to the
judge, campaign contributions made by the judge to other candidates and the ideology
of the governor who appointed him or her if he or she is not elected. Congressional
ideology can also be estimated with CF-scores. Bonica (2013) uncovered a strong
statistical correlation between CF and DW-NOMINATE Congressional scores, which
give greater validity to the measure.
This research created ideological advantage scores from these three measures. For
state courts, this chapter found the ideological mean of the state supreme courts by
averaging the ideological scores of each of the justices for a particular year. This study
then used this score as an ideological proxy for all of the state courts for a particular
year. For federal courts this research employed a similar strategy, averaging the
ideological means of the judges in each of the federal circuits. This chapter then
adopted these means as proxies for the lower federal district courts directly beneath
a circuit.
This research then coded ideological scores the following way: If a political inter-
est was liberal, the ideological advantage score was coded as one if the visited state
or circuit court was more liberal than the home state alternative; the analogous pro-
cedure was followed for conservative organizations. Entrance into the U.S. Supreme
Court and specialty federal courts was coded as 0 because these courts do not offer
alternatives. Groups that were coded as ideologically neutral also received neutral
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ideological advantage scores given that these groups are categorized as equidistant
between conservative and liberal courts.
State Judicial Selection: State political interests might enter into different
state courts if they believe that a particular state’s judicial selection method might
advantage them. State judicial selection is tied to ideology; consequently judicial se-
lection cannot be considered independently. To evaluate judicial selection, ideological
advantage was interacted with four judicial selection methods: partisan election, non-
partisan election, Missouri Plan and legislative appointment. Political interests, then,
should seek out state courts that are ideologically favorable in conjunction with judi-
cial selection methods that expose judges to popular opinion that favors the position
of the political interest.
3.7 Reasons why Political Interests Enter Outside Courts
What, then, motivates state political interests to enter into out of state courts?
This question was tested using logit. Table 3.1 shows three results from different
equations, with the first combining state political interest activity for both eminent
domain and marriage equality. Legal area, a dichotomous variable, either marriage
equality or eminent domain, was used to control for variation introduced by the legal
areas. The second and third models only test cases in marriage equality and eminent
domain, respectively; as a result, the legal area term was not included. In each of
the models, the dependent variable is extraterritorial action. In all, there were 60
instances of extraterritorial participation, 51 in marriage equality and 9 in eminent
domain.
Table 3.1 shows that a number of the independent variables showed positive asso-
ciations with extraterritorial legal actions. With a Maximum Likelihood Estimation
logit model, the coefficients are not as easily interpretable as in logistic regression.
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To give readers a sense of the impact of the significant explanatory variables, the
log odds, an alternative way of expressing probability, are included in the discussion
below in instances where there was a statistically significant relationship.
Interestingly, the group or political interest variable did not reach statistical signif-
icance in any of the models. Political interests clearly outnumbered classical interest
groups (52 to 9), yet they did not show a positive relationship with legal actions
in out-of-state courts. Seemingly, political interests would be more likely to enter
into out of state courts, given that these organizations lack in state membership to
discourage them from taking potentially actions that would not directly benefit their
in-state membership, yet these data do not suggest this.
These regressions do not show a statistically significant relationship between non-
membership groups and the decision to enter into out-of-state courts. The coefficients
in the combined and marriage equality models nonetheless are signed in the correct
direction and come very close to reaching statistical significance.
The regressions show that purposive political interests are positively associated
with entrance into out of state courts. Purposive political interests were positively
associated with extraterritorial legal actions in both the combined and eminent do-
main models. This relationship was especially strong in the marriage equality model.
The eminent domain model did not reach significance, yet is signed in the correct
direction. This research has argued that purposively oriented groups should be more
likely to enter into out-of-state courts because these groups work towards a purposive
goal which may be achieved in a different state. In the combined model, the log odds
show the probability of a purposive group entering into an out-of-state court is 1.07,
or 7% greater.
The conflict variable achieves statistical significance in the combined and marriage
equality models. Prior work argues that political interests are attracted to conflict
57
Table 3.1: Causes of Out of State Court Participation by State Political Interests
Variable
Model 1:
Combined
Model 2:
Marriage Equality
Model 3:
Eminent Domain
Legal Area (Marriage Equality) 0.006
(0.03)
Group or Political Interest (Interest) 0.04 0.08 -0.01
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Purposive vs. Material (Purposive) 0.07* 0.16* 0.04
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Conflict x 100 0.07* 0.1* -0.05*
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Federated 0.06* 0.07 0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Density x 100 -0.004* -0.01* -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Diversity 2.04 6.06* 0.8
(1.14) (1.95) (1.1)
Ideological Advantage 0.7* 0.6*
(0.08) (0.09)
Missouri Plan -0.8* -0.03
(0.03) (0.05)
Ideological Advantage * Missouri Plan 0.2 0.24
(0.17) (0.20)
N 523 272 251
AIC 78.25 121.87 -121.79
*p < 0.05
The dependent variable shows instances when state political interests entered into courts with no
jurisdiction over the “home” state. It’s coded as 1.
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in different government venues. Conflict then seemingly is one important factor in
whether political interests choose the federal or state courts. The measure did not
however reach significance in the eminent domain model. Competition then may help
to drive legal venue choices in some issues more than others.
Density and Diversity may impact the decision to enter into an out-of-state court.
The state political density of interests is negatively associated with the decision to
enter into out of state courts. This finding is consistent with prior research on state
political interests and localism, which observed that the density of state political
interests is negatively associated with out-of-state lobbying registrations (Wolak et al.
2002). It does not support the contention that state political interests are more likely
to leave their home state when there exists a higher concentration of political interests.
With marriage equality, this model shows that diversity is positively associated with
entering into out-of-state courts. This research has proposed that there is a greater
chance that a group from a politically diverse state would be able to speak to a
particular case. Perhaps the marriage equality results show this.
This research proposed that state political interests would be more likely to enter
into out of state courts. In the combined model, the results show a positive associa-
tion between federated partnerships and political interests entering into out-of-state
courts. The other two models do not show this relationship, but each comes very
close to reaching statistical significance. In the combined model, the log odds show
that a federated structure increases the likelihood of a political interest entering into
an out-of-state court by 7%.
The ideological measure could be tested in the marriage equality and combined
models. In eminent domain, there existed no examples of state political interests
selecting an out-of-state court where their ideological advantage was greater than
in the home state. Ideological advantage showed a positive relationship with out of
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state legal actions in both the marriage equality and combined models. These results
are consistent with the argument that state political interests seek out courts that
are ideologically more advantageous. For the marriage equality model, the odds of a
political interest going out of state when there is an ideological advantage are 83%
higher than when there does not exist an advantage; whereas with the combined
model, the odds are 202% higher.
With judicial selection, the state political interests that entered into out-of-state
courts did so in Missouri Plan States. These data did not then give the opportunity
to test the effect of judicial selection in states that elect their judges. The Combined
model does show a negative relationship between Missouri Plan States and state po-
litical interests entering into an out of state court. This suggests that the selection
of judges may impact the choices that political interests make. The combined model
shows that likelihood of state political interests entering into an out-of-state court
where the judges are chosen by the Missouri Plan are 4% lower. The interaction be-
tween judicial selection and political ideology does not produce statistically significant
results.
3.8 Conclusions
This chapter has asked three questions: The first is there enough participation
from state political interests to make research on the relationship between state po-
litical interests and judicial federalism worthwhile. The answer is clearly yes. From
the sample, state political interests took approximately a third of the legal actions.
Clearly, this percentage is not small and shows that state political interests are active
participants in policymaking in both the national and state courts. If state political
interests are active participants then a state policy orientation clearly has the poten-
tial to matter, given that it may change the incentive structure for where and how
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these interests participate in the American courts structure.
The next question considers whether state political interests have a national or
in-state political orientation. This question was examined by considering instances
when state political interests had entered into court without jurisdiction over the
political interest’s home state, whether in the federal or state courts. In all, state
political interests entered these extraterritorial courts about 10% of the time. This
figure is large and small, depending on one’s perspective. Most of the time state
political interests either remain in the courts in either their home state or a federal
court with jurisdiction over the home state. This argues for an in-state political
orientation. Yet, this also included Supreme Court cases. When these cases plus
those in federal specialty courts are excluded, the percentage increases to 17%. State
political interests can and do become actors in other states. In both subsamples,
entrance into home state courts was high, beginning at about 50%.
Finally, why do state political interests enter into courts without jurisdiction over
their home states? Under what conditions, then, would we expect that state po-
litical interests would be more likely to become national as opposed to state policy
actors? Ultimately, the results of a logistical regression did not point to any one
factor; nonetheless, some were especially powerful. These included a purposive policy
orientation, high levels of participation by political interests, ideological advantage
and a dense political environment in the interest’s home state. These findings may
show instances when we can expect state political interests not to show a home-state
policy orientation in the courts.
The next chapter will examine qualitatively the last part of this chapter, which
considered why state political interests turn to courts with no jurisdiction over the
home state. This represents an underdeveloped area of public policy research, which
a qualitative analysis can improve on.
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Chapter 4
IN-STATE POLITICAL ORIENTATION: A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
In Chapter Three, this research considered why state political interests enter into
courts that hold no jurisdiction in their respective home states. Ultimately, this
research found that there is not one cause, but rather a number of different reasons
often acting in combination with one another that cause state political interests to
leave their home state courts. The groups that enter into out of state courts represent
the exception to the idea of state political orientation. Understanding their reasons
for doing so will help to better understand this concept.
Nonetheless, quantitative research alone might not give the most clear analysis
because this particular area of inquiry remains theoretically underdeveloped. Previous
work on the nationalization of political interests touches on localism (e.g., Zeigler
1983). Yet this work is often more descriptive of the phenomenon of nationalization
rather than its motives. Using a population ecology framework (Gray and Lowery
2000) Wolak et al. (2002) found that state political interests in politically dense states
with strong economies were less likely to register to lobby in other states.
Yet, is localism with the courts the same as with state legislatures? Also could
there be other reasons why state political interests take political actions in other
states—especially in the courts? In Chapter Three, for example, this research sug-
gested that state judicial selection methods and ideology might affect the decisions
of political interests, as it does with judges (e.g., Hall 1992). Localism, then, is a
concept that remains theoretically empty, without much prior work to point future
researchers in a direction.
Thus, the study of localism remains in the theory-building stages. While quanti-
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tative techniques are well equipped to test existing theory, these techniques are not
well suited to theory creation. Qualitative case studies, however, are very helpful
for a number of reasons (Gerring 2006): One, case studies offer proximal evidence,
hence the “relationship discovered among different elements of a single case have a
prima facie causal connection: they are all at the scene of the crime” (Gerring 2006,
p. 474-475), There is a good but not certain chance then that what is observed holds a
relationship with the outcome of interest. Two, qualitative case studies can give light
to causal mechanisms. Quantitative analysis, then, while it can establish statistical
relationships between causal agents and outcomes, it often is not descriptive of the
processes themselves. Case studies, on the other hand, are well suited for exactly this
task.
Chapter Three tested a number of different explanations why state political inter-
ests might enter into a state or federal court that lacks jurisdiction over the interest’s
home state. Briefly these explanations included: groups vs. political interests, mate-
rial vs. purposive orientation, conflict, a federated structure, density and diversity, as
well as ideology and state judicial selection methods. These explanations were rooted
in theory. Yet these explanations did not speak directly to research on localism in the
courts. It would be helpful then to make use of qualitative case studies for two rea-
sons: First, these case studies can examine the validity of the explanations that this
study has proposed. Two, these case studies might suggest causal explanations that
were not previously considered. This chapter then aims to show how the explanations
that this research has proposed are theoretically appropriate. Also this chapter can
help to lay the groundwork for future research on localism, at least in the context of
the American courts.
To accomplish these objectives this research conducted a number of case studies
of state political interests that were active in both the eminent domain and marriage
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equality issues. This study selected groups from the subset of data that was used
in Chapter Three. Each political interest took a legal action hoping to favorably
influence the decision of a court. In all six groups agreed to interviews, three that
entered into out of state courts, three that did not.
To select the political interests for study, this research has chosen the diverse case
approach (Gerring 2006; Seawright and Gerring 2008). In diverse case selection, a
researcher selects cases that represent the values of the dependent, independent vari-
ables or different relationships between the explanatory variables and outcomes. A
researcher generally selects extreme values for continuous and one from each cate-
gory for categorical variables. Starting from a large-N dataset, researchers often use
discriminant analysis to select cases for continuous, while random sampling is used
with categorical variables. Generally, this approach does well at finding cases that
are representative of different categories of theoretical interest.
This research has chosen to sample cases where state political interests both de-
cided and did not decide to enter into courts with jurisdiction over the home state.
This obviously is the dependent variable and is dichotomous. This approach avoids
the problem of selection on the dependent variable. This research clearly shows in-
terest in state political interests that go out of state. Nonetheless, in selecting only
these cases, there is a greater chance of misrepresenting the motivation to enter into
out-of-state courts. Those groups that stayed in their in-state courts too have insights
to contribute as the counterfactual. In words, the motivation for a state political in-
terest not leaving courts with jurisdiction over the home state helps differentiate to
why an otherwise similar group might do so.
In selecting cases, letters were sent via email to organizations that were active in
both the eminent domain and marriage equality issues, the names of which were found
from the data collected and described in Chapter Two. Only state political interests
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were considered, and these were the same groups examined in Chapter Three. The
correspondence asked that the organization select a person knowledgeable about the
organization. Often this individual was the director or head of the organization;
sometimes this person was an attorney or legislative affairs coordinator. The initial
response was very low and a second attempt was made to contact these organizations.
Ultimately, six organizations agreed to the interview.
Each interview lasted about half an hour and was completed on the telephone.
The semi-structured interviews consisted of 15 to 17 questions. The questions were
constructed around the explanatory variables in Chapter Three, and were designed
to help determine the motivations for that political interest entering into out-of-
state courts or only in-state courts. This study has included these questions in the
appendix. The representatives of each of the political interests was asked a slightly
different set of questions based on whether the group did or did not stay in their
in-state courts. The reason for this is that a group that entered into only in-state
courts may have had the motivation to pursue its policy goals out of state, yet the
opportunity to do so may have not presented itself. Consequently the representatives
of these groups were asked if their organization would be willing to do so.
Ideally, this study would have selected a group to interview from each division in
the dichotomous and the extremes of the continuous independent variables. Unfor-
tunately, finding organizations that fit each of these categories was challenging. Yet,
there was more diversity in groups than may have been expected for only six orga-
nizations. For example, this research proposes that purposive organizations should
enter into out of state courts more often than their material counterparts. Both types
of organizations are represented in the case studies. The Texas Municipal League, for
example, is a material organization; it advocates for the material interests of its mem-
bers while the Palmetto Family Council is a purposive group, pursuing its purposive
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policy goals.
4.1 Political Interests
This chapter now gives its attention to the groups themselves. This research gives
a brief description of each of the organizations and how each is either consistent or
inconsistent with the theoretical expectations in its decision to either enter into out-
of-state courts or stay instate. These interviews were also used to consider how the
explanations shown in Chapter Three could be incomplete. The analysis of the groups
is organized around each of the independent variables in the regression in Table 3.1.
For each organization, this research considers whether the interview responses support
each variable contributing to the model proposed in Table 3.1. Also, this research
considers whether the responses support the outcomes of the model, e.g., one would
expect that purposive organizations would be more likely to enter into out-of-state
courts. This research also provides a brief description of each organization and the
cases that each was involved with.
4.1.1 Palmetto Family Council
The Palmetto Family Council is non-membership organization in South Carolina
that advocates for conservative policy, with a focus on issues that are perceived to
affect families. The organization emerged in 1994 during a 20-year period of time
between 1980 and 2000 when many conservative organizations formed to represent
the interests of a growing conservative movement in the United States. The Palmetto
Family Council is an independent state-level organization. It maintains strong ties
with many national-level family-oriented conservative organizations including Focus
on the Family and the Family Research Council, but also other state-level family
policy advocacy organizations. Dr. Oran Smith, the president of the organization,
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was interviewed.
The Palmetto Family Council participated in an amicus brief in Perry v. Schwarzeneg-
ger (2010), a case in a larger series of cases that are often collectively referred to as
Hollingsworth v. Perry (2013). The case originated in the U.S. District of Northern
California, where the plaintiffs brought suit against the State of California. In 2008
California voters approved Proposition 8, a state constitutional initiative that defined
marriage as between a man and a woman. The plaintiffs filed suit on the grounds
that this definition violated the equal protection given to individuals under the Four-
teenth Amendment in the U.S. Constitution. The Palmetto Family Council signed
an amicus brief that went before the 9th District of the U.S. court of appeals, which
holds no jurisdiction over South Carolina. This is the only recorded instance of court
participation by the Palmetto Family Council.
Group vs. Political Interest: According to Smith the Palmetto Family Council
maintains close ties to many churches and congregations; nonetheless the group does
not have open membership and cannot be categorized as a political interest group.
Members do not make policy decisions. Consequently, the leadership has greater
autonomy than a political interest group to take political actions that includes en-
tering into out of state courts, which the Palmetto Family Council did in Perry v.
Schwarzenegger (2010).
Purposive vs. Material: The Palmetto Family Council advocates for conserva-
tive, family oriented policy in South Carolina and is clearly a purposive organization.
Their decision to enter into the California cases then is consistent with theoretical
expectations.
Participation: Smith said that supporters and associates often put pressure
on the Palmetto Family Council to take political action in many controversies. He
emphasized that most of these controversies were state controversies that touched
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on morality, family and ethics. These issues included the confederate flag, clearly
a political issue that is specific to the Southern states. While there seems to be
support for participation in political issues that are specific to South Carolina, this
does not preclude support for participation in national issues, particularly those that
affect both national and South Carolina politics. The marriage equality controversy
is clearly an example of this.
Federated Structure: The Palmetto Family Council cooperates with both Fo-
cus on the Family and the Family Research Council. This research has categorized
state interests with strong national partnerships as federated interests. The Pal-
metto Family Council’s decision to enter into the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is
then consistent with this study’s theoretical expectations. Dr. Smith said that state
organizations often have counterparts in other states. These sister organizations com-
municate and act on each other’s behalf. In a federated structure, communication
and resources do not only move between the state and national interests but also
between the state political interests themselves. This, according to Smith, was key
in the Palmetto Family Council’s decision to enter into a California court. The re-
search in Chapter Three did not anticipate this lateral cooperation between partner
state-level political interests.
Density and Diversity: The data show that South Carolina does not have high
interest group density (Gray and Lowery 2000, p. 87). Smith’s perception of the den-
sity of conservative, family-oriented organizations in South Carolina was consistent
with the data. Smith said that while there was slight competition for contributors,
there were very few state organizations in South Carolina like the Palmetto Family
Council and with political issues there often was a greater incentive to cooperate than
to compete. Political density, then, was not a factor in the Palmetto Family Council’s
decision to take an out-of-state political action. South Carolina does rank high on
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political diversity (Gray and Lowery 2000, p. 98). Yet this too does not seem to be
a factor in the Palmetto Family Council’s decision to enter into the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Smith said that there were many state-level organizations like the
Palmetto Family Council in other states. The organization then could not speak to
the issue in ways that other state-level conservative policy organizations could not.
Ideology and Judicial Selection: Smith emphasized that the Palmetto Family
Council rarely entered into the courts. Consequently, this was not an area of expertise
to his organization. The Palmetto Family Council does not have in-house attorneys,
instead relying on friends and associates. Nonetheless, Smith did not rule out the
possibility that the Palmetto Family Council and other groups could be strategic. It
does not appear, however, that the Palmetto Family Council was judicially strategic
in its decision to enter into the California Courts, which are liberal, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals especially. Also the U.S. President and not the voters selects judges
who sit on the Ninth Circuit. Judicial selection, then, was not a consideration.
Other Considerations: Smith said that the Palmetto Family Council does not
wish to become involved in the politics of other states, asserting that states should
make governance choices without the interference of political interests in other states.
Smith nonetheless said that in Perry v. Schwarzenegger (2010) the decision was
merited because California voters had approved Proposition 8. The Palmetto Family
Council then saw itself as acting on behalf of the California voters in its entrance into
the California courts.
4.1.2 Louisiana Family Forum
The Louisiana Family Forum, like the Palmetto Family Council, is a non-membership,
conservative, family-oriented political interest. The Louisiana Family Forum focuses
its attention on Louisiana politics and works to influence policy outcomes through ed-
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ucation, lobbying and the courts. The Louisiana Family Forum was started between
1998 and 1999, the same as Palmetto Family, during a period of increased conserva-
tive activism. This research spoke with the Rev. Gene Mills, the president of the
organization. The Louisiana Family Forum, like the Palmetto Family Council, par-
ticipated in an amicus brief in Perry v. Schwarzenegger (2010), which was described
in the prior description of the Palmetto Family Council.
Group vs. Political Interest: The Louisiana Family Council does not hold
open membership. Consequently, its leadership can take actions without interference
from members. Their choice to take action in the California courts was then consistent
with theoretical expectations.
Purposive vs. Material: The Louisiana Family Forum pursues a set of pol-
icy goals that are articulated in its mission statement, which is “to persuasively
present biblical principles in the centers of influence on issues affecting the family
through research, communication and networking” (Louisiana Family Forum N.d.).
The Louisiana Family Forum is then purposive. Its decision to take action in the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is consistent with theoretical expectations.
Participation: Mills said that friends and associates put pressure on the Louisiana
Family Forum to take political action on various political issues. The Rev. Mills,
however, said that the Louisiana Family Forum makes decisions based on the organi-
zation’s core values and is not “peer-driven.” So while the organization might take a
political action in a high-profile case, the group would not act because of the attention
given to a controversy or outside pressure. The high level of political participation in
Perry v. Schwarzenegger (2010), then, does not seem to be a factor in their decision
to file an amicus brief in the California case.
Federated Structure: The Louisiana Family Forum holds partnerships with
Focus on the Family and other national conservative family-oriented political inter-
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ests. Rev. Mills did not say that his group’s relationships with national political
interests contributed to their decision to out-of-state courts. He instead emphasized
the Louisiana organization’s autonomy in its decision-making. The Louisiana Family
Forum’s partnerships with Focus on the Family and other national political interests
did not seem to contribute to its decision to enter into the California courts.
Density and Diversity: The data show that Louisiana has moderate political
interest density (Gray and Lowery 2000, p. 87). This research expects competition
between political organizations for resources and out of state political participation.
Mills did say that there were other state-level conservative family organizations like
the Louisiana Family Forum. He did not, however, see the Louisiana Family Forum
as competing with these other organizations, saying that there was not “a limited
pie”. Density does not then seem to be a factor. With diversity, the data show
Louisiana as having a higher diversity of political interests. The Louisiana Family
Forum, however, only entered into one case, Perry v. Schwarzenegger (2010) where
participation was high. While the diversity of political interests in the state is high
(Gray and Lowery 2000, p. 98), the Louisiana Family Forum was not in the position
to speak uniquely to the case. Diversity, then, does not appear to be a factor in its
decision to enter into the California courts.
Ideology and Judicial Selection: Mills said that the organization was strategic
about the courts that the organization took legal actions in. The Louisiana Family
Forum’s participation in Perry v. Schwarzenegger (2010), however, shows that the
Louisiana Family Forum was willing to enter courts that were not strategically ad-
vantageous, as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is liberal (see Epstein, Landes and
Posner 2013) and judicial selection does not hold an advantage, as the U.S. President
selects federal judges. This research cannot then assert that ideology or judicial se-
lection motivated this organization to enter into courts with no jurisdiction over the
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home state.
Other Considerations: Mills said that the Louisiana Family Forum, while a
state organization, could not give its attention to only politics in the home state. He
said that judicial decisions in other states had effects in Louisiana and consequently
he considered it appropriate for the Louisiana Family Forum to take political actions
in other states. The Rev. Mills said that he watched Texas and its judiciary closely,
which could be expected, given that Texas, like Louisiana, is part of the Fifth District
Court of Appeals. Texas is also large both geographically and in population. Cali-
fornia too has these qualities and is often seen as a bellwether state for future shifts
in American policy. The organization’s decision to enter into the California courts is
logical in this framework.
4.1.3 Vermont Freedom to Marry Taskforce
Vermont attorneys Susan Murray and Beth Robinson co-founded the Vermont
Freedom to marry Taskforce in 1996. The organization spearheaded the drive for
marriage equality and achieved partial victory when the Vermont Supreme Court
ruled that same sex couples were entitled to the rights and privileges of those in tra-
ditional marriages in Baker v. Vermont (1999). The high court, however, did not
mandate full marriage equality; instead it gave the Vermont legislature the option of
changing Vermont law to either grant marriage equality or civil unions. The Vermont
legislature did the later, creating an important yet unsatisfying victory for marriage
equality proponents. Today, the organization does not exist, having disbanded re-
cently in 2015 following the Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) ruling. This research spoke
with co-founder Beth Robinson, who now sits on the Vermont Supreme Court.
The Vermont Freedom to Marry Taskforce challenged the Vermont law on mar-
riage through test cases. In 1997, three same sex couples filed for marriage licenses in
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Vermont. The court clerks declined their requests. In response the couples initiated
legal challenges in trial court with the sponsorship of the Vermont taskforce, with
the ultimate goal of an appeal to the state supreme court, which heard the case in
Baker v. Vermont (1999) . Following the court’s decision the Vermont Freedom to
Marry Taskforce remained active on the state legislative response to the ruling. The
groups also participated in amicus briefs in other similar state challenges to marriage,
which included Li v. State (2005); Andersen v. King County (2006); Lewis v. Harris
(2006); Varnum v. Brien (2009).
Group vs. Political Interest: This research cannot classify The Vermont
Freedom to Marry Taskforce as a political interest group. The organization did have
a number of active participants who attended organized meetings and contributed
their efforts to the taskforce’s political goals. The group’s membership, however,
does not appear to have been formalized. Robinson said that she considered anyone
who had signed a statement affirming her personal support for marriage equality to
have been a member. Nor does it appear that these potential members directed the
actions of the organization. Robinson said that litigation was the strategy, as an
appeal to the Vermont legislature was untenable at the time.
Purposive vs. Material: The Vermont Freedom to Marry Taskforce was clearly
a purposive organization. Robinson emphasized that the organization’s name in-
cluded the word “taskforce” because the group existed to achieve the goal of marriage
equality. It is clear then that the group did not exist to represent the interests of its
members but rather to achieve a specific political goal.
Participation: This research considers calls for participation to potentially be an
important factor in the taskforce’s decision to enter into out-of-state courts. Robinson
said that the Vermont High Court’s decision in Baker v. Vermont (1999) was unsat-
isfying. Consequently, the group wanted to share the experience that it had gained in
73
the Vermont case in the state cases that followed. Like Baker v. Vermont (1999), the
subsequent state court cases were high profile and high stakes. These cases obviously
had the potential to advance marriage equality and the Vermont Freedom to Marry
Taskforce actively participated in these cases.
Federated Structure: The Vermont Freedom to Marry Taskforce did not have
a federated structure. In Baker v. Vermont (1999) Mary Bonauto, an attorney with
GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders, a New England organization, did participate
in the case as co-counsel. There does not, however, appear to be a national-state
structure in place. The Vermont Freedom to Marry Taskforce’s decision to enter into
out-of-state courts then does not seem to be influenced by a national partnership.
Density and Diversity Vermont has a low political density, with many fewer
political interests than California, Texas and other large states (Gray and Lowery
2000, p. 87). 1 Robinson said that there existed only a few organizations at the time
that advocated for marriage equality, which included the Vermont Coalition for Gay
Rights. She said that the Vermont Freedom to Marry Taskforce did not compete with
other organizations for members or resources. Political density then does not seem
to be a factor in this group’s decisions to enter into out of state courts. The data
show that Vermont has a moderate diversity of political interests (Gray and Lowery
2000, p. 98). Robinson said that she perceived Vermont to be a politically active
state, with political interests organizing around a number of issues. Robinson did say
that the Vermont Freedom to Marry Taskforce gained unique experience from Baker
v. Vermont (1999) and the group was able to uniquely speak to marriage equality
in other states; consequently, Vermont’s political diversity may represent one factor,
given that a Vermont organization had the unique experience and knowledge to speak
1Vermont arguably is a very politically engaged state. Gray and Lowery (2000) however measure
density two ways: density before government and density in the population. Wolak et al. (2002)
selected the first measure, which this study did also to be consistent.
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to this issue.
Ideology and Judicial Selection: Robinson said that the Vermont Freedom
to Marry Taskforce made strategic decisions. She said however that the organization
only made choices about which trial courts where the plaintiffs would file against the
state. These courts did not need to have liberal judges. Rather, the taskforce looked
for courts where the decision could be quickly appealed to the Vermont Supreme
Court—which was liberal.
Following Baker v. Vermont (1999), the task force filled amicus briefs in many
out of state courts. Robinson did not say that these decisions were strategic. It’s
true that many of these states are politically liberal—including Oregon, Washington
State, New Jersey and to a lesser extent Iowa. So, there most likely would not have
been litigation had these state courts not been liberal. Robinson as previously noted
asserted that marriage equality advocates found Vermont civil unions compromise
not satisfying. This seems to represent the driving force behind the group’s out of
state court actions.
Regarding state judicial selection, Oregon, Washington State, New Jersey and
Iowa do not elect their judges in partisan elections; Washington State and Oregon
do hold nonpartisan elections. Following the Iowa courts’ decision affirming same
sex marriage, Iowa citizens voted not to retain three Iowa State Supreme Court
justices. This however represents conservative and not liberal political pressure—
which would not have aided the Vermont Freedom to Marry Taskforce. In Oregon
and Washington State might liberal political pressure have affected the choices that
the justices made? Both the Oregon and Washington high courts ruled against same
sex marriage in 2005 and 2006 respectively. This research also does not find that any
of the justices lost their seats in in spite of their conservative rulings in liberal states.
It does not seem that—even in liberal states—there was enough public support for
75
marriage equality at the time for voters to have taken the seats away from justices
ruling conservatively; consequently the connections between state judicial selection
and the Vermont Freedom to Marry Taskforce’s decision to enter into out of state
courts is not clear.
4.1.4 Texas Municipal League
The Texas Municipal League represents the interests of Texas cities before the
Texas state legislature and in the courts. This research spoke with Scott Houston,
the deputy executive director and general counsel for the organization. The Texas
Municipal League traces its origins to 1913, when Austin mayor A.P. Woodbridge
invited neighboring cities to form an organization that acted in their collective inter-
ests.
The Texas Municipal League did not enter into state or federal courts that did
not have jurisdiction over Texas. The organization is active in eminent domain cases.
The data collected show seven instances in six separate cases when the Texas Munic-
ipal League entered into the courts. In each instance, the Texas Municipal League
participated in amicus curiae before the Texas Supreme Court. The organization,
then, only entered into the Texas state courts.
These cases involved monetary claims against Texas municipalities. For example,
in City of Houston v. Trail Enterprises, Inc. (2012) a landowner had filled suit against
the City of Houston for an ordinance prohibiting drilling for gas and oil wells on Lake
Houston, the main source of drinking water for the city. The landowning organization
claimed that the city restrictions on oil and gas drilling had violated its legal rights
under eminent domain. Consequently, it was alleged, the city of Houston had a legal
obligation to compensate the clamant. In Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates
(2004) a land developer filed suit against the City of Flower Mound for requiring
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that the developer make improvements to a public street as a condition for approving
the development permit. The developer claimed inappropriate takings under eminent
domain protections given by both the Texas and U.S. constitutions.
Group vs. Political Interest: Political interests may be more likely to enter
into outside courts because the leaders of the organization do not have formalized
membership. A political interest may then be more likely to enter into an out-of-
state court because had it had members, these individuals might see an out-of-state
legal action as not in their best interests. Consequently, there would be greater
freedom to act. With the Texas Municipal Association, Houston said that its members
decided the organization’s political agenda annually. This supports the notion that
membership groups are less likely to enter into out-of-state courts.
Purposive vs. Material: The Texas Municipal League strictly represents the in-
terests of its members. Consequently, it is a material and not purposive organization,
and would be expected to enter into out-of-state courts less. The Texas Municipal
League did not deviate from this expectation. As noted the organization only took
legal action in the Texas courts. Also, Houston strongly emphasized that it would be
highly unlikely that the Texas Municipal Association enter into out-of-state courts.
Houston said that its members had strict control over the organization’s legislative
and legal agendas.
Participation: Houston said that its members often expect that the Texas Mu-
nicipal League will participate in high-profile cases. The Texas Municipal League’s
decisions to enter into only Texas courts were then inconsistent with this research’s
expectations. Houston said that the Texas Municipal League might leave the Texas
courts, but most likely the organization would defer these cases to its partners at the
federal level.
Federated Structure: This research has suggested that federated state inter-
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ests might be more likely to enter into out-of-state courts. Their parent organizations
might give these groups the resources to act in other states. Also, the parent or-
ganizations might put pressure on these groups to act in other states. Also state
groups might be more likely to enter into other states because the states themselves
are becoming more politically similar. The Texas Municipal League’s actions were
not consistent with these expectations. The Texas Municipal League does not have
a parent organization; nonetheless it holds strong political partnerships with both
the National League of Cities and International Municipal Attorneys Association.
Houston said that Texas Municipal League’s national and international partnerships
incentivized greater state political participation. When national cases arise, Houston
said that the Texas Municipal League could defer these cases to its national affiliates.
Density and Diversity: This research has argued that state political interests
would be more likely to participate in out-of-state court cases when there are more
as opposed to fewer political interests. In dense interest group systems, group death
is more likely (Gray and Lowery 1998), and entering into the courts while out of
state might bring greater attention to a political interest that would otherwise be
obscure. Texas, despite its size, has moderate to low political interest density (Gray
and Lowery 2000, p. 87). Houston’s perception of the density of political interests
in regards to municipal associations was consistent with this data. Houston said
that there were very few groups that advocated on behalf of cities at the state level,
so while Texas might have many competing interests, there are relatively few that
represent cities. This would then be consistent with these theoretical expectations.
This research has also proposed that diversity might also be a factor. Chapter
Three argued that when there are more types of groups, there are more opportunities
for a group to speak to a case in another state. Texas ranks moderately on the
diversity scale (Gray and Lowery 2000, p. 98). Houston said that he saw Texas as a
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politically active state, with groups engaged in different political areas. The Texas
Municipal League, however, did not take any legal actions outside of Texas, and
the political diversity in the state did not compel it to do so. This observation is
consistent with the outcomes of the regression in Table 3.1, where diversity did not
reach statistical significance.
Ideology and Judicial Selection: This research has suggested that ideology
and judicial selection play roles in interest groups’ decisions to enter into out-of-
state courts. Houston asserted that the Texas Municipal League did make strategic
decisions about both judges and the courts where the group leaders believed that the
judgments would be favorable. Nonetheless, Houston also asserted that this was not
common in Texas cases given that the state and judiciary was mostly conservative
and not enough to compel the group to go out of state, given its in-state orientation
to Texas politics. The Texas Municipal League does not illustrate how ideology and
judicial selection impact the decision to influence policy in out-of-state courts.
4.1.5 League of Oregon Cities
The Oregon League of Cities was founded in 1925 to represent Oregon cities before
the state legislature and courts. The organization strongly advocates for municipal
home rule. In Oregon, cities retain much autonomy from the Oregon legislature,
which The Oregon League of Cities vigorously defends. This research spoke with
Sean O’Day, the lead counsel with the group.
The Oregon League of Cities participated in an amicus brief in West Linn Cor-
porate Park, LLC v. City of West Linn (2011), a case that went before the Oregon
Supreme Court. In the case West Linn Corporate Park, LLC, an incorporated devel-
opment group, filed inverse condemnation charges against the city of West Linn. The
group claimed that land use improvements required by the city for the development of
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a corporate park were not permissible under both the Oregon and U.S. constitutions.
This is the only case in the data where the Oregon League of Cities was a participant.
The group then did not take any legal actions in courts that lacked jurisdiction over
the home state of Oregon.
Group vs. Political Interest: The Oregon League of Cities represents the
interests of its member cities. The organization then can be classified as a political
interest group and not a political interest. The members of the group meet annually
to set the policy agenda for the year. The group’s decision not to enter into courts
that lack jurisdiction over Oregon is then consistent with theoretical expectations.
The members of the organization might see litigation outside of Oregon as being
wasteful of resources.
Purposive vs. Material: As noted the Oregon League of Cities holds broad
political goals such as protecting the home rule of its member cities. There is then a
purposive element to the group. Yet the members also meet annually to create the
legislative and legal agendas, which the group’s participation in eminent domain cases
suggest often protect their member cities from greater financial liability. The Oregon
League of Cites can then be classified as material and not purposive organization.
Their decision not to enter into out-of-state courts is theoretically consistent with
this.
Participation: O’Day said that the members of the Oregon League of Cities
expect that the group will participate in high profile legal cases. He also said that the
League of Oregon cities mostly focuses its attention on home rule and the political
autonomy of its towns and cities so it would be unlikely that calls for participation
would compel the organization to enter into out-of-state courts. Calls for participation
nonetheless are theoretically inconsistent with the Oregon League of Cities decision
to only remain in the Oregon courts.
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Federated Structure: The Oregon League of Cities is autonomous; nonetheless
it maintains ties with the National League of Cities. O’Day said that his organization
remains in close contact with the National League of Cities and the Oregon League
of Cities often defers cases to the National League of Cities when the group believes
that the outcome will ultimately affect policy beyond the Oregon borders. This
research has suggested that a federated structure might encourage a state group to
enter into out-of-state courts. The Oregon League of Cities’ decision to remain in the
Oregon courts is inconsistent with its partnership with the National League of Cities.
This observation suggests that a federated structure might decrease out-of-state legal
actions, since partner organizations specialize in other jurisdictions.
Density and Diversity: The data show that Oregon has high political density
(Gray and Lowery 2000, p. 87). There are a number of political interests that lobby
the state legislature and attempt to influence policy in Oregon. The research might
expect then that there would be an incentive for groups to enter into out-of-state
courts. The Oregon League of Cities, however, remained exclusively in the Oregon
courts. This is less consistent with these expectations. The data show that Oregon has
low political diversity (Gray and Lowery 2000, p. 98). Their decision to only remain
in the Oregon courts is then consistent with this research’s expectations because it
would be less likely that a political interest could speak uniquely to a particular case
in another state.
Ideology and Judicial Selection: O’Day said that the Oregon Municipal
League was strategic about the courts that the group litigated in. O’Day, nonetheless,
said that the organization took legal action almost exclusively in the Oregon state
court of appeals and state supreme court. Ideology and judicial selection then do
not appear to be factors in the Oregon Municipal League’s decision to remain in the
Oregon courts. O’Day said that in the Oregon courts there were few opportunities
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for legal venue shopping.
4.1.6 Michigan Environmental Council
In 1980, environmental leaders in Michigan created the Michigan Environmental
Council to aid in their efforts to protect the Michigan environment and the larger
Great Lakes region. The council is a peak association, with more than 70 individual
membership groups. The organization participates in Michigan politics in different
ways: lobbying the legislature, public education, giving expertise to issues and partic-
ipation in the courts. This research spoke with James Clift, the organization’s policy
director.
The Michigan Environmental Council participated in an amicus brief in K & K
Const., Inc. v Department of Natural Resources, a case before the Michigan Supreme
Court. In the case, the company sought damages under eminent domain following the
Michigan Department of Natural Resources’ decision to deny a construction permit on
wetlands owned by the company. In its ruling the Michigan Supreme Court considered
the impact of the Michigan Department of Natural Resources’ decision on the entirety
of the land, not only the wetlands. This was a novel interpretation, and it attracted
much public attention.
In the data for this project, the Michigan Environmental Council did not enter
into any courts that lacked jurisdiction over the home state of Michigan. Clift said
that the organization took an especially strong interest in issues that affected the
Great Lakes, which span a number of states and Ontario, a Canadian province. As
a result, the organization might enter into a neighboring states court, yet, to his
memory, had not done so, and would most likely remain in the Michigan courts.
Group vs. Political Interest: The Michigan Environmental Council sets its an-
nual legislative agenda with input and aid from its members. Consequently, members
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play a role in deciding what political actions the organization takes. The Michigan
Environmental Council’s decision to only enter into the Michigan courts is consistent
with its membership-based structure. Clift said that the leaders of the organization
enjoyed much autonomy in making day-to-day decisions. Nonetheless, this autonomy
did not contribute to any decisions to enter into out-of-state courts, perhaps because
its members might see such a choice as outside Michigan politics.
Purposive vs. Material: The Michigan Environmental Council is purposive,
advocating for the protection of the Michigan and Great Lakes environment. The
group’s participation in only the Michigan courts is not consistent with its purposive
orientation. Clift, however, strongly emphasized the importance of the larger Great
Lakes environment and said that the organization might enter into the courts of a
neighboring state.
Participation: The Michigan Environmental Council is very politically active,
Clift said, and its members expect that the organization will participate in high-profile
issues in different policy venues. Nonetheless, this organization has not entered into
courts that lack jurisdiction over the home state of Michigan. Clift said that the
Michigan Environmental Council might pursue its goals in an out-of-state court; so
in the future pressure to participate might cause the organization to enter into out-
of-state courts, particularly with Great Lakes issues. He did however also say that
the Michigan Environmental Council was strongly embedded in Michigan politics and
would most likely only take legal actions in the Michigan courts.
Federated Structure: The Michigan Environmental Council does not have a
federated structure, at least in the traditional sense. It does have in-state member
organizations. The council is not however part of a larger national organization nor
does it hold strong partnerships with one. This research has proposed that state
groups with a federated structure will be more likely to enter into out of state courts
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and the Michigan Environmental Councils choices to remain in the Michigan courts
are consistent with this prediction
Density and Diversity: According to the data, Michigan holds a high number of
political interests that are registered to lobby the state legislature (Gray and Lowery
2000, p. 87). Consequently, Michigan groups might be more likely to enter into out-
of-state courts. Clift said that there are many environmental groups in Michigan.
Nonetheless he also said that he did not think that the Michigan Environmental
Council competed with these other organizations for members or resources, with the
Michigan Environmental Council being somewhat unique in that it is an organization
of organizations. High political diversity (Gray and Lowery 2000, p. 98) has not
seemed to inspire the Michigan Environmental Council to look to outside state courts.
Clift said that he saw political diversity in Michigan as well. Clift said that the
Michigan Environmental Council could give important insights into environmental
issues affecting the Great Lakes. The group nonetheless has remained in Michigan’s
courts so political diversity does not seem to be a factor.
Ideology and Judicial Selection: Clift said that the Michigan Environmental
Council made strategic choices about the courts that it wished to enter into. Clift
said that the group often consults with outside attorneys who “Undoubtedly do a
little bit of judge shopping.” Many perceive the Sixth District Court of Appeals to be
liberal (Walsh 2012), and it is likely that people perceive the Michigan state courts
similarly. The Michigan Environmental Council then may not have an incentive to
enter into other state courts, which it has not done, given that the Michigan courts
are a close ideological match.
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Table 4.1: Interests and Out of State Courts
Palmetto
Family
Louisiana
Family
Forum
Vermont
Freedom to
Marry
Taskforce
Group v.
Political
Interest
Interest Interest Interest
Purposive v.
Material
Purposive Purposive Purposive
Participation Yes Yes Yes
Federated
Structure
Yes Yes No
Density Low Middle Low
Diversity Low High Middle
Ideology No No No
Judicial Selection No No No
The table above shows the three political interests that entered
into courts with no jurisdiction over the home state. The table
cells indicate the values this research assigned for each of the
independent variables based on interviews, outside sources and
historical facts.
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Table 4.2: Interests and In State Courts
Texas
Municipal
League
Oregon
League
of
Cities
Michigan
Environmental
Council
Group v.
Political
Interest
Group Group Group
Purposive v.
Material
Material Material Purposive
Participation Yes Yes No
Federated
Structure
Yes Yes No
Density Middle-low High High
Diversity Middle Low High
Ideology No No No
Judicial Selection No No No
The table above shows the three political interests that remained in
courts with jurisdiction over the home state. The table cells indicate
the values this research assigned for each of the independent variables
based on interviews, outside sources and historical facts.
4.2 Results and Conclusions
Having examined six political interests and their choices, this research now con-
cludes this theory building exercise by following the instructions of Professor John
Gerring and examining what was at the scene of the crime—which in this chapter is
the decision of political interests to enter into out of state courts. Table 4.1 shows
the three political interests that entered into out-of-state courts. Table 4.2 shows the
three political interests that did not.
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Examining Table 4.1, some clear patterns emerge. The political interests that en-
tered into out of state courts—and in doing so became national policymakers—shared
certain attributes. For one, these organizations lack(ed) formalized membership struc-
tures. All of these political interests have or had 2 active participants. Yet, these
participants did not elect the organizations’ leaders, nor did these individuals have
the power to make sure that the leaders followed their wishes. In Table 4.2 we see that
the groups that remained in courts with jurisdiction over the home state had mem-
bers. True, the Michigan Environmental Council is an association of associations, yet
the leadership in each of these groups follows the wishes of their memberships, who
decide the direction of the groups in annual meetings.
A similar pattern shows itself with purposive groups, which, with the exception
of the Michigan Environmental Council, all entered into out of state courts. With
material organizations, both groups in the sample remained in home state courts.
This research has proposed that purposive organizations might see their political
goals achievable in other states and these observations do not contradict this.
Taken together—membership and a purposive orientation—represent the strongest
factors. Nonetheless, the other factors are worthy of discussion, especially given that
the previous chapter discovered statistically significant relationships between these
independent variables and the decision to enter into an out of state court. To begin
with federated interests, the number of organizations that remained in their home
state courts equals the number that did not, suggesting that federation does not play
an important role. This nonetheless does not mean that federation is not an impor-
tant factor. Oran Smith pointed out that federated state-level sister organizations
often communicate, and come to each other’s aid. This represents one real world
example of how a federated structure contributes to the decision to enter into out of
2The Vermont Freedom to Marry Taskforce has ceased to exist.
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state courts.
Do calls for participation in political controversies motivate state political interests
to enter into out of state courts? In the interviews the leaders of organizations, most
said that members and those outside of the organizations encouraged participation
in high profile legal cases and debates. So, calls for participation are not exclusive to
those groups that enter into out of state courts and this may not be an important
factor.
Lowery and Gray look to external causes to explain the makeup of political interest
communities as well as their actions. Density and diversity may have limited power to
motivate political interests’ decisions to enter into out of state courts. The problem is
statewide density and diversity is not always descriptive of the density and diversity of
political interests acting on a particular issue. Most of the group leaders this research
spoke to said that there were few groups like theirs. Moreover, these leaders said that
they did not see their organizations in competition with each other for resources or
members.
Finally, the qualitative part of this research did not discover definitive connections
between judicial ideology, state judicial selection and the decision to enter into out
of state courts. This does not mean that these connections do not exist. All of the
leaders of the organizations that this research spoke to said that their organizations
were strategic. Attorney Scott Houston for example said the Texas Municipal League
acted strategically yet there were few opportunities to do so in Texas, with both
conservative federal and state courts. Yet they found it difficult to give examples
of how their groups were strategic. Indeed political interests may not make choices
so much as they seize opportunities (see Kingdon 1984). The Vermont Freedom to
Marry Taskforce, according to Beth Robinson, did not select the Vermont Supreme
Court because the court was liberal in Baker v. Vermont. Rather the group entered
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into the court because it happened to be liberal and this represented an opportunity
that was not present in other states.
This research now concludes its discussion of state political orientation. Both
Chapters Three and Four argue for in state political orientation. In this qualitative
consideration of state political orientation, the leaders in the state organizations that
this research spoke with—both liberal and conservative—expressed some measure of
discomfort with having crossed state lines. All felt the need to justify their choices.
This research now turns to state political orientation and its effect on the decision to
enter into the state and federal courts.
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Chapter 5
STATE OR FEDERAL COURTS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND THEIR
CHOICES
The previous chapters attempted to illustrate how state political interests are
uniquely embedded in their respective states. In the context of the American courts,
this research discovered that state political interests were actively engaged in the
marriage equality and eminent domain debates. Nonetheless these political interests
were unlikely to enter into other state courts or federal circuit courts that lacked
jurisdiction over their home states.
This chapter explores whether this state orientation of state political interests af-
fects the choice of whether to pursue policy goals at the level of the state courts versus
in the federal courts. This research has proposed that it does: place matters. State
political interests develop unique relationships with their respective state courts, and
these relationships ultimately affect venue choices. The mechanism remains unclear.
Nonetheless, the literature does make some suggestions as to how a state political
orientation might compel a state political interest to seek policy via the state courts.
First, state political interests might be in a better position to litigate at the state
level because these groups are more likely to have the political connections to do
so. A political interest would be more likely to find attorneys knowledgeable in the
laws of a particular state residing in that state rather than in Washington, D.C.
There would seemingly also be more opportunities for social interaction between the
leaders of state level political interests and these attorneys, given that these people
would share political and possibly physical space. These interactions would produce
partnerships that give state political interests a unique advantage over their national
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counterparts in litigating at the state level. Clearly, a national political interests can
hire an attorney skilled in state law, yet they might be less inclined to so without
having cultivated these social and political bonds first.
Yet, these social and political bonds might reach beyond the state political in-
terests and attorneys with specialized knowledge of state law. These bonds might
extend to the state judges themselves, who, seemingly, would also share political and
physical and political space. Judges wish to present themselves as judicious, and
independent of outside influence (e.g., Gibson and Caldeira 2009).
Nonetheless, judges, most likely, cannot escape outside influence, especially in
the states where interactions between state judges and state political interests would
seemingly happen more frequently than with their national counterparts. Political
interests may attempt to leverage these relationships that develop over time. These
interests, also, most likely have a unique awareness of the political vulnerabilities of
state judges and may be attracted to the state courts because these groups believe
that they can use this information.Comparato (2003), for example, found that po-
litical interests send targeted messages to state judges through amicus curiae briefs
depending on the state judicial selection methods in that particular state.
Next, individuals might put pressure on state political interests to participate
in cases in their home states. Cases bring media attention, which the members of
state political organizations are exposed to. These members may then call on the
state organization to participate in these cases as a symbolic gesture (Holyoke 2003).
Additionally, national political interests might encourage their state level counterparts
to participate in these cases because they believe that these groups will be socially
and politically closer to the people and consequently have a greater chance of building
support and momentum for a particular cause. Yet, why would one expect that these
cases would play out in the state courts? Entrance into the federal courts has become
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increasing difficult following New Judicial Federalism (Porter and Tarr 1982). As a
result, more cases that originate in the states will be adjudicated in state courts,
which state political interests might come under political pressure to participate from
their in-state members (Holyoke 2003).
Finally, state political interests can enter into federal courts, yet these courts
might be perceived as out of bounds or outside of the realm of the influence that
state political interests should have. Farole (1998) found that many political interests
that pursued policy at the national level were not comfortable entering into the state
courts. Many of those representatives of national political interests told Farole in
his interviews that these organizations felt uncomfortable in the state courts because
these groups did not possess the inside connections that their state counterparts did.
The aversion that national political interests have for state courts might also prove
true for state political interests, yet in the opposite direction. State political interests
might avoid national courts because these groups lack the social connections and
“comfort factor” that they have in their respective state judiciaries.
5.1 Examining the Impact of State Political Orientation
Does a state political orientation, then, affect the choices that state level political
interests make with judicial federalism? There are a number of ways to test this
proposal. One way to consider the impact of a state political orientation is by exam-
ining the rate at which state and national political interests enter into the state and
national courts. If state political interests have a state political orientation and this
orientation compels state political interests to select state courts as a political venue
then one would expect that state political interests do so at a disproportionately high
rate relative to their national counterparts. Using the data described in Chapter two,
this can be accomplished by examining instances when state and national political
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interests entered into the state and national courts. These data can be used to com-
pare relative proportions. If a state political orientation positively affects the decision
to enter into the state courts then state political interests should enter into the state
courts more often than national political interests.
The data collected give the opportunity to make some important observations and
gain unique insights. As previously described these data were collected in two distinct
legal areas: eminent domain and marriage equality. Eminent domain is largely driven
by questions of federal law. These cases often ask the courts to interpret the level of
protection given to private property by the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Marriage equality cases, on the other hand, show instances when both the federal and
state courts are advantaged. Prior to (Perry v. Schwarzenegger 2010), where political
interests challenged California’s same-sex constitutional prohibition under federal law,
the data collected show that political interests largely challenged prohibitions on same
sex marriage on state constitutional grounds. Thus, examining these two areas of law
provides instances when both the federal and state courts held a legal advantage.
The federal or state legal advantage is important. Political interests should turn
to the state courts only when state law is advantaged (Farole 1998). If state political
interests turn to the state courts in instances when federal law is advantaged, this
argues for state political orientation, given that the federal-state legal advantage is
cast as the most powerful predictor of legal actions in the state or federal courts.
A state political orientation, then, has the power to incentivize participation in the
state courts in spite of the advantages bestowed by the balance of power between
the federal and state courts. A state political orientation might also incentivize the
participation of state political interests when the state courts hold the legal advantage.
A state political orientation then could propel state political interests to turn to the
state courts even more in relationship to their national counterparts when there is a
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state legal advantage. Conversely, national political interests might have the ability
to change their legal strategies quickly, so the state political orientation might only
apply mainly to instances when the federal courts hold the advantage.
Groups with traditional membership structures might also make different choices
than those without them. This study observed in Chapters Three and Four that
groups without members were more likely to enter into courts with no jurisdiction
over the home state. State organizations with members then might hold a stronger
in-state political orientation. This orientation might cause these groups to not only
remain in courts that hold jurisdiction over the home state, but also in the state courts
themselves. The data collected creates the opportunity to only consider political
interest groups—which this research does.
5.2 Participation in the Federal and State Courts
5.2.1 Eminent Domain
This research recorded the participation of political interests in eminent domain
cases in both the federal and state courts. The cases observed in this area of law
all held a federal legal advantage, so this factor cannot affect the rate at which state
and federal interests turn to the state and federal courts. Table 5.1 shows that the
difference between the participation rates of national and state political interests
and interest groups in the state courts achieves statistical significance . Examining
the percentages, for state political interests, their rates of participation in the state
courts are much higher than their national counterparts, 31% versus 7%. The same
relationship held true for state political interest groups; their participation in the
state courts was also relatively high, 20% versus 6%.
The judges in these cases decided most of them on the basis of federal law. Seem-
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Table 5.1: State and National Organization Partic-
ipation Rates in State Courts in Eminent Domain
Political
Interests or
Groups
National or
State
Groups
Percent
State
Court
Political Interests*
National 7%
State 31%
Political Interest Groups*
National 6%
State 20%
*p ≤ .05
The above figure records individual act of participation, e.g.,
submitting an amicus brief, of both political interests and in-
terest groups in the state courts. The column labeled “Percent
State Court” shows the percentage of participation in the state
courts. With eminent domain cases, these cases were catego-
rized as all having a federal legal advantage.
ingly, the state political interests understood this, yet were nonetheless inclined to
make federal arguments in state rather than federal courts. Clearly, their national
counterparts did not show the same enthusiasm for choosing the state courts. How
can we explain these different tactics, given that state law doesn’t seem to be very
much of a consideration? The personal relationships and connections that state po-
litical interests develop with their state courts in addition to their embeddedness in
state political communities provides one explanation. Seemingly state political in-
terests decided to make federal arguments in state courts because these groups were
more comfortable doing so in these particular cases.
5.2.2 Marriage Equality
Next, this study examines the rate of participation by political interests and groups
in marriage equality cases. Unlike with the eminent domain cases, these cases include
periods of time when both the federal and state courts held a legal advantage. This
gives the opportunity to consider the state political orientation of groups both ways,
both when there is a state legal advantage and when there is not. The results can
also be compared against the results for eminent domain, given that both legal areas
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have periods of time when federal law is advantaged.
Table 5.2 shows the results for political interest participation in state and federal
courts in marriage equality cases. These data show that state political interests
participated at a higher rate than national interests when the cases with a state and
federal legal advantage were combined, with a 60% to 40% difference in participation
for national and state interests. State political interest groups similarly participate
at a disproportionately high rate. The difference of means between the participation
rates of national and state political interests in both the political interests and political
interest group categories reaches statistical significance. A similar pattern emerges
when examining only the cases where there existed a federal legal advantage. In these
cases, state political interests turned to the state courts at a disproportionately high
rate, 8% to 1% for state political interests and 12% to 0% for state political interest
groups. While the difference of means test achieves statistical significance for political
interests, it does not do so for political interest groups.
State political interests and state political interest groups, however, did not enter
into the state courts more often when there existed a state legal advantage, as shown
in Table 4.2. With these observations, the differences of means tests did not achieve
statistical significance. Examining participation, state political interests turned to
the state courts at exactly the same rate as their national counterparts. So while the
observations in the observations in the mixed and federal legal advantage categories
parallel those found in eminent domain, the marriage equality observations having
a state legal advantage did not. These findings do not contradict the idea of state
political interests having a state political orientation. Rather it suggests that national
political interests will turn to the state courts when they are compelled to do so by
legal advantage. In cases where this advantage did not exist, where there was a federal
legal advantage, national political showed a much greater hesitation to enter into the
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Table 5.2: State and National Organization Participa-
tion Rates in State Courts in Marriage Equality
Political
Interests or
Groups
National or
State
Groups
Percent
State
Court
Combined Federal and State Legal Advantage
Political Interests*
National 7%
State 31%
Political Interest Groups*
National 6%
State 20%
State Legal Advantage
Political Interests
National 96%
State 96%
Political Interest Groups
National 100%
State 100%
Federal Legal Advantage
Political Interests*
National 1%
State 8%
Political Interest Groups
National 0%
State 12%
*p ≤ .05
The above figure shows individual act of participation, e.g., sub-
mitting an amicus brief, of both political interests and interest
groups in the state and federal courts. The “Percent State Court”
column shows the percentage of participation in the state courts.
The “Legal Area” row shows periods of time when the courts fa-
vored federal or state law.
state courts, as shown by their proportionately low entrance rate compared to their
state counterparts.
It would seem that a state political orientation impacts the decision to turn to
the state courts when the law offers a choice. While state courts can interpret state
and federal law, the federal courts primarily interpret federal law. Clearly, national
political interests cannot go to the federal courts when the legal question focuses on
state law, so they will turn to the state courts. Yet, cases that focus on federal law,
do present a choice, given that the state courts can interpret both federal and state
laws. In these cases, the perceived comfort with either the federal or state courts
matters. State political interests seemingly venture towards the state courts because
these groups are embedded in the same legal and political communities as those in
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the state judiciary. National political interests, however, are not, and it is logical to
assume that these groups would veer towards the national courts, given that these
groups lack the in state connections of their state counterparts.
5.2.3 Case Families
The measures shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, however, may not accurately capture
the choices that political interests and groups make to enter into the state or federal
courts. The participation in some individual cases was higher than in others, espe-
cially the marriage equality cases leading up to Obergefell v. Hodges (2015). A second
way to examine the participation of political interests in the state and federal courts
is to examine the participation in case families. As described in Chapter 2, legal
cases make their way through different courts. Individual cases, then, are often part
of larger case families. It is helpful to examine the participation of political interests
in these families because the participation of political interests in some case families is
disproportionately high. Multiple acts of participation in a case family, however, can
be condensed into a single observation. This approach gives equal weight to the case
families, which, arguably, is more representative of the actions that political interests
took in the courts.
To create this measure, this research applied the same rules that were used with
the previous two measures. This measure, however, captures participation in case
families, so the entrance into a group of associated cases counted as one observation
regardless of the number of times the political interest or group decided to participate
in that family. There is one exception, however: If in a case family, a political interest
entered into the federal and sate courts then there are two observations, one for the
state and federal courts. To qualify for inclusion in the measure, a political interest
must have entered into at least one individual case on the side that brought the case
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before the court, as with the previous two measures. The counts may seem high,
given that participation in a family of cases only counts as one observation, but this
is to be expected, given that most of the case families were small, with only one or
two cases.
Table 5.3 gives the results of this analysis. This tabulation of case participation
produces the same results as counting each instance of participation as a single ob-
servation. This particular analysis bolsters the previous findings. These data suggest
that state political interests are embedded within state legal and political communi-
ties and will pick the state courts at a much higher rate than the political interests
at the national level, given this orientation. Examining participation in case families
rather than individual cases does not change the outcome. In instances where there
was a federal legal advantage state political interests turned more often to the state
courts than similar groups at the national level. This does not hold true for state legal
advantage, yet in these instances there is really not so much of an option between the
federal and state courts, given that state courts largely have jurisdiction over state
legal matters.
5.3 Regression Analysis
It would seem that state political interests and groups enter into the state courts
more often than those that focus on national policymaking. Yet, is state political
embeddedness a powerful determinant to enter into the state courts? This research
suggests that it is. State political interests are embedded in state political communi-
ties and this compels these groups to turn to the state courts at a disproportionately
high rate. This hypothesis can be tested with regression, with the choice to enter into
either the state or federal courts as the outcome variable of a logit regression.
Clearly, to test this proposal, this study must also take previous research (Farole
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Table 5.3: State and National Organization Partici-
pation Rates in State Courts in Legal Case Families
Political
Interests or
Groups
National or
State
Groups
Percent
State
Court
Eminent Domain: Federal Legal Advantage
Political Interests*
National 7%
State 31%
Political Interest Groups*
National 7%
State 21%
Marriage Equality: Combined Federal and
State Legal Advantage
Political Interests*
National 43%
State 61%
Political Interest Groups*
National 32%
State 64%
Marriage Equality: State Legal Advantage
Political Interests
National 96%
State 96%
Political Interest Groups
National 100%
State 100%
Marriage Equality: Federal Legal Advantage
Political Interests*
National 2%
State 9%
Political Interest Groups
National 0%
State 12%
*p ≤ .05
The above figure shows instances when political interests and
groups entered into case families, which are associated legal
cases. For an act of participation to count, the political interest
must have entered into a legal case on the side that brought the
action to the court in at least one of the cases. The “Percent
State Court” column gives the percentage of participation in the
state courts.
1998) into consideration, which argues that political interests turn to the state courts
for two reasons: The first is that there is a legal advantage in doing so. As described
previously, the structure of the law can create strong incentives for participation in
either the state or federal courts. Miller v. California (1973) offers a good example
of this, when the U.S. Supreme Court in Miller v. California (1973) gave the states
the power to set community standards on pornography. The second requirement
is that the group has the resources such as attorneys knowledgeable in state law
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to do so. This is why national political interests with a federated structure were
advantaged, because their local level partners gave these groups greater access to state
level resources. Existing theory argues that both conditions are necessary together;
so for a political interest to enter into the state courts both requirements must have
been fulfilled—a group must have a legal incentive and the resources to litigate in
state courts.
Chapter Two described the variables, but, briefly, the important variables in-
cluding the two just mentioned were collected as follows: For legal advantage, this
research marked individual cases as either having a federal or state legal advantage
based on the criteria the U.S. Supreme Court established in Michigan v. Long (1983),
which declared that legal cases are decided on federal law unless the decision explicitly
points to state law as its basis. This study then observed time periods where most of
the cases were decided by federal or state law and coded the individual cases falling
inside of these periods as having a federal or state legal advantage.
The state legal resources variable was challenging to operationalize. This variable
was constructed as follows: State political interests, the state chapters of national
political interests and national political interests with state chapters were marked
as having the resources to litigate in the state courts. Ideally, the resources that
each group had would be known; yet, gaining this information is difficult without
asking each political interest to provide what would might be perceived as sensitive
information. This measure is less than perfect because it will include groups that lack
state resources; nonetheless, it captures the political interests that have the greatest
potential to have these resources, state political interests and national interests with
federated structures.
The final measure is state political orientation. This study marked groups as
having a state political orientation if the group was either a state organization or a
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chapter of a national political interest. This measure included those organizations in
the state legal resources, with the exception of national political interests, as these
groups are not embedded in the states themselves.
For the logit regression, there are three independent variables: legal advantage,
resources and state political orientation, with this study having take the first two
variables from existing theory. Previous research (Farole 1998) argues that both legal
advantage and state resources are necessary; consequently, this research interacted
these two variables in the regression. This study included state political orientation
in the regression independently. As noted the outcome variable is whether the legal
action took place in a state or federal court with the outcome being an action in a
state court. Only cases where the political interest or group entered into the court
on the side that brought the case were considered, consistent with prior research on
political interests and the courts (e.g., Olson 1990).
With logistic regression multicollinearity represents one area of particular con-
cern. Multicollinearity occurs when two or more independent variables are linearly
associated with each other in a regression model. Multicollinearity does not bias a
logit model. It can however increase the variance in the coefficients and the size of
the standard errors. Additionally, multicollinearity can produce a less than efficient
model. Ideally, the predictor variables should be correlated with the outcome but not
each other (Chatterjee and Hadi 2015).
In this research, multicollinearity shows itself to be one area of particular con-
cern because the state political orientation and state legal resources variables include
many of the same observations. The variable inflation factor (VIF) is one way to
observe multicollinearity. VIF indexes how much the variance for the variable esti-
mates increases as a result of multicollinearity. Generally a VIF score greater than 10
indicates that multicollinearity is unacceptably high (Kutner, Nachtsheim and Neter
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2004). This study did VIF tests in three of the regressions: the combined, marriage
equality and eminent domain models. In the combined and marriage equality models
the VIF scores for each of the variables did not exceed a value of 5, with the legal ad-
vantage variable showing the highest scores. In the eminent domain model the legal
advantage variable showed perfect multicollinearity, but this is acceptable because
this variable was not included in the regression.
5.3.1 Political Interests
Table 5.4 shows five separate regressions. In Model One, the observations from
Marriage Equality and Eminent Domain were combined, with issue area (Marriage
Equality) being introduced as a control variable. Models Two and Three examine
Marriage Equality and Eminent domain independently, while Models Four and Five
examine Marriage Equality cases during time periods when either the federal and
the state courts held a legal advantage. For the State Political Orientation variable,
each model generated coefficient values. On Table 4.4, some cells, however, do not
have values. In the eminent domain model, as well as the marriage equality models—
where the cases with only a federal or a state legal advantage were considered, the
legal advantage variable had one value, making this variable and its interaction with
resources perfectly collinear with the other independent variables. As a result, the
logit did not include the legal advantage variable in its results.
The first row shows State Political Orientation. For each of the models, with
the exception of Model Five, state political orientation is strongly associated with
the decision for political interests to enter into the state courts. This is what the
previous findings that state political interests enter into the state courts at a higher
rate than their national counterparts suggested. It is also important to note that state
political orientation was not strongly associated with the decision to enter into the
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Table 5.4: Causes of Political Interests Entering into State Courts
Variables
Model 1:
Combined
Model 2:
Marriage
Equality
Model 3:
Eminent
Domain
Model 4:
Equality
Federal
Advantage
Model 5
Equality
State
Advantage
Coefficient
(Error)
Coefficient
(Error)
Coefficient
(Error)
Coefficient
(Error)
Coefficient
(Error)
State
Orientation
1.59*
(0.19)
1.01*
(0.45)
1.72*
(0.25)
1.94*
(0.72)
0.29
(0.58)
State
Resources
0.17
(0.23)
0.17
(0.62)
0.20
(0.25)
-0.41
(0.73)
-1.22
(0.69)
Legal
Advantage
7.84*
(0.66)
7.55*
(0.73)
Resources x
Advantage
-0.72
(0.70)
-1.59
(0.88)
Legal Area
(Equality)
-1.58*
(0.30)
N 1620 756 864 396 360
AIC 857 239 632 123 114
*p ≤ .05
Entrance into a state court by a political interests represents the dependent variable.
The variable of interest is state political orientation, the results of which are on the first
line of the regression table. In all but Model Five, the results show that state political
orientation shows a positive relationship with entrance into the state courts.
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state courts in Model Five. This is to be expected, given that this model included only
observations that were coded as having a state legal advantage. The prior tabulation
of results in cases where there was a state legal advantage showed that in these cases
state political interests did not enter into the state courts more than their national
counterparts. The regression results support this prior observation, failing to show a
relationship between state political orientation and entrance into the state courts.
It is interesting to observe that the strong relationship between state political
orientation and the use of the state courts was consistent across issues. While eminent
domain can be described as a material issue, marriage equality is purposive, with
individuals organizing to achieve a social rather than political goal. Nonetheless, state
political interests in both legal issues seem to act in very similar ways, preferring to
enter into the state courts at a much higher rate than national political interests on
federal questions. There is reason to believe that this pattern would be found in other
legal areas, given the differences between the marriage equality and eminent domain
issues.
5.3.2 Interest Groups
These data also create the opportunity to look not just at political interests but
also political interest groups. Do state political interest groups act in ways that are
dissimilar to the larger community of political interests? These groups do arguably
have different internal dynamics given their membership bases (Walker 1991; Olson
1965), and the members can put pressure on the organization to take actions that
leadership in the organizations might not see as a good use of limited resources, one
example being symbolic participation in court cases (Holyoke 2003). There exist
arguments for state political interest groups both remaining and leaving the state
courts. For the state courts, the members of a state political interest group might
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see the state courts as a venue where the group should take action, given the ties
that the state courts might be expected to have with state politics. Conversely, the
members of a political interest group might push the leaders of the group to take
action in the federal courts because the impact of the decision might be perceived
as being greater because the decisions of the federal courts often reach beyond the
borders of the home interest’s state and may have a greater potential of bringing
greater publicity and attention to a particular issue.
This research constructed Table 5.5 exactly the same as Table 5.4, with each of the
five models included in a column. Again, the models regress political participation in
the state courts on state political orientation and control variables for both eminent
domain and marriage equality, which is also divided into time periods when the federal
and state courts held a legal advantage.
As with the regressions in Table 5.4, there are a number of empty cells in Table
5.5. In Models Three, Four and Five, once again, the Legal Advantage variable takes
on a single value and is perfectly collinear with other predictors. As a result, the
logit does not include this variable. There was a second challenge. The interest
group regressions also had separation and quasi separation problems. This happens
when a variable either predicts binary outcomes strongly or perfectly (Institute for
Digital Research and Education: UCLA 2013). One solution is to use Firth logistical
regression, which is what was done for the interest group regressions (Heinze and
Schemper 2002).
The first row of Table 5.5 shows the same pattern of results as for Table 5.4. For
each model with the exception of the Fifth Model, there exists a strong relationship
between state political orientation and the use of the state courts. As with the
regression models for political interests, the fifth model, where the state courts held
the legal advantage, did not achieve statistical significance. It would seem then that
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Table 5.5: Causes of Political Interest Groups Entering into State Courts
Variables
Model 1:
Combined
Model 2:
Marriage
Equality
Model 3:
Eminent
Domain
Model 4:
Equality
Federal
Advantage
Model 5
Equality
State
Advantage
Coefficient
(Error)
Coefficient
(Error)
Coefficient
(Error)
Coefficient
(Error)
Coefficient
(Error)
State
Orientation
0.10*
(0.02)
0.06*
(0.02)
0.12*
(0.03)
0.13*
(0.03)
-4.72
(4.27)
State
Resources
0.13*
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.02)
0.19*
(0.03)
-0.03
(0.03)
3.89
(6.46)
Legal
Advantage
1.06*
(0.09)
0.95*
(0.04)
Resources x
Advantage
-0.16
(0.10)
-0.001
(0.052)
Legal Area
(Equality)
-0.14
(0.03)
N 579 175 404 103 72
AIC 128 -217 196 -78 -4681
*p ≤ .05
Entrance into a state court by a political interests represents the dependent variable.
The variable of interest is state political orientation, the results of which are on the first
line of the regression table. In all but Model Five, the results show that state political
orientation shows a positive relationship with entrance into the state courts.
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political interest groups employ similar tactics and strategies as political interests
such as public interest law firms. This does not preclude the possibility that the
members of political interest groups put pressure on their leaders to act in ways
that perhaps political interests do not; nonetheless, the regression shows that state
political interests and interest groups acted in ways that were similar. As with the
regressions shown for state political interests, state political orientation was positively
associated with the use of the state courts, except in Model 5, where the state courts
held the legal advantage.
5.4 Conclusions
This research has argued that state political interests develop strong relationships
with the political and legal communities that these groups are embedded in. Existing
qualitative research has not shown this relationship. Nonetheless, the public policy
research beginning with Truman et al. (1951) strongly suggests that state political
interests are strongly bound to their in-state political communities (e.g., Zeller 1954;
Zeigler 1983; Hrebenar 1987; Gray and Lowery 2000). Farole (1998) also observes in
his qualitative work that national political interests often felt uncomfortable in the
state courts, citing an in-state bias towards in-state political interests.
This dissertation asserts that this embeddedness or state political orientation af-
fects the decisions that state political interests make to turn to the state or federal
courts. The evidence strongly suggests that state political orientation represents one
important factor when considering political interests and judicial federalism. National
political interests will turn to the federal courts more often. State political interests,
on the other hand, will enter into the state courts more often
The regression analysis and tabulation of instances of political participation in
the federal courts buttresses this conclusion. In cases that were expected to turn on
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a federal question, state political interests entered into the state courts at a much
higher rate than national groups. In contrast, when a case was more likely to be
decided with state law, state and national political interests entered into the state
courts at about the same rate. Yet cases that turn on state law do not really provide
a venue choice, given that the federal courts largely cannot interpret state law. The
state courts, however, can interpret state and federal law, and there is a real choice.
The data show that national political interests do not seem to have the same comfort
or confidence in the state courts that their state partners do. This could be for a
number of different reasons: National political interests may not have the personal
contacts and connections to state judges and attorneys knowledgeable in a particular
state’s laws, also the legal and political norms, history and culture (Elazar 1972).
National political interests, too, might not experience the pressure that their state
counterparts experience to act in a state when a national issue affects those who live
in a state in a direct way. While the reasons why state and national political interests
enter into the state and national courts at different rates, the evidence suggests that
the groups do exactly this.
This research also offered evidence for the concept or the idea of state political
orientation. This study operationalized this concept in a number of different ways:
First, instances of participation in the federal and state courts were examined. State
political interests entered into the state courts more often and this argues for state
political orientation because it is an explanation that makes the most intuitive sense.
It does not seem likely that state political interests would turn to the state courts more
often for reasons other than that these groups are socially and politically embedded
within their respective states. Conversely, these state groups are less likely to take
legal actions in the federal courts because these groups are less familiar with the
courts and consequently more fearful of them. In the first sets of regressions this
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research operationalized state political interest by assigning state groups this value.
Operationalizing state political interest this way gave the expected results in two
different legal areas. Finally, this study operationalized state political orientation
by examining only state political interests and labeling those state groups that had
taken legal actions in different state courts or federal circuits lacking jurisdiction over
the interest’s home state as not having a state political orientation. This approach
too, gave the same results as the previous research: the regression showed that state
political interests that lacked a state political orientation were negatively associated
with the use of the state courts. Seemingly, then, state political orientation exists,
given the consistency in the results and the different ways that the concept was
operationalized.
Yet while having a state political orientation tells part of the story, it does not
tell all of it. There exist two significant challenges. The first is that there may be
gaps in existing theory, which does not take into consideration either judicial selection
methods or judicial ideology, as described in Chapter Three. With judicial selection
methods, political interests and groups may turn to the state courts because these
groups believe that judges might come under electoral pressure to grant favorable
rulings. As noted previously, Comparato (2003) observed in his research that political
interest groups send implicit messages to state judges about their personal electoral or
political vulnerabilities. State judges, then, are seemingly targetable and this might
give reason for political interests, state and national to turn to the state courts.
Ideology represents a second unexplored linkage between political interests and
judicial federalism, which, seemingly, would incentivize political interests, both state
and national, to turn to the state courts when there is a closer ideological match
between the group and the judges or justices on the court. As noted in Chapter Three,
the attitudinal (Segal and Cover 1989; Segal and Spaeth 2002) and the strategic
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judicial (Epstein and Knight 1997) models hold that U.S. Supreme Court Justices
hold attitudinal preferences. While the judges in the lower federal and state courts
may not have the same ability to implement their attitudinal preferences because
they can be overruled (Segal and Spaeth 2002), this does not mean that these lower
court judges will not try when given the opportunity to do so. A state court, then
might offer a political interest a more desirable venue than the federal courts if the
ideology between the group and the judge is a closer match.
Finally, existing theory (Farole 1998), which requires a legal and resource incentive
for groups to turn to the state courts, might be incomplete. This study’s data shows
that legal advantage is a powerful variable in predicting whether state or national
political interests turned to the state or federal courts. The state resource variable,
however, showed a positive association between resources and legal actions in the
state courts sporadically, and the interaction between these terms did not produce
any meaningful results.
The following chapter will attempt to address some of these challenges using the
data that was collected for this study. This study may not be able to answer all of the
remaining uncertainties, particularly the relationship between state resources and the
decision to litigate in state courts, because this is difficult information to get, given
that the information is sensitive and the sample captures the actions of more than
1000 unique interests. Nonetheless, the data collected gives the opportunity to paint
a more complete picture of the relationship between political interests, both state and
national, and judicial federalism.
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Chapter 6
JUDICIAL IDEOLOGY, STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION AND COURT
CHOICES
The previous chapter examined state political orientation and discovered that
the embeddedness of state political interests in state political communities positively
affected the decision to turn to either the state or national courts. State political
interests, it would seem, are much more at ease when turning to the state courts than
their national counterparts when a federal question will most likely decide the case.
Yet, as the previous chapter pointed out, the data collected for this project can
help with many of the unanswered and incompletely answered questions on the re-
lationship between political interests, also interest groups, and the American courts.
This sample, as described in Chapter Two, includes numerous observations of the
actions of political interests in both the state and federal courts, also at each level
from trial to the highest appellate courts. These data, then, may be helpful for aiding
the understanding of political interests and the courts.
Generally, there are two challenges. The first challenge is to consider reasons why
political interests turn to the state courts that previous research has not considered
fully. Here, two important variables exist: judicial ideology and judicial selection.
Prior research has struggled to find the connections between ideology, judicial se-
lection and interest group behavior; nonetheless, judicial ideology can weigh heavily
in the decisions that judges make, especially for those who sit on the U.S. Supreme
Court (e.g., Segal and Cover 1989; Segal and Spaeth 2002).
Political scientists have shown that judicial selection methods affect the decisions
that state judges make (Hall and Brace 1992; Langer 2002). State judges, particularly
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those who were elected to office under party labels, can come under electoral pres-
sure to decide a case for a particular side (e.g., Hall and Brace 1992; Langer 2002).
Nonetheless, even those judges who were not elected to their jobs can find themselves
under political pressure to decide a case for a side. Comparato (2003), in his research,
argues that state judges appointed to office can come under pressure from the state
legislature, which can in effect overrule a case by changing the state law.
Yet questions also remain with the existing research by previous scholars. The
quantitative research done in this study in Chapter Five raises questions about the
importance of state legal resources and the interaction between resources and legal
advantage, which prior research (Farole 1998) asserts as true. First—in this research—
the state legal resources variable did not always show a statistically significant rela-
tionship with the decision to turn to the state courts. This should be expected. Farole
(1998) argued that both state legal resources and legal advantage were both necessary
for a political interests to turn to the state courts. Yet, the interaction between these
two variables did not achieve significance in any of the regressions. This research can
examine the importance of legal resources and its relationship with legal advantage.
These are clearly two areas where the data may help to improve existing theory.
This chapter will first focus on the potential impact of ideology and judicial selection
methods on the decision of political interests to take legal actions in the state courts
and then reexamine existing theory using quantitative methods. Once this is com-
pleted, this research will then offer its own assessment of why political interests, both
state and national, pursue their policy goals in the state or federal courts. Clearly,
there is much that the data collected cannot capture; nonetheless, it offers a unique
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opportunity to perhaps gain original insights.
6.1 Judicial Ideology and State Selection of Judges
Political scientists have long argued that political interests attempt to influence
court decisions (e.g., Bentley 1967; Truman et al. 1951). Judges’ personal ideologies
help shape their rulings for the U.S. Supreme Court (e.g., Segal and Cover 1989;
Segal and Spaeth 2002), federal appellate courts (e.g., Epstein, Landes and Posner
2013) and state Supreme Court Judges (Hall and Brace 1992; Brace and Hall 1997).
Political interests, then, have a powerful incentive to seek out judges and justices that
share their ideological views. Ideology, then, should not be ignored when examining
the relationships that political interests have with the courts.
Early research on interest groups and the courts shows that political interests
seek out courts that were ideologically receptive. The disadvantage theory suggests
exactly this, arguing that organizations that represent the disadvantaged sought out
the courts and more specifically the federal courts because these venues were most
receptive to their positions (see Cortner 1968; Sorauf 1976; O’Connor 1980; Berry
2015; Greenberg 1974; Dhavan and Jacob 1978; Truman et al. 1951). Case studies on
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) illustrate
this. The NAACP has long advocated for the rights and liberties of black Ameri-
cans beginning with efforts to end lynching (Francis 2014), yet the organization has
achieved the most success in the courts, not the legislature or other more traditional
political venues (Vose 1959, 1972). While the disadvantage theory doesn’t directly
assert that liberal groups sought out liberal courts, it is nonetheless suggested given
that these organizations can be characterized overall as liberal as well as the federal
courts at the time, especially under Chief Justice Warren. 1
1Political scientists disagree on how liberal the Warren court was. Segal and Spaeth (1989) for
example found that the Warren court was more liberal than the Burger court on civil liberties, but
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More recent research also finds that political interests seek out courts that are
ideologically advantageous. De Figueiredo and de Figueiredo Jr (2002) examined
interest groups and their decisions to either pursue policy in the legislature or the
courts. In their model, when courts were unlikely to change the status quo, the
decision to enter into the courts was highly influenced by the ideology of the courts.
Ideology, then, as modeled by De Figueiredo and de Figueiredo Jr (2002), was a factor
in the decision to turn to the courts.
Such research has examined the effect that ideology might have on the decision of
a political interest to turn to the courts in general. In these studies the alternative
choice is often between lobbying the legislature or the courts (e.g., Holyoke 2003;
De Figueiredo and de Figueiredo Jr 2002). Ideology, nonetheless, might also incen-
tivize the choice between individual courts. A political interest may be attracted to a
court for ideological reasons alone; the interaction between judicial selection methods
and ideology might produce an even greater incentive for a political interest to enter
into a particular court. Hall and Brace (1992), for example, found that judges in the
liberal minority on conservative courts were more likely to side with the majority in
death penalty cases when they were elected from a single member district. Clearly,
the liberal judges in these cases felt pressure to conform to the majority because they
were in the ideological minority, but also because the voters could remove them from
their offices. Political interests recognize this, and send signals to judges about their
political vulnerabilities (Comparato 2003).
6.2 Testing the Impact of Ideology and Selection
The data collected for this research creates the opportunity to test the impact of
ideology on the decision of political interests to turn to either the state or federal
not economic issues.
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courts. Chapter Two also examined the impact of ideology and found that ideology
was positively associated with state political interests turning to courts, either state
or federal, that lacked political jurisdiction over the interest’s home state. This test
is similarly constructed, yet instead of measuring the impact on the decision to turn
to a state or out-of-state court, it examines the decision to turn to the state versus
the federal courts.
6.2.1 Judicial Ideology
This research constructed the judicial ideology measure for this chapter in a similar
way to the ideology measure in Chapter Three. First, this study coded political
interests either as -1 for liberal, 1 for conservative and 0 if the group did not take a
clear ideological position. For most political interests, particularly those involved in
the marriage equality issue, it was clear whether the group was liberal or conservative.
Liberal organizations obviously tended to support marriage equality and this research
coded them as such. In eminent domain this research coded groups as conservative if
these political interests supported property rights and government compensation for
takings. 2 Prior work in political science has also taken this approach. 3
Second, this research assigned ideological scores for the federal and state courts.
For the federal circuit courts, the common space project assigned ideological scores
based on measures created by Giles, Hettinger and Peppers (2001a,b), which used
senatorial courtesy scores to generate ideological scores. Senatorial courtesy scores
were constructed the following way: If at least one U.S. Senator shared the same
2Previous eminent domain research categorized property rights actions as both liberal and con-
servative. This research labels these actions as conservative and actions that favor government tak-
ings as liberal.
3McCarty and Poole (1998); Bonica (2013, 2014) assigned ideological scores based on group con-
tributions. While seemingly simplistic, this measure is arguably valid, given that political interests’
ideology tends to be bimodal, falling on one side or the other of the political spectrum (Bonica 2013).
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party as the U.S. President who appointed the judge, then the NOMINATE score of
that senator or the average between two senators belonging to the same party as the
President was used. Otherwise, the NOMINATE score of the President was used.
These scores were then changed into scores compatible with NOMINATE. For the
U.S. Supreme Court, the judicial common space project transformed Martin-Quinn
scores (Martin and Quinn 2002), which are ideological measures of U.S. Supreme
Court justices that were based on their voting records. These scores, similarly, were
transformed into scores that are interchangeable with NOMINATE. For the state
courts, this study used CF scores from Bonica and Woodruff (2012). These scores are
like the common space scores in that they are scaled the same as the NOMINATE
scores on a -1 to 1 scale, and can also be substituted for NOMINATE. The measure-
ment of Campaign Finance (CF) scores, however, is different. Bonica based his CF
on three criteria: campaign contributions in partisan and nonpartisan elections, their
own private campaign contributions if they did not run for office or the governor who
appointed them if they did not run for office or make campaign contributions.
Next, this research considered what the alternative legal venue would have been.
If the political interest entered into a state court, the alternative venue was the
federal court with jurisdiction over where the case originated. For cases in the federal
courts, the state alternative was the state courts from where the case originated. The
institutional structure of the American courts complicates this analysis. Cases in
the D.C. Federal Circuit were not included. While a federal court, the D.C. Circuit
functions as a state supreme court. There is no state alternative for the District
of Columbia. If the D.C. Circuit were to be seen as a state court in this research,
there would be no federal alternative because most cases can only be appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court from the D.C. Circuit. There were a select number of cases in
the federal courts where a state alternative could not be decided on. For example a
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corporation that operates in multiple states may have brought a case before the U.S.
Federal Circuit where the facts of a case were not associated with any particular state.
Here, it was too difficult to assign an alternative state. Cases originating with the
American Indian tribes, too, were not included, as these are semi sovereign territories
under U.S. not state legal jurisdiction.
This research then used these scores to create ideological scores for the federal and
state court pairs. It was done this way: the ideological averages of the courts were
taken for each of the years in the sample. The averages were taken by dividing the
summed ideological scores by all the judges on the court in a year. Obviously, this
is not a perfect measure, given that it includes the scores of recently retired and new
judges for a year, yet this was the best that could be done, given that the appointment
and retirement dates are shown by year and not month. In this manner ideological
scores were constructed for the U.S. Supreme Court, each of the U.S. Courts of Appeal
and each state supreme court for each year in the sample. Using this data, a matrix of
state-federal alternative pairs could be constructed. While ideological scores could be
assigned to most courts, similarly scaled ideological data for judges was not available
for the lower federal and state courts. To address this, this study used the ideological
data for U.S. Circuit Courts as a proxy for the U.S. District courts and similar data
for state supreme courts for all state courts beneath it.
This methodological choice is clearly not ideal. Nonetheless, political scientists
have not assigned ideological scores to federal district judges that are directly com-
parable with U.S. Supreme, federal circuit and state supreme court judges. Also
political interests in the data collected took far fewer court actions in the federal dis-
trict courts than they did the circuit, U.S. Supreme and state courts. Additionally,
the federal district courts are part of the circuits and one might reasonably expect
that these lower courts are ideologically similar, particularly given that the circuit
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judges directly above will be first to review the appeals to the judges’ rulings. Re-
search has found that federal judges are less likely to make decisions based on their
attitudes the further down they are in the judicial hierarchy (Epstein, Landes and
Posner 2013).
Finally, this research constructed the ideological advantage measure. For liberal
political interests, if the state court ideological score was lower than the score assigned
to the federal courts then the measure was marked as holding an ideological advan-
tage. The state could have been conservative like its federal counterpart, yet if the
court was less conservative then the federal match then it was coded as having this
advantage. For conservative political interests, the observations were coded as having
a state ideological advantage if the state court had a higher, i.e., more conservative,
ideological score. For political interests that were neither coded as being conservative
or liberal, the state ideological advantage was always marked as 0.
6.2.2 Judicial Selection
In addition to ideology, the institutional structure of state courts is also very
important. The United States is unlike many countries in the world in that it elects
many of its judges. This has generated controversy since the early American republic,
with Alexis de Tocqueville commenting that, “these innovations will, sooner or later,
have disastrous results” (De Tocqueville 2003, p. 314), asserting that judicial integrity
and electoral accountability were not compatible. Judicial scholars have framed their
research on judicial elections this way, as a debate between accountability to the
electorate and the independence of judges (e.g., Dubois 2014; Gibson and Caldeira
2009; Hall 1987; Brace and Hall 1997).
The conflict between judicial independence and accountability was not lost on
American lawmakers, particularly those in the Progressive movement, who attempted
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to put greater political distance between the electorate and judges (Dubois 2014).
These lawmakers implemented nonpartisan judicial elections, where judicial nominee
does not run under a party label, and the Missouri Plan. Typically, in the Missouri
Plan, the governor of a state selects a nominee from a list of candidates assembled by
a state panel knowledgeable about the qualifications of judges and the skills necessary
to do the job well. The judges will typically then stand for reelection either in districts
or at the state level.
A number of studies have explored the relationship between the institutional struc-
ture of the state judiciaries and judicial independence (Hall 1987; Hall and Brace 1992;
Hall 2001; Brace and Hall 1997; Brace, Langer and Hall 2000), and concluded that
state judges do come under pressure to decide cases in ways that are inconsistent
with their attitudes and judicial philosophies. A number of these studies have exam-
ined the rulings of liberal judges in conservative states on the death penalty issue;
where there is often pressure to conform to the rulings of the conservative judges (Hall
1987; Hall and Brace 1992; Hall 2001; Brace and Hall 1997; Brace, Langer and Hall
2000). Institutional features like partisan elections (Brace and Hall 1997) or elec-
toral districts (Hall and Brace 1992) and competitive state politics limits the political
distance between the judges and the electorate (Brace and Hall 1997). While many
judicial politics studies focus their attention on the threat from the electorate, there
also exists a threat to judicial independence from legislators who can write law that
overturns their rulings (see Comparato 2003).
The construction of the ideology measure was described above. For the judicial
selection variable, this research coded observations where the state court elected its
judges under a partisan label as 1 and 0 otherwise. 4 Some judicial politics research
4Other judicial politics research has operationalized judicial selection methods this way. Brace
and Hall (1997) assigned a 1 to courts where the judges were selected in partisan and nonpartisan
elections.
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has concluded that state judges are as political vulnerable under reformed judicial
selection systems like the Missouri Plan (e.g., Hall 2001). This research, nonetheless,
will agree with the prior research that holds that state judges are most politically
vulnerable under elections, and in particular elections where the judicial candidates
run under party labels (Dubois 2014; Brace and Hall 1997). Brace and Hall (1997)
oded both partisan and non-partisan courts as 1. This research coded only courts
where the judges were elected under party labels as 1 and groups non-partisan and
Missouri Plan judicial elections together, as reformed state judicial election methods.
This is justifiable, given that non-partisan elections, like the Missouri Plan were cre-
ated as a reform measure (Herndon 1962). Non-partisan elections also have different
electoral dynamics. Clearly non-partisan elections deny voters party label and force
them to rely instead on incumbency as a cue (Schaffner, Streb and Wright 2001).
Additionally, these elections suppress voter turnout (Dubois 2014; Schaffner, Streb
and Wright 2001).
6.3 Multivariate Analysis
Table 6.1 shows the results of three logit regressions, one for eminent domain,
one for marriage equality and one that combines data from these two legal areas
while controlling for legal area. These regressions have included the control variables
from the previous chapter, legal advantage and state legal resources, as well as the
state political orientation variable described in the previous chapter. The regressions
include ideological advantage and partisan election variables, as well as the interaction
of these variables. It is expected that the ideological differences between the state
and federal courts might incentivize a political interest, whether state or federal, to
turn to the state courts. Nonetheless, state judicial selection methods and partisan
elections in particular might further incentivize entry into the state courts by political
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interests. A political interest that supports the death penalty would be aware that
the Texas courts are politically conservative but also that a liberal judge would most
likely make herself or himself politically vulnerable if he or she voted against what
would be expected to be a conservative judgment. Once again the dependent variable
is dichotomous and shows entry into the state courts. The samples, however, have
slightly fewer cases because federal-state court pairs could not be established for all
of the observations, as described previously. In model three coefficients are missing
for the legal advantage variable and its interaction with resources. Again, for eminent
domain, legal advantage was marked as federal for all of the observations. 5 This
produced singularities that interfered with the inversion of the Hessian Matrix.
In Table 6.1, the control variables showed similar levels of statistical significance
as in the previous regressions. Both legal advantage and state political orientation
were very strong predictors of the decision for political interests to turn to the state
courts. The variables of interest, legal advantage and partisan elections, showed mixed
results, both as stand alone variables and when interacted. The ideological advantage
variable showed a strong relationship with the outcomes in the combined and marriage
equality models, one and two. The partisan election variable, on the other hand,
was positive in the combined and eminent domain models. The interaction between
ideological advantage and partisan elections did not achieve statistical significance.
The conditional impact of partisan elections on entry into the stat courts when there
was an ideological advantage did not show a strong relationship with entry into the
state courts. Partisan elections, then, did not seem to enhance the prospects of
state political interests turning to the state courts when there existed an ideological
incentive to do so.
5Appendix C examines the possibility that states enjoyed a legal advantage following Kelo v.
City of New London and reevaluates the regression results of this chapter.
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Table 6.1: The Effects of Ideological Advantage and Judicial
Selection in Entering Into State Courts
Variables
Model 1:
Combined
Model 2:
Marriage Equality
Model 3:
Eminent Domain
Coefficient
(Error)
Coefficient
(Error)
Coefficient
(Error)
State
Orientation
1.80*
(0.21)
1.22*
(0.48)
1.88*
(0.24)
State
Resources
0.14
(0.24)
-0.27
(0.67)
0.30
(0.27)
Legal
Advantage
8.63*
(0.69)
8.09*
(0.82)
Resources x
Advantage
-1.98
(0.71)
-1.58
(0.91)
Legal Area
(Equality)
-2.19*
(0.33)
Ideological
Advantage
1.28*
(0.27)
2.49*
(0.55)
0.37
(0.42)
Partisan
Election
1.80*
(0.25)
0.14
(0.76)
2.10*
(0.27)
Advantage x
Election
-0.57
(1.10)
0.21
(0.68)
N 1610 755 855
AIC 800 215 564
*p ≤ .05
*This regression examines the effect of ideological advantage and partisan
elections on the decision to enter into out of state courts.
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The table offers interesting results for ideological advantage and judicial selection
methods. When there was an ideological advantage, political interests involved in
the marriage equality issue were seemingly more responsive to the ideological dif-
ferences between the federal and state courts than those interests active in eminent
domain. The reasons for this are not entirely clear, but it is possible to offer informed
speculation.
With marriage equality cases, success, at least early on, seemed highly unlikely
(Becker 2015). Political interests then may have been uniquely sensitive to the differ-
ences in ideology between the federal and state courts because the probability of suc-
cess was very low at the time. In this context, liberal political interests needed to take
advantage of every opportunity for success. The possibility also exists that the state
judiciaries reflected the ideologies of the states themselves (Brace and Hall 1997).
The political interests then may have selected liberal states, which the judiciaries
happened to mimic. Additionally, liberal states would seemingly have constitutions
giving greater protections of the rights of same sex couples to marry.
Clearly, this was not the only strategic choice. Much of the initial litigation
took place in politically liberal states like Hawaii, Vermont and Massachusetts. Also,
many of these state constitutions could be interpreted to grant equal if not greater
protections than the U.S. Constitution. 6 Yet these advantages were seemingly not
enough and the above regressions suggest that the political ideologies of the federal
and state courts may have been taken into consideration.
With eminent domain there might not exist a strong incentive to closely weigh the
6Obviously the U.S. Supreme Court had not established a federal standard on same sex marriage
during these early cases. Nonetheless, there seems to be a sense in the legal community of how legally
powerful the state and the U.S. constitutions were in relationship to each other. As an example,
Massachusetts Supreme Court Chief Justice Margaret Marshall, penning the majority opinion in
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health (2003), writes, “The Massachusetts Constitution protects
matters of personal liberty against government incursion as zealously, and often more so, then does
the Federal Constitution, even where both Constitutions employ essentially the same language.”
(p. 329 Goodridge v. Department of Public Health 2003)
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ideological differences between the federal and state courts. The data show that 1315
out of 1568 observations took place in the federal courts, which is to be expected, given
that most of the decisions are based on an interpretation of the U.S. Constitution’s
Fifth Amendment. Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings in (Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon 1922) and (Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City 1978), the
U.S. Supreme Court established a clear federal standard, one that would meet the
requirements for a jurisprudential regime (Richards and Kritzer 2002). There was less
legal ambiguity in eminent domain than in the marriage equality cases; consequently,
political interests may have been less sensitive to the ideological differences between
the federal and state courts because they could be more certain that the case will
be decided according to these established rules of interpretation. The U.S. Supreme
Court has called for strict scrutiny in state decisions to take property (see Gieseler
and Gieseler 2010). This, according to Bartels (2009), could compel judges to follow
established legal protocol rather than deciding cases based on their ideology.
It would seem then that political ideology is sometimes an important factor. Po-
litical interests then enter into the federal or state courts on the basis of ideological
advantages, but not necessarily. The structure and interpretation of American law
affects whether political interests enter into the state or federal courts on the basis of
ideology. When there are strong jurisprudential structures already in place perhaps
there is less of an incentive to decide based on ideological differences between federal
and state courts because the interests can count on the judges in this case to be lim-
ited by the structure and expected interpretation of the law (Bartels 2009; Richards
and Kritzer 2002).
The partisan election variable reached statistical significance in the combined and
eminent domain models. This variable then is like the ideological advantage variable
in that it showed strong results in some but not all of the models. Perhaps one reason
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why this variable is not positively associated with the entrance of political interests
into the state courts in marriage equality cases is that the issue was largely driven by
liberal interests (e.g., Klarman 2012; Keck 2014). The states, however, with partisan
elections of state judges— with the exception of perhaps Illinois and New Mexico—
tend to be politically conservative. There is then little political incentive for state
political interests to select these courts as legal venues. Partisan election, however,
does show a positive relationship with the decisions of political interests to enter into
the state courts. One reason for this might be that the states with partisan elected
judges are mostly politically conservative. Conservative political interests advocating
for property rights then had a number of states to turn to.
In the models the conditional impact of partisan elections on the choice to enter
into the state or federal courts when there was an ideological incentive did not reach
statistical significance in any of the models. One might expect that political interests
would seek out courts where the judges would be ideologically friendly and the insti-
tutional structure of the courts might compel those judges in the ideological minority
to take their side. Yet, the results do not support this. These results disagree with
some previous findings (e.g., Brace and Hall 1997), found that the interaction between
judicial ideology and state judicial selection affected judicial decision making in state
supreme courts.
With the eminent domain cases, one explanation for the lack of findings in this re-
gression is that these cases may be more likely to emerge in conservative states, which
elect their judges directly more often than their liberal counterparts. Consequently,
liberal groups make pursue legal actions in eminent domain in conservative states be-
cause that is where these legal controversies erupt. These liberal organizations would
most likely forgo any judicial ideological advantage.
Judicial ideology and selection methods appear to have the power to affect the
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choices that political interests make in selecting the federal or state courts. Yet, these
effects do not appear to be consistent across different legal issues. There seem to be
other factors that cause judicial selection and ideology to have an effect on the courts
that political interests enter into. A limited number of states have partisan elections
and these states tend to be conservative. Consequently judicial selection methods
may not be helpful to liberal interests. Judicial ideology and judicial selection can
become important factors in the choice to enter a state or federal court, but there is
less consistency than with the state political orientation and legal advantage variables
identified earlier.
6.4 A Simplified Model of Political Interests and Judicial Federalism
What then is the best model of political interests and the courts? This research
will now turn to putting together a model that predicts whether political interests
enter into the state or federal courts. As noted previously, the existing model of
judicial federalism is incomplete: it fails to take into account the differences between
state and national political interests; it also fails to consider both judicial ideology
and state judicial selection, which are important factors. Yet, there are also challenges
with existing theory. Table 6.1 shows that the state legal resources variable does not
achieve statistical significance in any of the models. Also the conditional impact of
state political resources on the decision to enter state courts when there is a state
legal advantage also does not reach statistical significance in any of the models. There
could be two reasons for this: First, the state political resources variable includes
many groups that lack these resources. Second, state political resources are not a
necessary condition for political interests to enter into the state courts.
The prior qualitative work was better able to measure state political resources
because unlike this research there were a limited number of interests in the qualitative
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data set. Farole (1998) examined the most legally active interests in obscenity and
eminent domain. He assessed state litigation capacity primarily through interviews
with members of the organizations, who provided information on the number of in-
house and volunteer attorneys. This previous research asserted that political interests
with a federated structure often had access to these state attorneys. The Sierra Club
for example had both staff and a network of volunteer attorneys; so did the American
Civil Liberties Union, whose network of state attorneys facilitated the organization’s
state litigation.
This research labels national political interests with state affiliates as having state
litigation resources based on this earlier research. Yet, this linkage between federated
political interests and access to state level attorneys may not be certain. Farole
(1998) in his qualitative research only interviewed the most active political interests.
These interests, like the American Civil Liberties Union, the Sierra Club and the
American Farm Bureau, are large national organizations with seemingly well-funded
state chapters that in the data collected for this research entered into litigation semi-
independently of their national offices. Can we then expect that less well-developed
organizations can do the same? While a federated structure might provide a national
litigation-oriented political interest like the Sierra Club with the state level attorneys
that it needs, this most likely does not hold true for other types of interests, even
with a federated structure.
This research also included state political organizations in the state political re-
sources category. If national political interests with state chapters have access to
state level attorneys and litigation resources, then, seemingly, state political interests
do as well. Yet, assigning state political resources to state groups might not be cor-
rect. National organizations like the Sierra Club or American Civil Liberties Union
may have the ability to bring state attorneys into their organization because these
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organizations are well known and have a national political reach. An environmental
attorney in San Francisco then might be more willing to volunteer his or her time with
the Sierra Club because the organization has national name recognition and might
seem like a better use of the attorney’s time than a state group that has the same
purpose.
The national, federated groups are probably also usually much better funded than
the state-level groups. In the qualitative part of this research, many of the leaders
in state political organizations said that they often turned to local attorneys that
they knew personally. State groups then do not gain access to state-level attorneys
through resources but rather their relationships and embeddedness in state political
communities. There are then potentially two different mechanisms at play. For state
organizations gaining access to state legal resources seems to be more a function of
state political orientation.
Next, state political resources might not be a necessary condition for legal par-
ticipation in the state courts. In cases that were decided on the basis of state law,
national political interests were just as likely to enter into the state courts as state
political interests. This makes perfect sense for national political interests with state
chapters, given that these chapters might have access to state level litigation resources,
yet many of these federal groups lacked a federated structure and still were able to
enter into the state courts at roughly the same rate as their state counterparts. This
observation shows that political interests lacking state legal resources can find these
resources if the group chooses to enter into the state courts. While state political
interests and federated national interests with state affiliates may have greater access
to state attorneys, this does not appear to limit national non-federated interests from
doing this.
It is true that state political interests entered into the state courts when there was a
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federal question, yet this arguably had more to do with their state political orientation
rather than their state political resources. In cases with a federal legal incentive, the
national political interests were not put in the position where these groups felt that
they had to choose the state courts. Consequently, it would seem that these groups
turned to the federal courts because they lacked this political embeddedness and
identified more with the federal courts.
Finally, the costs associated with state litigation are different. The least costly
way for a political interest to enter into the courts is through an amicus brief, yet
this method of entering into the courts may even be less costly than that if the group
signs on to an existing amicus brief, in which case, state level resources would not
appear to be especially important.
As a result, the data collected suggest the following variables most affect the deci-
sions of political interests to turn to the state courts: legal advantage, state political
orientation, judicial ideology and state judicial selection methods. This research se-
lected logit to test the relationship between these variables and the decision of political
interests to take legal actions in state courts.
The regressions in Table 6.2 do not show any unexpected results. 7 With the
exception of the interaction term, each of the variables in the proposed model achieves
statistical significance in at least one of the regressions. The most influential factor
is clearly legal advantage, which holds statistical significance in the first and second
models. The next variable ranked in importance is state political orientation, which
shows a statistically strong relationship with entrance into the state courts in each
of the models. As with the regressions in Table 6.1, the ideological advantage and
partisan election variables reach statistical significance, but in separate legal areas.
7As with the previous regressions, the state legal advantage variable was omitted for eminent
domain. This is because legal advantage was coded as federal in all of the eminent domain cases.
This produced singularities that interfered with the inversion of the Hessian Matrix.
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Table 6.2: Preferred Model of Political Interests’ Choice of the
State Courts
Variables
Model 1:
Combined
Model 2:
Marriage Equality
Model 3:
Eminent Domain
Coefficient
(Error)
Coefficient
(Error)
Coefficient
(Error)
State
Orientation
1.79*
(0.20)
0.90*
(0.41)
1.95*
(0.23)
Legal
Advantage
7.46*
(0.43)
7.44*
(0.52)
Legal Area
(Equality)
-2.10*
(0.31)
Ideological
Advantage
1.22*
(0.27)
2.31*
(0.55)
0.45
(0.41)
Partisan
Election
1.77*
(0.25)
0.009
(0.76)
2.08*
(0.27)
Advantage x
Election
-0.58
(0.52)
-0.37
(1.10)
0.18
(0.68)
N 1610 755 855
AIC 805 220 564
*p ≤ .05
*This regression tests the model that this research believes to how the most
explanatory power of why political interests turn to the state and federal
courts. The “Combined” model takes together the observations from both
marriage equality and eminent domain legal areas; consequently, legal area
was used as a control.
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Ideological advantage achieves statistical significance in the marriage equality legal
issue, while partisan elections shows a positive relationship with entry into the state
courts in eminent domain. The conditional impact of partisan elections on the decision
of political interests to enter into the state or federal courts after taking into account
the effect of ideological advantage did not produce statistical significance in any of
the models, so, at least with eminent domain and marriage equality, judicial selection
methods did not appear to create an enhanced effect in selecting the state courts.
The choice not to include the state legal resource variable and its interaction with
legal advantage did not change the results shown in earlier regressions.
6.5 Conclusions
In this research the availability of data created new opportunities. First, prior
research could be considered quantitatively. Second, this research could examine
previously untested explanations for why political interests enter into either the state
or federal courts could be tested.
Judicial ideology and state judicial selection represent two important causes for
why political interests choose either the state or federal courts. This research found
that both judicial ideology and selection methods affected the decisions of political
interests to turn to the state or federal courts; nonetheless, this effect was mixed.
In marriage equality cases ideological advantage was a strong predictor of entering
the state courts, while partisan elections showed a strong relationship with the state
courts in eminent domain cases. Unlike in previous research on death penalty cases
(e.g., Brace and Hall 1997), there were no interactions between the effects. In other
words, the conditional effect of partisan elections when there existed an ideological
advantage did not reach statistical significance.
The reasons for the lack of a conditional effect are not entirely certain. This
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research has, however, proposed that with eminent domain cases, liberal political
interests have little choice but to enter into ideologically conservative states because
these states often elect their judges directly. Consequently, these groups forgo judicial
ideological advantage.
This research also found that the legal advantage and state political orientation
variables were consistently strong. Political interests make decisions about whether
to turn to the state or federal courts based on what legal basis, federal or state, these
groups expect the courts to decide on. Prior qualitative research showed this, and so
did this quantitative research. This factor, then, it would seem to be very important.
Political interests pay close attention to the courts and how these courts decide cases
and orchestrate their responses accordingly. State political orientation, too, showed
a strong statistical relationship with legal actions in the state courts in both eminent
domain and marriage equality. When thinking about political interests and their
actions in the state or federal courts it is necessary to distinguish between these types
of interests. State political interests are embedded within state political communities
and develop special bonds with their state courts; as a consequence, state political
interests are much more likely to pursue legal actions in the state courts, especially
their own state courts.
This model finds that legal advantage, state political orientation, ideological ad-
vantage and partisan elections have strong explanatory power across both eminent
domain and marriage equality legal issues. It is very reasonable to infer that this
model would explain the interactions between political interests and the state and
federal courts in other legal areas, as well because similar forces could be expected
to be at play. Political interests would be expected to seek out the state courts when
there was a legal incentive to do so, also when these groups had a unique attachment
to the state courts. Judicial ideology and partisan elections are important, yet these
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factors affect court selection in ways that are more complex and may be ideologically
specific, e.g. the states with partisan elections are mostly conservative.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
7.1 Outcomes
This dissertation has examined political interests and American judicial feder-
alism, focusing much of its attention on state political interests. In doing so, this
research has made a number of contributions to a number of different areas in politi-
cal science. Hopefully, this dissertation has also opened a number of different avenues
for further research. The courts, arguably, have become increasingly important in
American politics. Political interests in the near and distant future will make deci-
sions about whether to pursue their policy goals in the state or federal courts. It is not
unreasonable to expect that the state courts will become an increasingly attractive
political venue in a polarized, hyper-competitive political environment. Hopefully
this research sheds more light on this particular choice.
Much of this research has focused its attention on the importance of place. Amer-
ican federalism, both in the courts and in the larger society, creates an interesting
dynamic. On one hand, those in the federal government—the U.S. President, the
Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court—construct and build policy for the nation as
a whole. Yet Washington D.C. is but one political community—in the United States
there are tens of thousands of them—and these communities are different. The issues
might be the same, but the actors in these communities can be expected to respond
differently to them, given their unique political orientations. It makes sense to recog-
nize that state political interests are working to shape policy along with their national
counterparts in ways that reflect their political communities.
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This research has attempted to do exactly this. It has proposed that state polit-
ical interests are oriented towards their political communities and these orientations
ultimately affect their choices to turn towards the state or federal courts. Results of
this dissertation’s analyses suggest exactly this: State political interests turned to the
state courts at a higher rate than their national counterparts. Also, this research finds
that state political embeddedness is positively associated with the decision to enter
into the state courts, when other factors are taken into consideration in both eminent
domain and marriage equality, two political issues that are arguably very distinct
from each other, one being issue-driven and the other by material interests. This
finding hopefully gives a fuller picture of political interests and judicial federalism.
This finding also touches on research on the relationships between state and na-
tional political interests. Unfortunately, as previously noted, the research on state
and national political interests diverged. Political scientists used national political
interests to study theoretical issues, e.g., collective action or political subsystems. On
the other hand, researchers examined state political interests in comparative state
studies that often focused their attention on the makeup of state political communi-
ties. American policy, however, is dynamic and researchers have now taken a greater
interest in the relationships between state and national political interests, and their
unique policy contributions to political issues. A state political orientation affects
the choice of state or federal courts, but it is most likely also important in other
policy choices. For example, state political interests sometimes lobby in more than
one state. A weak state-level political orientation might very well be one factor in
this choice.
This research has also examined the effect of judicial ideology and state judicial
selection methods on the choice to enter into the state or federal courts. Previous
research has shown that these are two important factors in the decisions of judges. To
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date existing research, however, has not shown how ideology or judicial selection affect
the decisions made by political interests in the courts. While this research did not find
a positive interaction between judicial ideology and state judicial selection methods,
it did find a positive relationship between judicial ideology and the decision to litigate
at the state level in the marriage equality cases and a similar positive relationship
with state judicial selection and state courts in the eminent domain cases. This
connection is by no means certain. In the qualitative chapter some attorneys said
that their organizations were strategic; nonetheless the institutional structures of the
courts and ideologies of the states prevented venue shopping. In Texas for example a
liberal political interest would find it difficult to find a liberal judge. Nonetheless, the
evidence does suggest that these factors may influence the choices of actors other than
state judges. This is worth further investigation, and now is an ideal opportunity to
do so, with the development and refinement of interchangeable measures of ideology
for state and federal judges.
This research also developed a new model that explains why political interests—
not only those at the state level—turn to the federal and state courts. This model
included four factors: legal advantage, state political orientation, judicial ideology
and state judicial selection. The model produced similar results in both the marriage
equality and eminent domain cases. Would this model explain the decisions to enter
into the state or federal courts of political interests in other areas of law? This
is uncertain, and is an avenue for future research. Nonetheless, eminent domain
and marriage equality, as previously observed, are very different political issues, one,
arguably, being driven by ideology and the other by material interests. Thus there is
reason to believe then that this model is generalizable to other areas of law.
In addition, this research has examined localism in the courts. Political localism
remains largely underdeveloped. The early studies that touched on localism were
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mostly descriptive, noting that there existed a greater tendency for political interests
to register to lobby in more than one state. There are some more recent empirical
studies. Nonetheless, this area of research is akin to a town with a gas station,
souvenir shop and stretch of state highway running through the middle. If a small,
unincorporated settlement represents the study of localism and American politics, the
tree filled land behind the gas station represents localism and the American courts,
which remains untouched. While some may have visited or explored this area, there
are no visible signs of investigation. Localism and the American courts then represents
an important yet unexplored gap in the literature.
In examining state political orientation, this study has made a first effort at fill-
ing this gap. In doing so, this research has made a number of important findings
and perhaps opened future avenues for research. One finding is that state political
interests are very unlikely to enter into courts that lack jurisdiction over the home
state. Approximately 10% of the sample of state interest group activity in the courts
showed extraterritorial legal actions. This statistic is similar to the rate of out-of-state
lobbying registrations that were observed by previous research. Yet this rate may be
far less, given that this study’s sample did not include institutions, e.g., corpora-
tions, businesses and religions, which research has shown have a strong state political
orientation. These finding argue strongly for an in-state political orientation.
This research has also investigated both qualitatively and quantitatively why state
political interests enter into courts that lack legal jurisdiction over their home states.
The research approaches gave slightly different results. In the qualitative research,
the linkages between out-of-state legal actions and contributing factors such as par-
ticipation, state political density, and judicial ideology were not those seen in the
quantitative analysis. Nonetheless, two factors stand apart in both analyses: mem-
bership vs. non-membership organization and purposive vs. material orientations.
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The groups that enter into out of state courts seem to often have two qualities:
First these organizations are often purposive, advocating for a political cause rather
than material interests. Second, these interests often do not have members. There
are a number of reasons why the groups that enter into out of state courts have these
qualities. For one, these groups are most likely more willing to take political risks,
and the leaders are most likely able to take these risks because there are no members
to question the actions taken by the leaders. For a member of a state organization,
investing time and resources into a venue where there is no direct in state benefit
might appear to be a waste of limited time and resources, but one that is more easily
taken without the oversight of members.
Two, holding a purposive orientation, a political victory in a different state might
carry the same or close to the same value as one in the home state. The Sierra Club
was founded in 1892 to protect the Sierra Nevada, a range of mountains lying wholly
within the state of California, The organization was then at the time a state organi-
zation. The organization nonetheless strongly advocated for the creation of Mount
Rainier and Glacier National Parks, both outside of the home state of California Fox
(1981). Purposive state organizations then value out of state political victories and
this ostensibly inspires out of state political actions, including those taken in the
courts.
This research also suggests that political interests decide to enter into out of state
courts in different ways. A leader of one political interest emphasized the relationship
between state level political interests that were members of a federated partnership.
Consequently these federated partnerships operate laterally as well as vertically, with
information and resources being shared between partners that operate at the same
level. A second leader emphasized the spillover effects of policy in other states and
at the federal level. It would seem that state political interests also enter into the
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politics of other states when these groups perceive that policy changes in these states
will ultimately change policy in their home state. California is often described as
a “bellwether” state, as its policies often become the policies of the United States.
It would then come as little surprise that state political interests in South Carolina
and Louisiana, as well as many others, entered into the California courts during the
marriage equality controversy.
7.2 Future Research
As touched on briefly in the previous section, this dissertation opens a number
of different avenues for future research. This dissertation brought together research
in both public policy and judicial politics. This research contributes towards both
subfields. It also provides a platform for future research on political interests and
the courts, an area of American politics that may become increasingly active and
important in the future.
Within judicial politics, as noted, this research found a statistically significant
relationship between ideology, state judicial selection and the decision to enter into out
of state courts. Previous research has not found these connections. In judicial politics,
much of the research has given its attention to how these factors influence the choices
that judges make. Nonetheless, in the courts, there are other actors. Ultimately, the
judicial politics subfield will need to consider how these influential factors affect the
choices that other actors make. These findings merit further consideration.
This is now an ideal time to begin considering these questions. The measures of
judicial ideology have become increasingly sophisticated. In addition, these measures
are comparable. The ideology of a state supreme court justice can now be considered
alongside the ideology of a U.S. Supreme Court justice or federal circuit judge. These
measures, however, are not perfect. Good data still do not exist for state judges in
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the appellate and trial courts, as well as for federal district judges. These data will
most likely become available in the near future. It should also be noted that these
measures are directly comparable with those of groups, as well as elected officials.
Researchers will then have the opportunity to examine ideology and its impact on
the different actors in a way that is much more descriptive and complete.
This dissertation also introduces research possibilities in public policy. As noted,
the literature on state and national political interests has diverged. Both state and
national interests, however, are active at shaping policy concurrently both at the
national and state levels, as seen in this dissertation. Future research will continue
to show the ways in which national and state political interests contribute to policy
making. It will better describe how state and national political interests are similar,
but also different. Research in the last decade (e.g., Baumgartner, Gray and Lowery
2009) has already pointed future research in this direction.
In this research, the state political interests showed a state political orientation,
which was separate and distinct from their counterparts in Washington D.C. Prior re-
search has shown that national and state political interests are similar. This research,
however, suggests that while national and state political interests may be similar in
some ways, they are dissimilar in others, many of them important. For example, state
political orientation was positively linked with the decision by interests to enter into
in state courts at a much higher rate than their national counterparts.
The study of political interests and judicial federalism merits future research of
its own. As American politics becomes increasingly polarized and contentious it is
not unreasonable to conclude that political interests will seek out alternate political
venues, the state courts not being an exception. This research, however, can be made
more complete. There are a number of ways that this research can be improved upon.
For one, future research can examine legal areas other than eminent domain and
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marriage equality. American politics is not lacking in legal controversies and there
exists a myriad of legal topics, which researchers can easily access through Westlaw
and other legal databases. The only requirement is that the state or federal courts
should be able to decide these cases on the basis of either state or federal law. Ob-
viously, if a case can only be decided on the basis of state law then there exists no
option of turning to the federal courts. Prior to data collection, this research consid-
ered a number of different legal areas that include marijuana legalization, abortion,
pornography and religious liberty. 1
Future research will hopefully also be able to examine the data in ways that are
more complete. For example, this research considered entrances into the courts as
equivalent acts. Other researchers have also adopted this approach in their quantita-
tive analyses of interest groups and the courts, (e.g., Olson 1990). Yet legal actions
are not equivalent. Participating in an amicus brief, for example, does not entail the
investment of time or resources that sponsoring a test case does. Hopefully future
research will be better able to consider the level of involvement. Most political in-
terests, as described earlier, participate in amicus briefs, so future research may have
difficulty in finding enough observations for the quantitative study of direct partici-
pation or test cases difficult. Perhaps better data will facilitate research that better
captures the different strategies with multiple groups in multiple cases.
Political interests employ varied strategies. These groups also play different roles
in cases. Some groups assume leadership roles, coordinating and directing the move-
ment of cases through the courts. Other groups assist these groups in their efforts.
Other groups enter into cases on their own, independent of the consent of the leaders.
1These are all ”social“ issues. In retrospect this study should have considered alternatives to em-
inent domain as its economic region of law. These cases might include workplace and environmental
regulations, which are governed by both federal and state law. Any type of business-regulation pol-
icy where there is both a federal and state regulatory role (e.g., insurance, banking) might also be
candidates.
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These groups are often referred to as “rogue litigants.” Unfortunately, large data sets
fail to capture these types of dynamics. Future research on political interests in the
courts, however, will hopefully be able to do exactly this: capture the group actions,
but also see these actions in a larger context. This will give a much more complete
and accurate picture.
Future research should also focus its attention on the changing American fed-
eralism, not only in the courts but with executive and legislative branches as well.
Political researchers are now giving much effort and time to polarization, and under-
standably so. As the parties drift apart ideologically, groups compete more fiercely.
Ostensibly, these groups will seek out alternative political venues, particularly when
other groups control the institutions that control power. The states themselves ar-
guably represent an important outside venue. Both Republicans and Democrats have
sought out the states as policy-making venues. For example, under President Ronald
Reagan, the federal government gave federal dollars directly to the states in block
grants as a way to end liberal programs. Liberals, on the other hand, have turned
to the states with U.S. drug policy, with many states in recent years having adopted
liberal measures that often are at odds with federal laws.
The state courts might also become increasingly important political venues. State
judges, unlike their federal counterparts, can interpret both federal and state laws.
Groups might seek out a state court because they believe that the judges will fa-
vorably interpret federal law. In the marriage equality controversy, for example, the
Southern courts did not interpret the U.S. Constitution as liberally as did the courts
in California. Yet, the interpretation of federal law is not the only advantage, there
is also state law. Clearly, the U.S. Constitution is the ultimate authority, the “law
of the land,” yet the boundaries between state and federal authority, like most legal
controversies, are a “matter of interpretation.”
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It is unclear how American judicial federalism will evolve. Time will ultimately
decide that. The signs, the tea leaves, however, point in the direction of increased
competition and contestation in the state courts. Future research in this area will aid
our understanding not only in the topic that this dissertation has chosen, but also
the nature of power in America and the future of politics and conflict in the America
that has yet to come.
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General
1. Can you describe the origins or your organization? Why was it created? What
are its purposes?
2. Would you call your organization a state and not a national interest group?
3. If yes, can you give some specific examples of how your organization has
participated in state politics?
Purposive vs. Material Orientation
1. Would you say that your organization pursues its political goals or protects
the material interests of those it represents more?
2. Can you give any specific examples of this?
3. Is an out-of-state political victory as valuable as an in-state political victory?
Why?
Participation
1. Is your organization more likely to enter into political venues where
participation from other political organizations is high?
2. Do your members (formal or informal) expect that your organization
participate in high-profile issues?
Density and Diversity
1. In your state are there organizations that are like yours? Can you name a few?
2. If yes, do you compete with these similar organizations for members (if open
membership) or financial backers? Can you give some examples of this?
3. Do you see your state as having some, or quite a few important issue areas
that interest groups organize around?
Courts
1. Does your organization have in-house attorneys? Does your organization hire
private attorneys? If yes, are your attorneys’ offices inside or outside of your
state?
2. In your opinion is your organization strategic about the courts where it
pursues its policy goals? Would you agree that picking a court that agrees with
your organization?s political values is important? What about a court where
the judges are elected and the state voters are sympathetic to your cause?
Out of State Legal Actions
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1. My data shows that your organization has/has not participated in out-of-state
court cases. (If yes)
2. Why does your organization enter into out-of-state courts?
3. In these specific cases, why did your organization enter into this out-of-state
or federal court that did not have jurisdiction over your home state?
4. (If no) Would your organization ever pursue its goals in out-of-state courts?
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This data set includes observations of interest group activity for 20-year periods in
two legal areas, eminent domain and marriage equality. This research took these ob-
servations fromWestlaw, an online legal data service. In the data each row represents
an act of participation by an interest group, or what may possibly be categorized as
an interest group depending on the typology used. There are 3640 observations of
interest group activity spanning 335 unique case groups. These data include obser-
vations of both appellate and trial courts, both in the federal and state or territorial
courts. The sample includes interest group participation in all of the U.S. states and
territories. Below is a description of some of the important variables used in this
research.
Variable: State or Federal Court
The United States has both federal or state courts. Litigants must pick which court
system they wish to take legal actions in. The variable is dichotomous, coded 1 or
0, with 1 representing the state courts. In this study, this represents the dependent
variable.
Variable: Group or Political Interest
For political scientists, the phrase “interest group” often has a specific connotation.
Usually this phrase describes membership-based political organizations. There ex-
ists however in American politics politically active groups without members such as
public interest law firms. This variable distinguishes between these types of groups,
with 1 indicating a non-membership “political interest.” Broadly speaking, this re-
search uses the phrase ”political interests” to refer to both of these types together.
In the statistical analyses however, ”political interests” indicates a non-membership
organization.
Variable: Purposive or Material Interest
Some political scientists categorize political interests as purposive or material (e.g.,
Kobylka 1991). While ‘material political interests represent the property interests of
their members, purposive interests work towards purposive goals. An organization
that advocated for the legalization of same sex marriage, for example, would be
considered a “purposive group.” This variable is also a dummy variable, with 1
representing a purposive interest.
Variable: Participation
Some political scientists have argued that competition drives participation in politics,
with political interests turning to venues with high competition and visibility (e.g.,
Holyoke 2003). This study constructed this variable by adding the acts of legal
participation in a case family, which is a legal case and its related cases.
Variable: Federated
Many political interests hold partnerships with organizations at either the national
or state levels. This research categorized national political interests as federated if
they have state chapters or close ties with independent state organizations and vice
versa with state political interests. This research made this determination two ways:
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First, state chapters of national organizations generally had the name of the state
or geographical location in their title, e.g., the “San Francisco Bay Chapter” of the
Sierra Club. Second, this research looked at the political interests’ websites, which
generally show their alliances and affiliates.
Variables: Density and Diversity
Virginia Gray and David Lowery have researched the creation and destruction of po-
litical interests in the states (e.g., Gray and Lowery 2000). This research is generally
descriptive of the makeup of political interests in the states themselves, but political
scientists have used this research to describe why political interests take political ac-
tions.Wolak et al. (2002), for example, examine the relationship between density and
out-of-state lobbying registrations. Much of their research focuses on two variables:
density and diversity. This research follows Gray and Lowery’s operationalization
of these variables. Political density represents the number of lobbying registrations
in a state in a year. Diversity, on the other hand, is taken from a Herfindahl index,
which measures the concentration of political interests across the different guilds.
This is an inverse measure.
Variables: Ideological Advantage
Judicial ideology may incentivize the choices that political interests make in the
courts. This research constructed this variable two different ways. In Chapter
Three, this study labeled out-of-state court actions as ideologically advantageous
if a group entered into an out-of-state court and it was a closer ideological match.
In Chapters Five and Six, this dissertation categorized a legal action as ideologi-
cally advantageous if the state court was a closer ideological match than the federal
alternative.
Variable: Judicial Selection
Judicial politics scholars have found that judicial selection methods influence the
decisions that judges make (e.g., Brace and Hall 1997). This research considers
whether state judicial selection methods contribute to the decisions that political
interests make. In Chapter Three, this research operationalized judicial selection as
a categorical variable, with partisan and non-partisan elections, Missouri plan and
legislative appointment. In Chapters Four and Five this research operationalized
judicial selection as a dummy variable, with 1 showing a partisan election.
Variable: Judicial Selection
Judicial politics scholars have found that judicial selection methods influence the
decisions that judges make (e.g., Brace and Hall 1997). This research considers
whether state judicial selection methods contribute to the decisions that political
interests make. In Chapter Three, this research operationalized judicial selection as
a categorical variable, with partisan and non-partisan elections, Missouri plan and
legislative appointment. In Chapters Four and Five this research operationalized
judicial selection as a dummy variable, with 1 showing a partisan election.
Variable: Legal Advantage
American law advantages the state or federal courts, and this advantage changes over
time. This research operationalized this variable by following the coding scheme that
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the U.S. Supreme court created in Michigan v. Long (1983), where the high court
declared that for a court to have decided a case on the basis of state law, the decision
should rest on state law. This research then looked for periods of time where the
courts ruled on the basis of federal or state law and coded this accordingly as a
dummy variable with 1 showing a state legal advantage.
Variable: State Political Orientation
This research assigned a 1 to state political interests and the state chapters of na-
tional political interests that took legal actions under their state title, e.g., the San
Francisco Bay Chapter of the Sierra Club.
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In categorizing cases as either having a state or federal judicial advantage, this
research made use of the test that the U.S. Supreme Court established in Michigan v.
Long (1983) to decide whether cases were decided on the basis of either state or federal
law. Consistent with the test, this research categorized cases as having a state judicial
advantage if the court decided the case on the basis of state law. This research then
sought out periods of time where state or federal law was advantaged and categorized
cases in these periods of time as having a state or federal advantage, as attorneys
cannot be certain the basis on which the courts will rule on an individual case. The
approach showed that the courts decided marriage equality cases on the basis of
state law until efforts to overturn California’s Proposition 8, a state constitutional
amendment prohibiting same sex marriage, on the basis of federal law. This research
found however that American courts decided eminent domain cases largely on the
basis of the protections given to private property by the Fifth Amendment in the U.S.
Constitution, so these cases were all labeled as having a federal judicial advantage.
Nonetheless, this categorization is somewhat quizzical following the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London (2004). American states can grant
greater protections than those given by the U.S Constitution, and this is exactly
what many states did in the wake of the public outcry following the Kelo v. City of
New London (2004) ruling, which gave state governments the ability to seize private
property for economic development. By 2009, 37 states had introduced new eminent
domain legislation, often granting greater protection to private property(Lopez et al.
2009). California voters, for example, passed Proposition 99, which prohibited state
and local governments from transferring ownership of a an owner-occupied residence
to a business or an individual (Office 2008).
These new laws however did not seem to produce the quantity of litigation that
one might initially expect. Chapter Two describes the difference between direct and
indirect condemnation, with direct condemnation addressing the taking of private
property and indirect the compensation for private property. The data that this
research collected show that most of cases following the Kelo decision did not give
their attention to the taking of property but rather the compensation that government
was expected to provide as a consequence of its laws, regulations and actions. Because
the Kelo ruling speaks most directly to the taking of property and this is what the
states acted to protect, it makes sense then that this research found that most cases
were decided on the basis of federal law because most of these cases dealt with just
compensation rather than the meaning of the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment
“public use” phrase.
For those readers who are not convinced that there continued to exist a federal
judicial advantage post Kelo it may be helpful to show the regression results with
these cases marked as having a state legal advantage. The table below reconstructs
the regression found in Table 6.2 for eminent domain results. There are three models.
The first shows the original regression. The second assigns state legal advantage to
direct condemnation cases following the Kelo decision, while the third model assigns
state legal advantage to all cases post Kelo
In Table C1, Models 2 and 3 emulate the results from the original regression.
State political orientation and partisan elections achieve statistical significance in all
of the models. Legal advantage reaches statistical significance in the second model, as
in the original regression, but not the third. Regardless, making adjustments to state
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Table C.1: State Judicial Advantage in Eminent Domain Post Kelo
Variables Model 1: Original Model 2: Direct Model 3: Direct & Indirect
Coefficient
(Error)
Coefficient
(Error)
Coefficient
(Error)
State
Orientation
1.95*
(0.23)
2.05*
(0.24)
1.98*
(0.23)
Legal
Advantage
3.67*
(0.72)
0.38
(0.32)
Ideological
Advantage
0.45
(0.41)
0.20*
(0.44)
0.38
(0.41)
Partisan
Election
2.08*
(0.27)
1.83*
(0.29)
2.14*
(0.28)
Advantage x
Election
0.18
(0.68)
-0.50
(0.82)
0.17
(0.68)
N 855 855 855
AIC 564 530 563
*p ≤ .05
*These regressions test the model that this research believes to how the most explanatory
power of why political interests turn to the state and federal courts. The different models,
however, show different assignments of state legal advantage in eminent domain cases post
Kelo v. City of New London. Model 1 shows the regression in Table 6.2. Model 2 assigns
state legal advantage to direct condemnation cases following the Kelo decision. Model 3
gives state legal advantage to all cases following the Kelo decision.
legal advantage does not substantially alter the effects of state political orientation
and the other causal factors that this dissertation has attempted to develop.
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